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INTRODUCTION 
early everything a lawyer, judge, businessperson, or public 
official does is controlled, or at the very least significantly 
affected, by a statute. Our legal system, as Judge Guido Calabresi 
colorfully put it, has become “statutorified.”1 That being the case, it 
makes sense to understand the law that governs the interpretation of 
statutes. The Oregon appellate courts have devoted a great deal of 
attention over the past twenty-five years to developing and applying a 
predictable set of rules of interpretation. In fact, Oregon’s development 
of—and, for the most part, adherence to—a set of interpretive 
conventions has garnered national attention.2 
This Article is my attempt to organize that body of law in a helpful 
way, offering some historical background, conceptual underpinnings, 
and explanatory examples of the rules that the Oregon courts regularly 
apply. Included as well is a fair amount of editorial commentary. As an 
appellate court judge for more than twenty-five years, and as a teacher 
of law school classes on the subject of statutory construction for an 
even longer period of time, I’ve developed my own views about many 
of these rules. They are not etched in stone. They represent choices that 
courts make. And those choices are, in nearly all cases, debatable. 
Acknowledging the contestability of the rules of construction makes 
clear that there is always room for reconsideration and improvement. 
1 GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 (1982). 
2 See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, The States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: 
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 YALE L.J. 1750, 1776 
(2010) (Oregon statutory construction cases “offer a perhaps unparalleled example of a 
judicially imposed, consistently applied interpretive regime for statutory cases.”). What 
makes Oregon so unusual is the fact that its courts regard the rules of statutory construction 
as law. Scholars refer to this as “methodological stare decisis.” Id. at 1822–24. It turns out 
that a number of courts—notably the United States Supreme Court—do not consider 
themselves bound by any particular rules of construction. Id. at 1823. This has prompted 
criticism that a failure of courts to agree on binding rules of construction “wastes court and 
litigant resources,” eliminates the incentive for legislatures to coordinate their actions with 
judicial rules of interpretation, and makes judicial decisions seem more result oriented. Id. 
at 1767; see also Sydney Foster, Should Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory 
Interpretation Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 1863 (2008). Not all scholars agree. Some like 
the idea that courts like the United States Supreme Court do not give stare decisis effect to 
statutory interpretation methodology. See, e.g., Evan J. Criddle & Glen Staszewski, Against 
Methodological Stare Decisis, 102 GEO. L.J. 1573 (2014); Ethan J. Leib & Michael Serota, 
The Costs of Consensus in Statutory Construction, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 47 (2010), 
http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-costs-of-consensus-in-statutory-construction. 
N 
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The Article proceeds in three parts. Part I begins with some 
background—a brief historical introduction to how the Oregon courts 
have approached the subject of statutory construction, followed by a 
more detailed examination of the seminal cases of Portland General 
Electric Co. v. Bureau of Labor & Industries3 (PGE) and State v. 
Gaines,4 which together set out the analytical framework for statutory 
construction in Oregon. Part II describes the rules of statutory 
construction that are applied within the PGE and Gaines framework, 
including the goal of determining “legislative intent” and the various 
tools and sources courts commonly employ to accomplish that. Part III 
then addresses several special problems involving the interpretation of 
statutes in Oregon, including the interpretation of statutes adopted by 
initiative, the interpretation of statutes previously interpreted by 
administrative agencies, and the interpretation of federal statutes by 
state courts. 
I 
BACKGROUND 
A. Early Statutory Construction
Courts have been interpreting statutes as long as there have been 
statutes to interpret. In the Anglo-American tradition, judicially 
developed rules of construction date back at least to the early fourteenth 
century.5 In the broadest of terms, early statutory construction 
borrowed from canon law the idea that those who enacted a law were 
best suited to interpret it authoritatively.6 That fit well with early 
English practice; the members of Parliament who enacted statutes were 
also the judges who interpreted them. Thus, Chief Justice Hengham 
could famously declare, “Do not gloss the statute, for we know better 
than you; we made it.”7 
3 317 Or. 606, 859 P.2d 1143 (1993). 
4 346 Or. 160, 206 P.3d 1042 (2009). 
5 The classic study of early English interpretive traditions is THEODORE F.T. 
PLUCKNETT, STATUTES & THEIR INTERPRETATION IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE 
FOURTEENTH CENTURY (Harold Dexter Hazeltine ed., Cambridge Studies in Legal History 
1922). 
6 On the influence of canon law on the development of statutory construction, see 
generally Hans W. Baade, The Casus Omissus: A Pre-History of Statutory Analogy, 20 
SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 45, 59–62 (1994). 
7 Quoted in PLUCKNETT, supra note 5, at 50. For a nice introduction to the role of equity 
in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English law, see generally William S. Blatt, The 
History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in Form and Substance, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 
799 (1985). 
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In the succeeding centuries, though, a system of courts developed 
separately from the legislature. And as the legislative and judicial 
functions separated, ideas about the interpretation of statutes markedly 
changed. In brief, statutory construction became much more strictly 
textual. Courts lost interest in the subjective intentions of Parliament 
and focused instead on the meaning of the words of its enactments.8 By 
the middle of the eighteenth century, resort to extrinsic sources—
records of parliamentary proceedings that we would now classify as 
“legislative history”—was forbidden.9 Although courts occasionally 
mentioned the “spirit” or “reason” of a statute as a guiding interpretive 
principle, such things were to be gleaned from the words of the statute 
alone. At the same time, English courts reserved for themselves a 
measure of leeway to consider matters of fairness and equity. 
In the middle of the eighteenth century, Blackstone neatly 
summarized the state of affairs: statutes are to be interpreted by the 
“signs” of the legislature’s will. “And these signs are either the words, 
the context, the subject matter, the effects and consequences, or the 
spirit and reason of the law.”10 No mention of extrinsic materials. 
Blackstone did allow judges, on occasion, to weigh equitable 
considerations when the legislature did not anticipate a particular 
problem.11 The authority to do that, though, was to be exercised 
judiciously. Otherwise, Blackstone explained, courts would “set the 
judicial power above that of the legislature, which would be subversive 
of all government.”12 
8 See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the 
“Judicial Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 999 
(2001); John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 
47–56 (2001). 
9 The rule against consulting legislative history in England lasted until 1992, when the 
House of Lords reversed the longstanding prohibition in Pepper v. Hart, [1992] UKHL 3, 
[1993] AC 593 (appeal taken from Eng.). See generally Michael P. Healy, Legislative Intent 
and Statutory Interpretation in England and the United States: An Assessment of the Impact 
of Pepper v. Hart, 35 STAN. J. INT’L L. 231 (1999); William S. Jordan III, Legislative History 
and Statutory Interpretation: The Relevance of English Practice, 29 U.S.F.L. REV. 1 (1994). 
10 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *59. 
11 “[I]t is necessary that, when the general decrees of the law come to be applied to 
particular cases, there should be somewhere a power vested of excepting those 
circumstances, which (had they been foreseen) the legislator himself would have excepted.” 
Id. at *61. 
12 Id. at *91. 
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American judicial views of statutory construction were heavily 
influenced by Blackstone and the English tradition.13 That only makes 
sense because colonial courts before the Revolution were steeped in 
English common law.14 But, at least after the Revolution, not everyone 
embraced the equitable authority of courts to depart from the text of a 
statute, which seemed dangerous to some. As Thomas Jefferson 
commented in 1785, “Relieve the judges from the rigour of text law, 
and permit them, with pretorian discretion, to wander into it’s [sic] 
equity, and the whole legal system becomes uncertain.”15  
A sort of blended approach resulted, one that sought to determine 
legislative intent with an emphasis on a statute’s text. At the same time, 
it allowed some amelioration of the potentially inequitable results of 
literal interpretation through the application of certain canons of 
construction that had come to be accepted over the years.16 
Early Oregon judicial decisions followed that pattern, searching for 
the legislative intent, but finding it by means of an analysis of the 
statute’s text. There was rarely a mention of “equity” and never a 
reference to anything like what we would now refer to as “legislative 
history.”17  
B. ORS Chapter 174
In the early to mid-nineteenth century, a codification “movement” 
developed, calling for a shift from the common law to statutes in a wide 
variety of areas of the law.18 I put the word “movement” in quotes 
because there’s much scholarly debate about whether there was 
anything so coherent as a single “movement” and whether, instead, the 
urge to codify actually was a result of different efforts with different 
13 For an introduction to the history of American statutory construction decisions in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, see generally WILLIAM D. POPKIN, STATUTES IN 
COURT: THE HISTORY AND THEORY OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (1999).  
14 On the relationship between the English common law and early American legal 
analysis, see generally WILLIAM E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: 
THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY 1760–1830 (1975). See 
also John Choon Yoo, Note, Marshall’s Plan: The Early Supreme Court and Statutory 
Interpretation, 101 YALE L.J. 1607 (1992). 
15 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Phillip Mazzei (Nov. 1785), in 9 THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 67, 71 (Julian Boyd ed. 1954).  
16 See generally Manning, supra note 8, at 105–07. 
17 For a summary of nineteenth-century Oregon statutory construction cases, see 
generally Jack L. Landau, The Intended Meaning of “Legislative Intent” and Its 
Implications for Statutory Construction in Oregon, 76 OR. L. REV. 47, 88–103 (1997). 
18 See generally CHARLES M. COOK, THE AMERICAN CODIFICATION MOVEMENT: A 
STUDY OF ANTEBELLUM LEGAL REFORM (1981). 
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causes.19 It’s an interesting debate, but not one especially important for 
my purposes. What is important for my purposes is that this interest in 
codification prompted the drafting of “codes” of statutory construction, 
which distilled various principles of interpretation that the courts had 
developed over the centuries. In 1850, for instance, a proposed New 
York Code of Civil Procedure included references to proper rules of 
statutory construction. Among the proposed rules was a statement that 
“[i]n the construction of a statute, the intention of the legislature . . . is 
to be pursued if possible; and when a general and particular provision 
are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former. So a particular 
intent will control a general one, that is inconsistent with it.”20 
Although never adopted by the New York legislature, the proposed 
New York Code proved influential, ultimately being adopted in one 
form or another by a number of other states, including Iowa, Indiana, 
and California.21 
Around the same time, the Oregonian territorial legislature 
appointed a commission to collect, codify, and modify existing laws of 
the state into a single code.22 In the process, the commission borrowed 
from the proposed New York Code. In particular, the commission 
cribbed the statutory construction provisions verbatim. Shortly after 
statehood, the legislature again appointed a commission to update a 
single code of state statutes. Headed by Matthew P. Deady, the 
commission retained the provisions concerning the construction of 
statutes. The code that resulted—known to this day as the “Deady 
Code”—included the following guidelines on interpreting statutes: 
19 For an introduction to the debate, see generally Robert W. Gordon, Book Review, 36 
VAND. L. REV. 431 (1981) (reviewing COOK, supra note 18). 
20 DAVID DUDLEY FIELD ET AL., THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE STATE OF 
NEW YORK § 1692 (1850), reprinted in 1 NEW YORK FIELD CODES 1850–1865, at 707 
(Lawbook Exchange 1998) (known as the “Field Code”). 
21 See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 193–99 (3d 
ed. 2005) (providing an overview of the Field Code and its influence); Mildred v. Coe & 
Lewis W. Morse, Chronology of the Development of the David Dudley Field Code, 27 
CORNELL L.Q. 238, 239–45 (1942) (summarizing development of the code); Henry Upson 
Sims, The Problem of Reforming Procedure, 21 YALE L.J. 215, 216 (1912) (discussing 
adoption of the 1848 New York code by nearly two dozen states). 
22 For an interesting history of the development of the territorial code and the Deady 
Code, see generally Robert N. Peters, The “First” Oregon Code: Another Look at Deady’s 
Role, 82 OR. HIST. Q. 383 (1981). Peters suggests that Deady perhaps gets too much credit, 
as the later code borrowed much from the 1853 territorial code, which James K. Kelly 
principally authored. See id. 
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Sec. 684. In the construction of a statute . . . the office of the judge is 
simply to ascertain and declare what is, in terms or in substance, 
contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what 
has been inserted; and, where there are several provisions or 
particulars, such construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give 
effect to all. 
Sec. 685. In the construction of a statute, the intention of the 
legislature . . . is to be pursued if possible; and when a general and 
particular provision are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the 
former. So a particular intent shall control a general one that is 
inconsistent with it.23 
In succeeding years, the legislature added other rules of statutory 
construction. For example, it added one governing severability and 
another governing the effect of repealing a statute that repeals a statute. 
(Does it have the effect of reviving the original? According to Oregon 
Revised Statutes (ORS) 174.080, the answer is, no.)24 And, with the 
wholesale revision of Oregon statutes in 1953, the legislature’s rules of 
construction were codified in ORS chapter 174, where they have 
resided ever since.25 
23 THE ORGANIC AND OTHER GENERAL LAWS OF OREGON: TOGETHER WITH THE 
NATIONAL CONSTITUTION, AND OTHER PUBLIC ACTS AND STATUTES 1843–1872, ch. VIII, 
§§ 684–85 (1874).
24 OR. REV. STAT. § 174.080 (2017).
25 Before 1953, Oregon statutes were periodically compiled and updated by different
individuals (often judges), who usually worked from the original Deady Code. These 
individuals updated previous compilations by removing any provisions that had been 
repealed, substituting amendments, and inserting new enactments, sometimes with 
commentary. Deady himself did a compilation in 1866. THE ORGANIC AND OTHER 
GENERAL LAWS OF OREGON 1845–64 (M.P. Deady ed., 1866). He and Lafayette Lane 
updated that compilation in 1874, followed by William Lair Hill’s compilations in 1887, 
THE CODES AND GENERAL LAWS OF OREGON (William Lair Hill ed., 1887), and 1892, THE 
CODES AND GENERAL LAWS OF OREGON (William Lair Hill ed., 1892). Charles Bollinger 
and William Cotton prepared a new compilation in 1902. THE CODES AND STATUTES OF 
OREGON (Charles B. Bellinger & William W. Cotton eds., 1902). Eight years later, William 
Paine Lord, along with Richard Ward Montague, prepared a new compilation, known as 
“Lord’s Oregon Laws.” LORD’S OREGON LAWS (William Paine Lord & Richard Ward 
Montague eds., 1910). Conrad Patrick Olson prepared a new version in 1920. OREGON 
LAWS (Conrad Patrick Olson ed., 1920). Ten years later, an “Oregon Code Annotated” was 
prepared under the supervision of the Oregon Supreme Court. OREGON CODE (1930). The 
court compiled and annotated another version in 1940, known as the “Oregon Compiled 
Laws Annotated,” or “OCLA.” OREGON COMPILED LAWS ANNOTATED (1940). In 1949, 
the legislature chartered a wholesale revision of the state’s statutes, which ultimately 
resulted in the “Oregon Revised Statutes,” or “ORS.” For details about the history of the 
codification of Oregon statutes, see generally Charles G. Howard, Editorial, The Oregon 
Revised Statutes, 33 OR. L. REV. 58 (1953). 
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C. One Hundred Years of Latitude
During the century following statehood, statutory construction 
decisions followed no consistent pattern. In the late nineteenth century, 
Oregon Supreme Court opinions tended to be quite textual in emphasis. 
But the court also began to look beyond the text of a statute to its 
legislative history. The first time the court did so was in 1892.26 
After that, though, the court followed no consistent rule about 
precisely when it was appropriate to consult such extrinsic evidence of 
legislative intent. Well into the twentieth century, it invoked the 
traditional rule that a statute must be ambiguous before there is license 
to consult legislative history.27 At the same time, the court just as often 
resorted to legislative history without any mention of ambiguity.28 In 
other cases, the court hedged, saying that it may be appropriate to 
examine legislative history to confirm its interpretation of an otherwise 
unambiguous statute.29 
In a similar vein, sometimes the court would resort to dictionary 
definitions as an aid to interpreting a statute.30 At other times, the court 
complained that statutory construction “is not done by consulting 
dictionary definitions of words.”31 
The court occasionally cited the legislature’s codified rules of 
statutory construction, but not often. Although I haven’t attempted an 
actual empirical analysis, my impression is that early Oregon statutory 
construction cases ignored chapter 174.32 In some cases, the court 
openly departed from those rules, declaring that they were not to be 
26 State ex rel. Baker v. Payne, 22 Or. 335, 29 P. 787 (1892). 
27 See, e.g., Morasch v. State of Oregon, 261 Or. 299, 301, 493 P.2d 1364, 1365 (1972) 
(“When a statute is ambiguous, we are authorized to turn to its history in order to determine 
the legislative intent.” (citation omitted)); Berry Transport v. Heltzel, 202 Or. 161, 166, 272 
P.2d 965, 967 (1954) (extrinsic sources of legislative intent allowed “only in cases where
the language used in a statute is ambiguous and uncertain”).
28 See, e.g., State v. Leathers, 271 Or. 236, 242, 531 P.2d 901, 904 (1975) (“The primary 
purpose of statutory construction is to ascertain the legislative intent. In this endeavor, we 
may give due consideration to legislative history.”). 
29 See, e.g., State v. Trenary, 316 Or. 172, 178 n.5, 850 P.2d 356, 359 n.5 (1993) 
(“Although we need not resort to legislative history, it confirms our conclusion.”). 
30 See, e.g., Stephens v. Bohlman, 314 Or. 344, 351, 838 P.2d 600, 604 (1992) (citing 
Replace, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1976)). 
31 Davidson v. Or. Gov’t Ethics Comm’n, 300 Or. 415, 420, 712 P.2d 87, 91 (1985). 
32 For example, from 1953 to 1993, the court cited ORS 174.020—which declares the 
foundational principle that the object of statutory construction is to ascertain legislative 
intent—in only forty-three cases, nearly all of them after 1980. Similarly, during the same 
period, the court cited ORS 174.010—which states that courts must take statutes as they are 
enacted—in only fifty-three cases, again, most of them after 1980.  
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taken too literally. As the court commented in Johnson v. Star 
Machinery Co., “The rule requiring the court to follow the plain 
meaning of seemingly unambiguous language is not inflexible and not 
without exceptions.”33 
D. PGE and the Return to Plain Meaning
In 1993, the Oregon Supreme Court determined that some 
housecleaning was in order. To do that, it selected PGE v. Bureau of 
Labor & Industries,34 a case involving the interpretation of the state’s 
parental leave law, ORS 659.360(3). That law states that an employee 
“shall be entitled to utilize any accrued . . . sick leave . . . during the 
parental leave.”35 One of PGE’s employees was the parent of a 
newborn child and asked his employer for a total of twelve weeks of 
parental leave. He asked that he be permitted to use as part of that 
twelve weeks of parental leave his accrued sick leave, regardless of 
whether he was sick. PGE declined the employee’s request on the 
ground that the collective bargaining agreement governing his 
employment provided that sick leave could be used only if an employee 
actually was sick. The employee argued that the statute trumped the 
agreement in providing that he had the right to use any accrued sick 
leave during parental leave. The employee filed a complaint with the 
Bureau of Labor and Industries (BOLI), which took his side of the 
dispute, concluding that the statute controlled and was not limited by 
anything in the agreement.36 
A sharply divided Oregon Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, 
affirmed.37 The majority sided with BOLI, concluding that the statute 
unambiguously provided that the sick leave could be used regardless of 
any conditions imposed by the collective bargaining agreement.38 The 
33 270 Or. 694, 703–04, 530 P.2d 53, 57 (1974). Compare that with, for example, State 
ex rel. Everding v. Simon, 20 Or. 365, 373–74, 26 P. 170, 172–73 (1891) (“Courts cannot 
supply omissions in legislation nor afford relief because they are supposed to exist. . . . 
‘[W]hen a provision is left out of a statute, either by design or mistake of the legislature, the 
courts have no power to supply it.’” (citation omitted) (quoting Hobbs v. McLean, 117 U.S. 
567, 579 (1886)), and Monaco v. U.S. Fidelity & Guar. Co., 275 Or. 183, 188, 550 P.2d 422, 
424 (1976) (“This court cannot correct clear and unambiguous language for the legislature 
so as to better serve what the court feels was, or should have been, the legislature’s intent.” 
(citation omitted)).  
34 317 Or. 606, 859 P.2d 1143 (1993). 
35 OR. REV. STAT. § 659.360(3) (1993). 
36 PGE, 317 Or. at 608–09, 859 P.2d at 1144–45. 
37 PGE v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 116 Or. App. 356, 842 P.2d 419 (1992) (en banc). 
38 Id. at 359–60, 842 P.2d at 420–21. 
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Chief Judge dissented, concluding that the statute unambiguously said 
quite the opposite, that sick leave can be used “during” parental leave, 
not “as” parental leave.39 Judge Edmonds also dissented, but he 
concluded that the wording of the statute did not clearly address the 
matter one way or the other. In his view, though, the legislative history 
favored PGE’s interpretation.40 
The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed, unanimously. After describing 
the facts of the case, the court delivered something of a tutorial on the 
basics of statutory construction in Oregon: 
In interpreting a statute, the court’s task is to discern the intent of 
the legislature. ORS 174.020. To do that, the court examines both the 
text and context of the statute. That is the first level of our 
analysis. . . . 
Also at the first level of analysis, the court considers the context 
of the statutory provision at issue, which includes other provisions of 
the same statute and other related statutes. Just as with the court’s 
consideration of the text of a statute, the court utilizes rules of 
construction that bear directly on the interpretation of the statutory 
provision in context. Some of those rules are mandated by statute, 
including, for example, the principles that, “where there are several 
provisions or particulars such construction is, if possible, to be 
adopted as will give effect to all,” ORS 174.010, and that “a particular 
intent shall control a general one that is inconsistent with it,” ORS 
174.020. Other such rules of construction are found in case law, 
including, for example, the rules that the use of a term in one section 
and not in another section of the same statute indicates a purposeful 
omission, and that use of the same term throughout a statute indicates 
that the term has the same meaning throughout the statute. 
If the legislature’s intent is clear from the above-described inquiry 
into text and context, further inquiry is unnecessary. 
If, but only if, the intent of the legislature is not clear from the text 
and context inquiry, the court will then move to the second level, 
which is to consider legislative history to inform the court’s inquiry 
into legislative intent. When the court reaches legislative history, it 
considers it along with text and context to determine whether all of 
those together make the legislative intent clear. If the legislative 
intent is clear, then the court’s inquiry into legislative intent and the 
meaning of the statute is at an end and the court interprets the statute 
to have the meaning so determined. 
If, after consideration of text, context, and legislative history the 
intent of the legislature remains unclear, then the court may resort to 
general maxims of statutory construction to aid in resolving the 
remaining uncertainty. Although some of those maxims of statutory 
39 Id. at 363–64, 842 P.2d at 423–24 (Joseph, C.J., dissenting). 
40 Id. at 364–65, 842 P.2d at 424 (Edmonds, J., dissenting). 
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construction may be statutory, see, e.g., ORS 174.030 (natural 
rights), others more commonly may be found in case law. Those 
include, for example, the maxim that, where no legislative history 
exists, the court will attempt to determine how the legislature would 
have intended the statute to be applied had it considered the issue.41 
Having thus described the rules of construction, the court turned to the 
issue at hand. In surprisingly quick fashion, the court concluded that 
the statute unambiguously entitled employees to use sick leave during 
parental leave, without any reference to a contrary agreement or 
employer policy. “We conclude,” the court held, “that the text and 
context of ORS 659.360(3) unambiguously allows an employee to use 
accrued leave . . . during the parental leave, even if the employee has 
not met the conditions of leave eligibility contained in an existing 
collective bargaining agreement.”42  
It’s worth making a number of observations about the Oregon 
Supreme Court’s opinion.  
First, the court’s tutorial on the rules of statutory construction came 
out of the blue. Nothing in the court’s prior case law signaled an interest 
in the subject. Nothing about the nature of the case itself remotely 
suggested that it was a likely candidate for a landmark decision about 
those rules. 
PGE was, if anything, an odd choice. The employee’s claim 
originally was filed with BOLI, the administrative agency charged with 
enforcing the statute at issue, and BOLI had authoritatively interpreted 
it in rendering its decision. Ordinarily, when an agency charged with 
enforcing a statute interprets it, that charge raises significant issues 
concerning the extent to which courts reviewing the agency 
interpretation must defer to that interpretation. And, in fact, several 
years earlier, in Springfield Education Association v. School District, 
the court took some pains to describe the circumstances under which 
courts are obliged to defer to the interpretations of administrative 
agencies.43 In PGE, however, the court appeared to have missed that 
point. There was no mention of Springfield or agency deference at all, 
which—as I’ll discuss in greater detail later—caused no small amount 
of confusion for several years following PGE.44  
41 PGE, 317 Or. at 610–12, 859 P.2d at 1146–47 (citations omitted) (quoting and citing 
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 174.010–.030 (1993)). 
42 Id. at 614, 859 P.2d at 1148. 
43 See 290 Or. 217, 221–31, 621 P.2d 547, 551–57 (1980). 
44 See infra text at notes 839–56. 
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Second, although PGE represented a curious vehicle, there could be 
little question that the court intended the decision to serve as a reference 
point for future statutory construction cases. After taking the trouble to 
catalog the various rules of statutory construction and organizing them 
into a three-step analytical process, the court proceeded to decide the 
case before it without any reference to those principles. The court’s 
actual decision in PGE was startlingly brief, barely more than a 
statement of a conclusion that the statute was “unambiguous.” Clearly, 
the court had not set out its catalog of statutory construction principles 
to explain the decision in PGE itself.  
Third, the court’s description of the rules of statutory construction 
did not so much announce new rules as organize existing rules into 
three groups and then sequence the way in which those rules applied. 
Under PGE, statutory construction analysis proceeded in three steps: 
First, an analysis of the text in context, along with relevant rules of 
textual analysis. If that analysis produces a clear picture of the 
legislature’s intention, stop. The analysis is at an end. “If, but only if,” 
the textual analysis comes up short, the court commanded, is it 
appropriate to proceed to a second analytical step—examination of the 
legislative history. If, but only if, that legislative history analysis comes 
up short, courts may then proceed to a third level of “general maxims” 
of construction to resolve the persistent ambiguity.  
Students of my legislation classes will no doubt recognize in the 
foregoing description a familiar pattern: What the court described in 
PGE is remarkably similar to the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-
century school of statutory construction known as “plain meaning,” 
famously represented by the United States Supreme Court’s decision 
in Caminetti v. United States.45 In that case, the Court declared that 
resort to legislative history or other extrinsic considerations cannot be 
permitted to alter the “plain” meaning of a statute’s text.46  
Fourth, and relatedly, the court in PGE described the principles of 
statutory construction as settled, if not obvious, matters. In truth, 
nothing was quite so settled, much less obvious.  
45 242 U.S. 470 (1917); see also Arthur W. Murphy, Old Maxims Never Die: The “Plain-
Meaning Rule” and Statutory Interpretation in the “Modern” Federal Courts, 75 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1299, 1300 (1975) (citing Caminetti as “vintage example” of the plain meaning
rule).
46 242 U.S. at 485 (“Where the language is plain and admits of no more than one 
meaning, the duty of interpretation does not arise, and the rules which are to aid doubtful 
meanings need no discussion.”). 
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For example, the court began its description of the rules of statutory 
construction with the declaration that “the court’s task is to discern the 
intent of the legislature.”47 Again, as students of my legislation classes 
could explain, there exists a wide spectrum of approaches to statutory 
construction, and ascertaining legislative intent occupies only one point 
along that spectrum.48 Textualists, for instance, object to the very idea 
of ascertaining legislative intent, insisting instead that the object of 
statutory construction is to ascertain the ordinary meaning of the words 
of the statute as they would have been understood at the time of 
enactment—not just by legislators, but by anyone.49 Pragmatists take a 
very different approach; they decline (at least in some cases) to give 
authority to a statute’s text and instead consider an eclectic set of 
factors, including “statutory text, specific legislative intent, 
imaginative reconstruction, legislative purpose, evolution of statute, 
and current [social] values.”50 The Oregon Supreme Court was either 
47 PGE, 317 Or. at 610, 859 P.2d at 1145. 
48 The literature on the subject is truly enormous. Scalia and Garner’s bibliography of 
books and articles on statutory construction runs some forty pages. ANTONIN SCALIA & 
BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 465–506 (2012). 
There has been so much legal scholarship devoted to debating different theories of statutory 
construction that one scholar queried, “Hasn’t there been enough written on theories of 
interpretation to give the subject matter a rest?” Robert John Araujo, Method in 
Interpretation: Practical Wisdom and the Search for Meaning in Public Legal Texts, 68 
MISS. L.J. 225, 225 (1998). And that was twenty years ago. A sampling of some of the more 
frequently cited writings includes WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION (1994); ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE LAW (1998); ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN 
INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION (2006); Lisa Schultz Bressman & 
Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of 
Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725 (2014); Frank 
H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983); William N. Eskridge,
Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990); Daniel A. Farber, Statutory
Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L.J. 281 (1989); Abbe R. Gluck, The
Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie for the Age of Statutes, 54 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 753 (2013); John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 673 (1997); Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2006); Caleb Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347 (2005);
Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism and the Interpretation of Statutes and
the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179 (1986); Adrian Vermeule, Interpretive
Choice, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74 (2000).
49 As Scalia and Garner put it, “In their full context, words mean what they conveyed to 
reasonable people at the time they were written,” which they characterize (not altogether 
accurately) as “the oldest and most commonsensical interpretive principle.” SCALIA & 
GARNER, supra note 48, at 15–16.  
50 WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, 
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 219–22 (2d ed. 2006). 
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unaware of the alternative approaches to statutory construction or not 
interested in entertaining them. 
Or the court simply assumed the matter had been foreclosed by the 
legislature. Note that the court in PGE referred to ORS 174.020 in 
describing the goal of statutory construction as determining legislative 
intent.51 But even there, the court glossed over some interesting and 
contestable matters. Does the legislature have the authority to 
determine the role of the courts in construing statutes? Or are the rules 
of statutory construction intrinsic to the judicial power and beyond the 
reach of the legislature? Remember that, for the first 150 years of the 
court’s existence, it barely acknowledged the existence of those 
legislative rules. In PGE, however, the court cited them as 
authoritative. 
That’s no idle, academic issue. A number of scholars have suggested 
that such legislatively prescribed rules of construction pose 
constitutional problems.52 Some courts have, as well. In Texas, for 
example, the state legislature enacted a “Code Construction Act,”53 
which the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has concluded violates 
constitutional principles of separation of powers.54 
Aside from that, there’s the question of what the legislature meant 
when it stated that the object of statutory construction is determining 
“legislative intent.” Recall that ORS 174.020 dates back to the Deady 
Code of 1862. What the legislature meant by “legislative intent” in 
1862 very well could have been something quite different from what 
the phrase is commonly taken to mean now.55 The court in PGE didn’t 
address the question. 
51 See PGE, 317 Or. at 610–11, 859 P.2d at 1145–46. 
52 See, e.g., REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 
263–81 (1975); James C. Thomas, Statutory Construction When Legislation Is Viewed as a 
Legal Institution, 3 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 191, 211 n.85 (1966); Alan R. Romero, Note, 
Interpretive Directions in Statutes, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 211, 221–28 (1994). 
53 TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.023 (West 2017). Among other things, the law lists 
various considerations that a court may take into account “whether or not the statute is 
considered ambiguous on its face.” Id. It also requires courts to “consider at all times the old 
law, the evil, and the remedy.” Id. § 312.005.  
54 Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782, 786, 788 n.4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc); see 
also State v. Parsons, 220 N.W. 328, 331 (Iowa 1928) (it is doubtful that the legislature has 
the authority “to direct the judiciary in the interpretation of existing statutes”); 
Commonwealth ex rel. Roney v. Warwick, 33 A. 373, 374 (Pa. 1895). 
55 I took a stab at determining what the legislature most likely understood what is now 
ORS 174.020 to mean back in 1862 in The Intended Meaning of “Legislative Intent” and 
Its Implications for Statutory Construction in Oregon, supra note 17. In a nutshell, I 
concluded that, consistent with prevailing nineteenth-century interpretive conventions, it is 
unlikely that the legislature understood “legislative intent” to embrace the sort of actual, 
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For another example of the court oversimplifying the rules in PGE, 
consider the assertion that “[i]f, but only if,” textual analysis 
demonstrates that a statute is ambiguous may a court resort to 
legislative history. As I mentioned earlier, the court’s earlier cases 
reflect no such hard-and-fast rule. Rather, in some cases, the court 
stated that it is appropriate to examine legislative history to resolve 
ambiguity, while in other cases the court examined legislative history 
without reference to ambiguity at all. In fact, as recently as five months 
before PGE, the court examined legislative history in its analysis of 
what it ultimately determined was an unambiguous statute.56 The court 
in PGE ignored such inconsistencies. 
Aside from that, the court in PGE didn’t question whether any of the 
rules that it cited made sense in the first place. The court, for example, 
cited the rule that the use of a term in one section of a statute and the 
omission of the term in another suggests a purposeful omission.57 That 
certainly is an oft-cited rule.58 But, as we’ll see later on, it’s a rule that’s 
subject to criticism. The court in PGE didn’t address such criticism. Its 
objective was more modest: accept the rules as given and just organize 
them into a useful sequence of analysis. 
E. PGE Applied
The Oregon Supreme Court decisions in the decade and a half 
following PGE confirmed that the court intended the case to serve as 
something of a landmark. Almost immediately, the court began citing 
PGE in every single opinion involving an issue of statutory 
construction.59 The court went so far as to chide the lower courts if they 
failed to do likewise. In Panpat v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, 
Inc.,60 the court reversed a decision of the Oregon Court of Appeals 
with the comment that “[w]e note that the Court of Appeals undertook” 
subjective legislative intentions informed by such evidence as legislative history. I suggested 
that it creates an interesting conundrum: if the court had engaged in a PGE analysis of the 
statute on which PGE was supposed to have been based, it would have found that the 
legislature would not have intended the court to adopt that sort of PGE analysis. Id. at 105–
08. While on the subject, I have to confess that one member of the Oregon Supreme Court
at the time I wrote the article reported to me that he had read it and concluded that I needed
to “get a life.”
56 State v. Trenary, 316 Or. 172, 178 n.5, 850 P.2d 356, 359 n.5 (1993). 
57 PGE v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 317 Or. 606, 611, 859 P.2d 1143, 1146 (1993) 
(citing OR. REV. STAT. § 174.010 (1993)).  
58 See infra text at notes 586–96. 
59 By my count, the court cited PGE in approximately 350 cases between 1993 and 2009. 
60 334 Or. 342, 351 n.2, 49 P.3d 773, 778 n.2 (2002). 
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to construe a statute “without reference to PGE v. Bureau of Labor and 
Industries or to the legislature’s intent.”  
A significant irony emerged in the cases applying PGE, especially 
the cases from the Oregon Supreme Court. The court had declared in 
PGE that the object of statutory construction is to determine 
“legislative intent.” In saying that, the court placed itself squarely in a 
traditional, “intentionalist” school of interpretive thought. But, as I’ve 
noted, it also invoked the “plain meaning” strain of that traditional 
approach to statutory construction, which tends to foreclose 
consideration of a significant source of legislative intent—that is, 
legislative history. And, in a significant majority of the cases that 
followed PGE, the court concluded that the meaning of the statute in 
dispute was “plain.” That meant that resort to legislative history all but 
disappeared.61 At the same time, resort to textual aids—in particular, 
dictionary definitions—soared in frequency. In application, then, PGE 
led to statutory construction of a distinctly textual emphasis.  
No case better illustrates the point—the court’s invocation of 
legislative intent as its goal, but its refusal to consider significant 
evidence of that intent in the form of legislative history—than Jones v. 
General Motors Corp.62 At issue in the case was the meaning of recent 
amendments to Oregon’s summary judgment rule, Oregon Rules of 
Civil Procedure 47 C. Before the 1995 legislative session, the rule 
provided that summary judgment may be granted if the pleadings and 
evidence show that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”63 
In 1995, the legislature added a provision stating that “[n]o genuine 
issue as to a material fact exists if, based upon the record before the 
court viewed in a manner most favorable to the adverse party, no 
objectively reasonable juror could return a verdict for the adverse 
party.”64 In Jones, the court of appeals concluded that the additional 
phrasing was added to the rule to, in effect, “federalize” the state’s 
summary judgment rule to make it easier for trial courts to grant 
summary judgment and to create a shifting of burdens.65 Under the 
61 Professor Gluck, for example, found that, between 1993 and 1998, the supreme court 
did not mention legislative history in approximately four out of every five statutory 
construction decisions. Gluck, supra note 2, at 1779. And when the court did mention 
legislative history, it found it “useless” in approximately one-third of those cases. Id.  
62 325 Or. 404, 939 P.2d 608 (1997). 
63 OR. R. CIV. P. 47 C (1993). 
64 1995 Or. Laws, ch. 618, § 5 (codified at OR. R. CIV. P. 47 C (1995)). 
65 Jones v. General Motors Corp., 139 Or. App. 244, 251, 911 P.2d 1243, 1247–48 
(1996) (en banc). 
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court’s understanding of the federal practice, once the moving party 
makes a prima facie showing that it is entitled to summary judgment, 
the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show the existence of the 
required genuine issue of material fact.66  
The court acknowledged that the actual wording of the 1995 
amendment didn’t mention the added burden shifting language and, in 
fact, “[o]n its face, the added language is capable of meaning exactly 
the same thing as the existing law.”67 But, the court held, there is a 
presumption that, when the legislature amends a law, it intended the 
amendment to mean something. Moreover, the majority explained, the 
extensive legislative history plainly showed that the legislature did 
indeed intend to federalize Oregon summary judgment law.68 
I concurred, writing separately to express my disagreement with the 
court’s reading of the 1995 amendment on two grounds. First, the 
wording of the amendment was not capable of being read to 
accommodate the intricate burden-shifting of federal summary 
judgment law. Second, in any event, the legislative history wasn’t as 
clear as the court had suggested. As I saw it, the new provision simply 
parroted the phrasing of several Oregon Supreme Court cases 
interpreting the existing rule, and the legislature intended to codify that 
phrasing.69 
The Oregon Supreme Court reversed.70 The court concluded that the 
meaning of the 1995 amendment was plain and unambiguous and 
simply restated phrasing in a number of its summary judgment 
decisions.71 The court acknowledged that the court of appeals had 
reached a different conclusion on the basis of the legislative history and 
that the parties had offered various arguments about whether the court 
had correctly interpreted that legislative history.72 Nevertheless, the 
court politely declined even to address those arguments: 
The parties offer conflicting arguments about why the legislature 
adopted the 1995 amendments to ORCP 47 C. We decline to resolve 
that dispute. Paying heed to ORS 174.010, this court must ascertain 
and declare what is contained in the amendment. If, as here, the 
66 Id. at 263, 911 P.2d at 1254.  
67 Id. at 250, 911 P.2d at 1247. 
68 Id. at 251, 911 P.2d at 1247–48. 
69 Id. at 265–75, 911 P.2d at 1255–60 (Landau, J., concurring).  
70 Jones v. General Motors Corp., 325 Or. 404, 939 P.2d 608 (1997). 
71 Id. at 412–14, 939 P.2d at 613–15. 
72 Id. at 410–11, 939 P.2d at 611–12. 
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amendment’s text is not ambiguous, the parties’ disagreement about 
the legislature’s motive for doing what it did is beside the point.73 
As much as the PGE case was cited, it wasn’t popular with everyone. 
Law review articles took issue with the supreme court’s approach to 
statutory construction. Professor Steve Johansen, for instance, 
suggested that the decision was “unnecessarily complex, arbitrary, and 
a little fanciful.”74 Appellate practitioner Rob Wilsey similarly 
complained of the decision’s “artificial rigidity.”75 I got into the act as 
well, asserting that the method of analysis was “unjustifiably artificial,” 
particularly its rule that courts could not examine legislative history in 
the absence of an established ambiguity.76 Members of the Oregon 
Court of Appeals also expressed frustration with PGE in published 
opinions, usually concurrences or dissents. Among the more 
memorable was the concurring opinion of Judge (later, Chief Judge) 
Rick Haselton in Young v. State of Oregon.77 The case involved the 
construction of a statute that included an obvious drafting error; the 
legislature accidently omitted from the text of the overtime 
compensation statute an exception for state managers.78 The majority 
dutifully followed PGE, concluding that there was nothing in the 
statute that reasonably could be construed to include the exception.79 
Judge Haselton reluctantly agreed, commenting that “[t]his case is just 
the latest, if perhaps the most egregious, of a series of cases in which 
fidelity to PGE has driven our court to patently silly results.”80 
Interestingly, the supreme court denied review. 
As it turned out, the Oregon Legislature was unhappy with PGE too. 
What triggered the legislature’s displeasure was the supreme court’s 
decision in Jones. In the sort of coincidence that only happens in real 
73 Id. at 415–16, 939 P.2d at 615 (emphasis omitted) (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 174.010 
(1997)). 
74 Steven Johansen, What Does Ambiguous Mean? Making Sense of Statutory Analysis 
in Oregon, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 219, 268 (1998). 
75 Robert M. Wilsey, Note, Paltry, General & Eclectic: Why the Oregon Supreme Court 
Should Scrap PGE v. Bureau of Labor & Industries, 44 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 615, 664–65 
(2008). 
76 Jack L. Landau, Some Observations About Statutory Construction in Oregon, 32 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 67 (1996). 
77 161 Or. App. 32, 42–43, 983 P.2d 1044, 1050 (Haselton, J., concurring), review 
denied, 329 Or. 447 (1999). 
78 Id. For background on the legislature’s notorious faux pas, see Gregory Chaimov, 
How an Idea Really Becomes a Law: What Only Jacques Cousteau Can Know, 36 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 185, 192–94 (2000). 
79 Young, 161 Or. App. at 35–40, 983 P.2d at 1046–48 (majority opinion). 
80 Id. at 42, 983 P.2d at 1050 (Haselton, J., concurring). 
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life, the staff counsel for the House Judiciary Committee that conducted 
hearings on the 1995 amendments to the summary judgment rule, Max 
Williams, was elected to the House several years later and appointed 
chair of the very same committee. In 2001, unhappy that the Jones 
court had not deigned even to consider the legislative history that he 
had worked so diligently to prepare, Williams drafted a bill to put a 
stop to such practice. What resulted was a set of amendments to ORS 
174.020, so that it now provides that “[t]o assist a court in its 
construction of a statute, a party may offer the legislative history of the 
statute.”81 There’s no mention of the necessity of an ambiguity. Rather, 
the statute as amended provides that “[a] court shall give the weight to 
the legislative history that the court considers to be appropriate.”82 
The response to the 2001 amendments to ORS 174.020 was curious. 
The new law included a savings provision, stating that it applied only 
to claims filed after its effective date.83 So some delay was to be 
expected. But it took a full eight years for the Oregon Supreme Court 
to address the effect of the amendments. In the meantime, both it and 
the court of appeals applied the amendments in some cases, resorting 
to legislative history without first determining the existence of an 
ambiguity,84 but ignored them in other cases, continuing to assert that, 
under PGE, examination of legislative history is inappropriate in the 
absence of an ambiguity.85 In still other cases, the courts intriguingly 
81 OR. REV. STAT. § 174.020(1)(b) (2017). 
82 OR. REV. STAT. § 174.020(3) (2017). 
83 2001 Or. Laws, ch. 438, § 2. 
84 See, e.g., State v. Makuch, 340 Or. 658, 667 n.6, 136 P.3d 35, 39 n.6 (2006); Stevens 
v. Czerniak, 336 Or. 392, 403 n.12, 84 P.3d 140, 146 n.12 (2004).
85 See, e.g., Liles v. Damon Corp., 345 Or. 420, 430, 198 P.3d 926, 931 (2008) (“Because
the legislature’s intent is clear from our inquiry into text and context, further inquiry is 
unnecessary.”); Dep’t of Revenue v. Faris, 345 Or. 97, 105, 190 P.3d 364, 367 (2008) (“We 
conclude, from the text and context of ORS 305.265(2) alone, that the legislature did not 
intend to require a hand signature in order to certify a notice of deficiency. Taxpayers do 
not convince us that there is a need to consult legislative history . . . .”); Baker v. City of 
Lakeside, 343 Or. 70, 77, 164 P.3d 259, 263 (2007) (“Because there are two plausible 
interpretations, we look to the legislative history to determine the legislature’s intent.”); 
State v. Murray, 343 Or. 48, 52, 162 P.3d 255, 257 (2007) (“If the meaning of the statute is 
clear at that first level of analysis, then we proceed no further.”); State v. Sandoval, 342 Or. 
506, 511, 156 P.3d 60, 62 (2007) (“If, after that initial examination, the legislature’s intent 
. . . still is unclear, we may proceed to an examination of legislative history.”); Pacificorp 
Power Mktg., Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 340 Or. 204, 215, 131 P.3d 725, 731 (2006) (“If the 
legislative intent is clear after reviewing the ordinary meaning of the text and context, then 
no further inquiry is necessary.”); State ex rel. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Rardin, 338 Or. 
399, 407, 110 P.3d 580, 584 (2005) (“If the legislature’s intent is clear from the text and 
context of the statute, then further analysis is unnecessary.”); Walsh Constr. Co. v. Mut. of 
Enumclaw, 338 Or. 1, 10, 104 P.3d 1146, 1150 (2005) (Because first-level analysis 
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appeared to ignore both PGE and the 2001 amendments, proceeding to 
examine a statute’s legislative history without reference to either.86 In 
one case, State v. Rodriguez-Barrera, I suggested that the amendments 
could reasonably be interpreted to have no effect at all.87 Even before 
2001, the parties could offer legislative history to the courts without 
first establishing an ambiguity. And courts always were free to give 
legislative history the weight that they thought appropriate.88 As I 
recall, I thought that such an observation might get the attention of the 
supreme court. I was wrong about that. 
Stranger still, after years of chastening lower courts for failing to cite 
the decision, the Oregon Supreme Court began omitting its usual 
reference to PGE in its statutory construction cases. And some 
members of the court began publicly to disavow the notion that PGE 
was ever intended to serve as the watershed decision that it had become. 
All of which prompted me to write an article for the state bar appellate 
section’s annual “Almanac” entitled The Mysterious Disappearance of 
PGE.89  
F. State v. Gaines
The mystery was solved with State v. Gaines.90 An otherwise 
unremarkable criminal case about the statute defining the offense of 
obstruction of justice, Gaines was selected as the case with which the 
court finally would confront the effect, if any, of the 2001 amendments 
“demonstrates the legislature’s intent conclusively, we determine that consideration of 
legislative history is unnecessary.”); State v. Ward, 224 Or. App. 421, 425, 198 P.3d 443, 
444 (2008) (declining to consider legislative history in the absence of ambiguity), review 
denied, 346 Or. 116 (2009). 
86 See, e.g., Ware v. Hall, 342 Or. 444, 452 n.6, 154 P.3d 118, 122 n.6 (2007) (“To the 
extent that the text and context leave any doubt about the legislature’s intent, the legislative 
history removes it.”); Roberts v. State Action Insurance Fund (SAIF) Corp., 341 Or. 48, 53, 
136 P.3d 1105, 1107 (2006) (examining the text of a statute, the court stated, “A review of 
the legislative history confirms that that was the legislature’s intent,” without identifying 
any ambiguity); Mabon v. Wilson, 340 Or. 385, 391, 133 P.3d 899, 902 (2006) (stating that 
it is “satisfied” there is no ambiguity when statutory terms are viewed in context, “we 
nonetheless look to the history of the statute to determine whether that history undercuts in 
any way our preliminary assessment of the meaning of the wording of [the statute]”); Bobo 
v. Kulongoski, 338 Or. 111, 117–18, 107 P.3d 18, 21–22 (2005); In re Marriage of
O’Donnell-Lamont, 337 Or. 86, 105, 91 P.3d 721 (2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1050
(2005); Edwards v. Biehler, 203 Or. App. 271, 275, 124 P.3d 1256 (2005).
87 213 Or. App. 56, 61, 159 P.3d 1201, 1203, review denied, 343 Or. 224 (2007). 
88 Id. 
89 Jack L. Landau, The Mysterious Disappearance of PGE, 4 OR. APP. ALMANAC 153 
(2009). 
90 346 Or. 160, 206 P.3d 1042 (2009). 
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to ORS 174.020. Under ORS 162.235(1)(a), a person commits the 
offense of obstruction of justice if he or she “intentionally obstructs, 
impairs or hinders the administration of law or other governmental or 
judicial function by means of intimidation, force, physical or economic 
interference or obstacle.”91 In Gaines, the defendant was taken to jail 
on an unrelated charge. She refused to permit a police officer to 
photograph her. A police officer ordered her to cooperate, and she again 
refused. Rather than physically force her to be photographed, the state 
charged her with obstruction of justice. She was ultimately convicted.92 
On appeal, she argued that the trial court should have dismissed the 
charge because her passive failure to comply with an officer’s order did 
not amount to obstruction within the meaning of ORS 162.235. The 
Oregon Court of Appeals rejected her argument and affirmed.93 The 
defendant petitioned for review in the Oregon Supreme Court.94  
The supreme court granted the petition. But, as the court sometimes 
does, it added to its order accepting the petition a list of specific 
questions for the parties to address in their briefing on review. Among 
those questions was a request that the parties address the effect, if any, 
of the legislature’s amendments to ORS 174.020.95 Why the court 
decided to add that issue to its consideration of Gaines is not entirely 
clear. In any event, the defendant asserted that the amendments had the 
effect of altering PGE so that there was no longer any requirement of 
finding ambiguity in a statute as a prerequisite to examining legislative 
history.96 
The Oregon Supreme Court agreed, sort of. Its opinion in Gaines is 
quite subtle and very much worth careful examination. The court began 
by observing that the amendments posed something of a 
“conundrum.”97 As I had suggested in Rodriguez-Barrera, the court in 
Gaines observed that, on the face of things, the amendments to ORS 
174.020 did not appear to alter the law.98 But, the court said, it could 
91 OR. REV. STAT. § 162.235(1)(a) (2017). 
92 Gaines, 346 Or. at 162–63, 206 P.3d at 1045–46. 
93 State v. Gaines, 211 Or. App. 356, 361, 155 P.3d 61, 63, adhered to as modified on 
reconsideration, 213 Or. App. 211, 159 P.3d 1291 (2007), rev’d, 346 Or. 160, 206 P.3d 
1042 (2009). 
94 Petition for Review of Defendant-Appellant, State v. Gaines, 346 Or. 160, 206 P.3d 
1042 (2009) (No. S055031), 2007 WL 7042358. 
95 State v. Gaines, 343 Or. 363, 169 P.3d 1268 (2007) (Table). 
96 Gaines, 346 Or. at 165, 206 P.3d at 1046–47. 
97 Id. at 166, 206 P.3d at 1047. 
98 As the court put it,  
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not just ignore the fact that the legislative history of those amendments 
fairly clearly indicated an intention to alter precisely that aspect of the 
PGE analysis.99 So, the court concluded, for the purposes of resolving 
the issues in this particular case, it dispensed with the requirement that 
there be an ambiguity before examining a statute’s legislative 
history.100 
Turning to that history, the court derived three insights from its 
examination of the legislative enactment record. First, it was clear that 
the legislature expected not only that a party would be free to offer 
legislative history for the court to consider it but also “that the court 
would in fact do so.”101 Citing comments by Max Williams, the 
sponsor of the amendments, the court observed that the legislature 
intended to raise the level of legislative history to “the same level as 
text and context.”102 
Second, at the same time, the court said that the legislative history 
confirmed the legislature’s intent that courts retain complete authority 
to determine the weight to give to legislative history in determining the 
statute’s meaning. As the court observed, “The legislative history thus 
makes it clear that the legislature specifically intended not to mandate 
or intrude on that traditional province of the judicial branch.”103 
Third, the court noted that there was some tension between those 
two legislative objectives. In the court’s view, the legislative history 
revealed a legislative desire to “strik[e] a delicate balance between the 
legislature’s role in ensuring that its enactments are interpreted in the 
way that the legislature intended and the court’s independent role in 
performing that interpretive exercise.”104 The legislature may have 
wished for a reprieve from the unyielding “if, but only if” constraint 
that PGE imposed on even looking at legislative history, but, beyond 
[T]he 2001 amendments would seem to work little change to preexisting practices.
No procedural rule or practice in the past has limited a party’s ability to present
legislative history to a court, ambiguity or no ambiguity. Nothing has ever
compelled the court—other than its own resolve to correctly discern legislative
intent—to go beyond the legislative history proffered by the parties. And the use
that the courts have made of legislative history traditionally has been for the courts
to decide.
Id. (discussing OR. REV. STAT. § 174.020 (2009)). 
99 Id. at 166–67, 206 P.3d at 1047–48. 
100 Id. at 171–72, 206 P.3d at 1050.  
101 Id. at 167, 206 P.3d at 1048. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 168, 206 P.3d at 1048. 
104 Id. at 168, 206 P.3d at 1049. 
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that, it left to the courts to decide what, if anything, to do with that 
history.105 
The court’s opinion in Gaines then took an interesting turn. After 
carefully examining the legislative history of the 2001 amendments to 
ORS 174.020, the court stated, “This court remains responsible for 
fashioning rules of statutory interpretation that, in the court’s judgment, 
best serve the paramount goal of discerning the legislature’s intent.”106 
It was as if the court was saying, the amendments to ORS 174.020 are 
all well and good, but it remains up to the courts to decide how best to 
interpret statutes. In other words, the court was deftly hinting at the sort 
of separation-of-powers issues that it had avoided or ignored in PGE. 
Accordingly, the court concluded that it—not the legislature—would 
alter its approach to the interpretation of statutes. It did so “in light of 
the 2001 amendments,” but not because those amendments required it 
to do so.107 
The court summarized the effect of its decision in the following 
terms: 
The first step remains an examination of text and context. But, 
contrary to this court’s pronouncement in PGE, we no longer will 
require an ambiguity in the text of a statute as a necessary predicate 
to the second step—consideration of pertinent legislative history that 
a party may offer. Instead, a party is free to proffer legislative history 
to the court, and the court will consult it after examining text and 
context, even if the court does not perceive an ambiguity in the 
statute’s text, where the legislative history appears useful to the 
court’s analysis. However, the extent of the court’s consideration of 
that history, and the evaluative weight that the court gives it, is for 
the court to determine. The third, and final, step of the interpretive 
methodology is unchanged. If the legislature’s intent remains unclear 
after examining text, context, and legislative history, the court may 
resort to general maxims of statutory construction to aid in resolving 
the remaining uncertainty.108 
Gaines then took another interesting turn. The court took some pains 
to emphasize that, although there no longer exists an artificial barrier 
to the examination of legislative history, the court remains committed 
to careful examination of a statute’s text, which may impose significant 
limitations on the amount of weight that may be assigned to legislative 
history in a given case. “[T]here is no more persuasive evidence of the 
105 Id. at 169, 206 P.3d at 1049. 
106 Id. at 171, 206 P.3d at 1050. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 171–72, 206 P.3d at 1050–51 (citations omitted). 
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intent of the legislature,” the court commented, “than the words by 
which the legislature undertook to give expression to its wishes.”109 In 
light of that overriding principle, the court said that  
we clarify that a party seeking to overcome seemingly plain and 
unambiguous text with legislative history has a difficult task before 
it. Legislative history may be used to confirm seemingly plain 
meaning and even to illuminate it; a party also may use legislative 
history to attempt to convince a court that superficially clear language 
actually is not so plain at all—that is, that there is a kind of latent 
ambiguity in the statute. For those or similar purposes, whether the 
court will conclude that the particular legislative history on which a 
party relies is of assistance in determining legislative intent will 
depend on the substance and probative quality of the legislative 
history itself. . . . When the text of a statute is truly capable of having 
only one meaning, no weight can be given to legislative history that 
suggests—or even confirms—that legislators intended something 
different.110 
With those principles in mind, the court turned to the statute at issue 
in Gaines, examining both the text of the statute in its context and its 
legislative history, ultimately concluding that the court of appeals had 
erred in determining that defendant’s mere passive refusal to comply 
with an officer’s order amounted to obstruction.111  
Gaines is chock-full of important insights concerning the proper 
method of statutory construction going forward. I want to emphasize 
three. 
First, Gaines did not question the overriding objective of statutory 
construction that PGE had identified—legislative intent.112 
Interestingly, although Gaines asserted that it is up to the courts to 
determine the appropriate rules of interpretation, it appeared not to 
appreciate that PGE had relied on a legislative rule—ORS 174.020—
for its assertion that the object of statutory construction is legislative 
intent. Implicit is the apparent assumption that, even without that 
statute, the court would have reached the same conclusion.  
Second, the court’s comments about the judiciary’s paramount 
authority to determine appropriate rules of interpretation are 
tantalizing. To be sure, the court said only what it needed to say to 
resolve the issue before it. But its comments lead to a lot of questions. 
What, for example, is to be made of the other rules of construction set 
109 Id. at 171, 206 P.3d at 1050. 
110 Id. at 172–73, 206 P.3d at 1051 (emphasis omitted). 
111 Id. at 173–83, 206 P.3d at 1051–57. 
112 See id. at 165–66, 206 P.3d at 1047. 
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out in ORS chapter 174? It could be that, as they represent a mere 
codification of common-law rules (at least as they existed in the mid-
nineteenth century), they remain authoritative. Or, it could be that they 
will be regarded as something less than that.  
Third, the court’s comments about the primacy of a statute’s text 
seem especially significant. The court clearly was saying that, although 
legislative history will be given more attention in the future, its effect 
will remain limited by the reasonable construction of the words that the 
legislature enacted into law. The court thus reaffirmed its commitment 
to the sort of careful textual analysis that had characterized its decisions 
during the PGE era.  
II 
THE RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
So, under PGE and Gaines, the basic method of statutory 
construction in Oregon can be summarized as follows: the objective of 
statutory construction is to determine legislative intent. That objective 
is achieved by means of analysis that proceeds in two steps. At the first 
step, the court considers the text of the statute in its context, in light of 
any relevant rules of textual interpretation. Also included at the first 
step is consideration of any relevant legislative history, given whatever 
weight the court deems appropriate. If the analysis adequately reveals 
the meaning of the statute that the legislature intended, the court’s job 
is done. If some ambiguity remains, the court proceeds to a second step, 
which consists of applying a relevant “general maxim” of construction. 
What we need to do at this point is unpack that summary and 
examine its components in some detail. What does it mean to say that 
the goal of statutory construction is “legislative intent?” What’s 
included in the consideration of a statute’s “text” or its “context”? What 
are the rules of textual construction, and how do they apply? What’s 
included in a statute’s “legislative history,” and how does a court go 
about giving that history appropriate weight? What is meant by 
“ambiguity” of the sort that justifies resorting to general maxims of 
statutory construction? And finally, what exactly are the “general 
maxims” of statutory construction, and how does a court know which 
ones to apply?  
A. What Is “Legislative Intent”?
Let’s begin with what both PGE and Gaines characterized as the 
overarching objective of statutory construction—namely, determining 
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“legislative intent.”113 As I have already mentioned, the Oregon 
Supreme Court identified this goal without considering that there are 
other possibilities. The academic literature on statutory construction is 
fairly bursting with articles about a wide variety of theories of the 
proper role of the courts in determining the meaning of statutes.114 Still, 
in fairness to PGE and Gaines, in spite of that diversity of theoretical 
speculation, most courts around the country adhere to the traditional 
view that the goal of statutory construction is “legislative intent.”115  
There remains the issue of what it means to say that the goal of 
statutory construction is “legislative intent.” Interestingly, aside from 
the abundance of scholarship challenging the legitimacy of legislative 
intent as an interpretive objective, there is an equally vast literature 
debating the meaning of the idea itself. Some use the term in a literal, 
subjective sense—as Judge Richard Posner put it, an effort “to think 
[one’s] way . . . into the minds of the enacting legislators and imagine 
how they would have wanted the statute applied to the case at bar.”116 
Others use the term more broadly to refer to a statute’s “general aim” 
or purpose.117 Still others take a sort of middle position. They concede 
that it is not useful (or perhaps even possible) to speak of legislative 
intent in terms of the mental states of legislators, but argue that there is 
more to it than merely identifying a vague statutory purpose.118 
Complicating matters, the meaning of the phrase has tended to shift 
over time. ORS 174.020, for instance, refers to “legislative intent” as 
the objective of statutory construction.119 But contemporaneous 
113 See, e.g., State v. White, 346 Or. 275, 280, 211 P.3d 248, 251 (2009) (explaining that 
whether convictions merge depends on “whether the legislature intended to create two 
crimes or only one”); State v. Meek, 266 Or. App. 550, 555, 338 P.3d 767, 769 (2014) (“The 
legislature’s intent is our lodestar.”); Montgomery v. City of Dunes City, 236 Or. App. 194, 
199, 236 P.3d 750, 752 (2010); Friends of Yamhill Cty. v. Yamhill County, 229 Or. App. 
188, 192, 211 P.3d 297, 299 (2009) (noting that under Gaines and PGE, “we attempt to 
determine the meaning of the statute most likely intended by the legislature”). 
114 See supra sources and text accompanying note 48. 
115 See, e.g., 2A NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES 
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.5 (7th ed. 2014) (“[T]he essential idea that 
legislative will governs decisions on statutory construction has always been the test most 
often declared by courts.”). 
116 Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the Classroom and in the 
Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 817 (1983). 
117 E.g., Archibald Cox, Judge Learned Hand and the Interpretation of Statutes, 60 
HARV. L. REV. 370, 370 (1947); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent 
and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423, 424 (1988). 
118 E.g., Victoria F. Nourse, Elementary Statutory Interpretation: Rethinking Legislative 
Intent and History, 55 B.C. L. REV. 1613 (2014). 
119 OR. REV. STAT. § 174.020 (2017). 
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sources suggest that, when that statute was enacted in the mid-
nineteenth century, the term likely was understood rather emphatically 
not to embrace the specific, subjective intentions of individual 
legislators and that resort to evidence of such subjective intentions as 
legislative history was all but unheard of.120 
The Oregon Supreme Court appears to have a somewhat fluid idea 
of what the phrase “legislative intent” means. Ironically, the court has 
never attempted a sort of “PGE analysis” of ORS 174.020, which PGE 
itself cited as the source for the idea that legislative intent is the lodestar 
of statutory construction. Rather, the court appears to have assumed the 
term has always meant what it means today.  
As for what it means today, most often the court speaks of 
“legislative intent” in the narrow, specific sense of getting into the 
minds of legislators to determine what they would have wanted the 
statute to be taken to mean. It’s quite common to see references to what 
the legislature as a body or individual legislators “had in mind” when 
voting a bill into law.121 Particularly in the years following Gaines, the 
court frequently has resorted to detailed analysis of legislative history 
to unearth what legislators were specifically contemplating during their 
deliberations.  
Comcast Corp. v. Department of Revenue122 offers a fine example. 
The issue in that case was whether the communication giant’s internet 
transmission of cable television services was subject to a particular 
form of taxation reserved for “data transmission services by whatever 
means provided,” under state tax statutes.123 Comcast had argued that 
the statute was enacted in 1973 and that, although cable television 
120 See, e.g., THEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ON THE RULES WHICH GOVERN THE 
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 243 
(1857) (“[T]he tendency of all our modern decisions is to the effect that the intention of the 
legislature is to be found in the statute itself, and that there only the judges are to look for 
the mischiefs meant to be obviated, and the remedy meant to be provided.”). For a more 
detailed description of nineteenth-century interpretive conventions, see generally Landau, 
supra note 17.  
121 See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 339 Or. 69, 81 n.7, 116 P.3d 879, 886 n.7 (2005) (“There 
is no hint . . . that the legislature had any other purpose in mind.”); Blyth & Co. v. City of 
Portland, 204 Or. 153, 159, 282 P.2d 363, 366 (1953) (“It must be presumed that the 
legislative body had a purpose in mind in all the language that it used.”); Sch. Dist. No. 24 
v. Smith, 84 Or. 50, 52, 164 P. 375, 376 (1917) (“[I]t was probably not in the legislative
mind . . . .”); Guzman v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 200 Or. App. 448, 456,
115 P.3d 983, 987 (2005) (“[I]t appears that the legislature had other remedies in mind.”),
review denied, 340 Or. 34 (2006).
122 356 Or. 282, 337 P.3d 768 (2014). 
123 Id. at 314, 337 P.3d at 786 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 308.505(2) (2013)). 
2019] Oregon Statutory Construction 611
certainly existed then, the internet did not.124 Comcast asserted that it 
was highly unlikely that the legislature contemplated the phrase “data 
transmission services” to encompass internet technology that did not 
yet exist.125  
The Oregon Supreme Court noted that, in the early 1970s, the term 
“data transmission” had a particular, technical meaning in the 
communications industry that broadly encompassed the transmission 
of any information by means of some code, such as binary code, for 
storage and processing.126 The question, the court said, was whether 
the legislature had that technical meaning in mind when it enacted the 
tax legislation.127 Turning to the legislative history, the court cited 
comments of individual legislators to establish that they subjectively 
“understood” that the term was being used in its broad, technical 
sense.128 The court noted that one legislator specifically asked a 
representative of the Department of Revenue, “What is data 
transmission? Is this the phone-to-phone . . . kind of thing?”129 And it 
quoted the representative’s answer that the term referred broadly to 
“data from a computer terminal into a computer.”130 The court also 
quoted a legislator on the floor of the House of Representatives, who 
explained that the term encompasses any sort of computer data 
transmission.131 The court, in other words, mined the legislative record 
for evidence as to what legislators actually said and thought about the 
meaning of the legislation that was being considered.  
State v. Walker132 provides another example. That case required the 
court to interpret the Oregon Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations (RICO) law, which applies when an “enterprise” 
engages in a pattern of racketeering activity.133 Walker had been 
charged with violating the law when he and a companion entered a 
local Safeway store and proceeded to shoplift large quantities of 
Huggies diapers, Tide laundry detergent, beer, and frozen shrimp.134 
Upon their arrest, police searched Walker’s car and found in the trunk 
124 Id. at 289, 337 P.3d at 772. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 297–98, 337 P.3d at 777–78. 
127 Id. at 299–301, 337 P.3d at 778–79. 
128 Id. at 302, 337 P.3d at 780. 
129 Id. at 303, 337 P.3d at 780. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 356 Or. 4, 333 P.3d 316 (2014). 
133 Id. at 6, 333 P.3d at 318 (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 166.720(3)). 
134 Id. at 7, 333 P.3d at 318–19. 
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even more boxes of diapers, detergent, beer, and shrimp.135 Walker 
argued that the charges should have been dismissed because he and his 
companion did not qualify as an “enterprise” within the meaning of the 
statute.136 Oregon’s RICO law defines an “enterprise” expansively to 
include “any individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, 
business trust or other profit or nonprofit legal entity, and includes any 
union, association or group of individuals associated in fact although 
not a legal entity.”137 Walker argued that, although broadly worded, 
the term cannot be taken to include two people who shoplift; he argued 
that it should only apply to more formally organized criminal 
activity.138 In support, he cited portions of the legislative history of the 
state RICO law, which he said demonstrated that what the legislature 
had in mind was something more like organized crime.139 
The court rejected Walker’s argument.140 The court acknowledged 
that “the bill’s sponsors were concerned primarily with the presence 
and possible future expansion in Oregon of large-scale organized crime 
consortiums.”141 Nevertheless, the court explained, other legislative 
history showed that members were aware of the fact that the wording 
of the bill was broad and could apply to smaller-scale criminal 
endeavors.142 The court noted a question from a legislator to a local 
sheriff’s deputy during committee hearings about whether the law 
might apply to shoplifting.143 The deputy replied that it could.144 The 
court also referred to a comment from another legislator during a 
committee hearing emphasizing the breadth of the proposed law and 
the fact that it could apply to a group of “amateurs” committing a series 
of burglaries or shoplifts.145 The court found such legislative history 
“particularly telling,” revealing that legislators were aware of the 
breadth of the bill and its potential to apply to small-scale criminal 
activity.146  
135 Id. at 8, 333 P.3d at 319. 
136 Id. at 11, 333 P.3d at 321. 
137 OR. REV. STAT. § 166.715(2) (2013). 
138 Walker, 356 Or. at 15, 333 P.3d at 323. 
139 Id. at 17, 333 P.3d at 324. 
140 Id. at 17–23, 333 P.3d at 324–27. 
141 Id.  
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 17–18, 333 P.3d at 324–35. 
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 19–20, 333 P.3d at 325. 
146 Id. at 20–21, 333 P.3d at 326. 
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This approach to “legislative intent” isn’t without its problems. A 
number of scholars have complained that it is not very realistic to speak 
of the intentions of a ninety-member institution like the Oregon 
Legislature, or even a simple majority of it.147 Individual members may 
vote in favor of a bill for any number of reasons, some of them 
unknowable. In that sense, actual, specific intent is a fiction.  
Aside from that, even assuming it’s possible to determine the 
intentions of a large-member institution, it’s almost impossible to find 
reliable evidence of such intentions. In nearly all cases, resort to 
legislative history will reveal the actual, specific intentions of one, two, 
or a half-dozen individual members. The courts then simply extrapolate 
from those individual instances of legislative intent generalizations 
concerning the intent of the institution as a whole. Comcast and Walker 
illustrate the point. In the first case, the court relied on the statement of 
one legislator in committee hearings and another during floor debates. 
Similarly, in the second case, the court placed some emphasis on a 
colloquy between a single legislator and a witness. What the court is 
doing in such cases is engaging in a series of unspoken inferences and 
assumptions—that other legislators were aware of the statements of an 
individual’s intent or understanding, and the record would reveal if 
those other legislators disagreed or had a different intent or 
understanding. In Jones v. General Motors Corp., I complained of that 
problem.148 The majority had relied on the statement of a single senator 
during floor debates.149 I suggested that it was hard to understand how 
the statements of a single member of one house could be so easily taken 
to reflect the views of the institution as a whole, especially a bicameral 
institution.150 The majority dismissed my complaint with a juridical 
147 Perhaps the most famous critique of “legislative intent” is Max Radin, Statutory 
Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863 (1930). Scholars still argue about “legislative intent” 
to this day. See also Ryan D. Doerfler, Who Cares How Congress Really Works?, 66 DUKE 
L.J. 979, 1020–21 (2017) (“[L]egislative intent” is a “useful fiction.”); John F. Manning,
Without the Pretense of Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2397, 2403 (2017) (“[T]he
reality seems to be that a complex, multimember legislature likely has no genuine intent
about the outcomes in the hard cases that make their way into court.”); Richard I. Nunez,
The Nature of Legislative Intent and the Use of Legislative Documents as Extrinsic Aids to
Statutory Interpretation: A Reexamination, 9 CAL. W. L. REV. 128, 128 (1972) (“[T]he
concept of legislative intent, as discussed in the legal profession, is a fiction.”); Kenneth A.
Shepsie, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L. REV.
L. & ECON. 239 (1992).
148 139 Or. App. 244, 265–75, 911 P.2d 1243, 1255–60 (1996) (en banc) (Landau, J.,
concurring), aff’d, 325 Or. 404 (1997). 
149 Id. at 256–57, 911 P.2d at 1250–51 (majority opinion). 
150 Id. at 271, 911 P.3d at 1259 (Landau, J., concurring). 
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back of the hand, commenting that “[w]hatever the theoretical merits” 
of my point, the fact remains that courts engage in such reasoning all 
the time.151  
In short, Oregon courts tend, somewhat fancifully, to speak of 
legislative intent in very specific terms on the basis of very sketchy 
evidence.  
In some cases, though—particularly when there is no evidence of 
even an individual legislator’s intentions or understandings—the court 
views legislative intent in a more general way. In Bartz v. State,152 the 
court considered whether a petitioner’s post-conviction claim fell 
within an exception to the 120-day limitation period for filing such 
claims. The statutory exception applied when the grounds for relief 
“could not reasonably have been raised in the original or amended 
petition.”153 The petitioner contended that he could not reasonably 
have raised his claim in that case because his attorney failed to tell him 
about it.154 The Oregon Court of Appeals rejected the argument 
because the petitioner had failed to file an original or amended 
petition.155 The Oregon Supreme Court looked to the text of the statute 
in context, along with available legislative history, and came up empty 
as to whether the statute was intended to apply only when a petitioner 
had already filed an original or amended petition.156 Under the 
circumstances, the court said, what would control is the general 
“purpose” of the exception.157 The court interpreted that purpose to be 
giving persons extra time to file post-conviction petitions in 
extraordinary circumstances, a purpose that applied equally to persons 
who did and did not file an earlier, timely petition.158  
Referring to “legislative intent” in this sense is not without its own 
problems, principally that there is no a priori way to know the proper 
level of generality with which to describe the purpose of a statute. Still, 
in my view at least (and, if I am not mistaken, in the view of most courts 
151 Id. at 258, 911 P.2d at 1252 (majority opinion). 
152 314 Or. 353, 355, 839 P.2d 217, 219 (1992). 
153 OR. REV. STAT. § 138.510(2) (1991). 
154 Bartz, 314 Or. at 356–57, 839 P.2d at 220. 
155 Bartz v. State, 110 Or. App. 614, 617–18, 825 P.2d 657, 659, aff’d, 314 Or. 353 
(1992). 
156 314 Or. at 356–58, 839 P.2d at 220. 
157 Id. at 358, 839 P.2d at 220–21. 
158 Id. at 358, 839 P.2d at 221; see also, e.g., McKean-Coffman v. Emp’t Div., 312 Or. 
543, 550, 824 P.2d 410, 414 (1992) (explaining in the absence of more specific evidence of 
legislative intent, a statute’s purpose controls). 
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and commentators),159 referring to “legislative intent” as a general 
policy or purpose is probably more realistic, certainly more defensible, 
and probably more useful.  
B. First-Level Analysis
With the goal of ascertaining legislative intent in mind, PGE and 
Gaines instruct that the first analytical step in statutory construction is 
to examine the text of the statute in its context, along with relevant rules 
of textual construction and legislative history, to see whether that 
legislative intent has been expressed “unambiguously.” If the analysis 
shows an unambiguously expressed intended meaning, the analysis 
ends. It is, in effect, a one-step process. If, after the first-level analysis, 
the intended meaning of the statute remains ambiguous, it is 
appropriate to resolve that ambiguity by reference to general maxims 
of construction. Because a subsidiary object of the first-level analysis 
is determining whether a given statute is “ambiguous,” then, we need 
to establish precisely what “ambiguity” means in this context.  
1. The Meaning of “Ambiguity”
Linguists have come up with a number of distinct categories of
indeterminacy.160 For example, there is “lexical” ambiguity, which 
occurs when a word has more than one definition or “sense.” The 
classic example is the word “bank,” which can refer to a financial 
institution or the side of a stream. This is not often a problem 
encountered in statutes, either because relevant terms are defined or 
because their use in context resolves the ambiguity.  
There is “syntactic” ambiguity, when a statement yields two possible 
meanings resulting from its syntax, or sentence structure. Noam 
Chomsky’s example of “[f]lying planes can be dangerous,” is 
frequently cited.161 It can mean either that planes that are flying are 
dangerous or that the act of flying them can be dangerous. This 
category of ambiguity sometimes arises when statutes use an adverb in 
an uncertain way, as when defining a mental state for a criminal offense 
without making clear to what elements the mental state applies.  
159 See, e.g., DICKERSON, supra note 52, at 87 (“Whereas the concept of ‘legislative 
intent’ is in disfavor with many legal writers, that of ‘legislative purpose’ enjoys not only 
favor but preeminence. For most, it is the touchstone of statutory interpretation.”).  
160 For a helpful discussion of the different types of ambiguity, see generally Lawrence 
M. Solan, Linguistic Issues in Statutory Interpretation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
LANGUAGE AND LAW 87, 88–95 (Peter M. Tiersma & Lawrence M. Solan eds., 2012).
161 NOAM CHOMSKY, ASPECTS OF THE THEORY OF SYNTAX 21 (14th ed. 1985). 
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And there is “semantic” ambiguity, occurring when a statement’s 
syntax or structure does not produce the uncertainty, but the meaning 
of the words in the statement does. Take, for example, the statement, 
“John and Mary are married.” Does it mean that they are married to 
each other, or to different spouses? This is a relatively common form 
of ambiguity in statutory construction cases.  
Then there is a different form of indeterminacy that linguists refer to 
as “vagueness,” which refers to uncertainty about just how broadly an 
otherwise unambiguous term may be applied. For example, is a 
drivable lawn mower a “vehicle” within the state’s motor vehicle code? 
In Oregon—and, in truth, in most jurisdictions—courts don’t use 
such precise terminology when referring to the uncertainties that arise 
in statutory construction disputes. Rather, courts tend to lump all such 
forms of indeterminacy into a single category, referred to as 
“ambiguity.” That’s understandable, for judges are not linguists. It’s 
also probably a good thing, for it avoids potential confusion. 
“Vagueness,” for example, has a distinct meaning in the legal 
context—a statute may be unconstitutionally “vague” if its meaning 
cannot reasonably be determined or leaves unfettered discretion in its 
application—which is entirely foreign to the linguistic use of the 
word.162  
In Oregon case law, though, the term “ambiguity” still is treated as 
one of art. It occurs when a statute is reasonably capable of more than 
one meaning.163 That is to say, the wording of the statute must be 
reasonably capable of being interpreted to mean at least two different 
things. A statute may be ambiguous for any number of reasons—
whether lexical, syntactical, referential, semantic, or vague in the 
linguistic sense. The courts refer to all of those different forms of 
indeterminacy as “ambiguity.”  
162 See, e.g., Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 (1990); Kolender v. Lawson, 
461 U.S. 352, 357–58 (1983). 
163 See, e.g., State v. Cooper, 319 Or. 162, 167, 874 P.2d 822, 825 (1994) (“Because 
either interpretation is reasonable, the word is ambiguous.”); State v. Dasa, 234 Or. App. 
219, 230–31, 227 P.3d 228, 235 (“[T]he threshold of ambiguity is a low one. It does not 
require that competing constructions be equally tenable. It requires only that a competing 
construction not be ‘wholly implausible.’” (quoting Godfrey v. Fred Meyer Stores, 202 Or. 
App. 673, 686, 124 P.3d 621, 628 (2005), review denied, 340 Or. 672 (2006) (internal 
quotation marks omitted))), review denied, 349 Or. 173 (2010); Rooklidge v. DMV, 217 Or. 
App. 172, 180, 174 P.3d 1120, 1126 (2007) (“‘Ambiguity’ is a term of art that means there 
are at least two reasonable interpretations of the statutory terms.”), cert. denied, 557 U.S. 
923 (2009). 
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An important caveat: there must be more than one reasonable 
interpretation to establish a statute’s ambiguity.164 Remember that 
Oregon courts are very focused on the text of a statute and the 
reasonable construction of its terms. Implicit (and often explicit) is the 
idea that words are not infinitely elastic; there are limits to what courts 
can interpret them to mean.  
At the same time, the cases suggest that the threshold of 
reasonableness is not an overly demanding one. Especially before 
Gaines, the Oregon Court of Appeals—which tended not to have the 
Oregon Supreme Court’s aversion to legislative history—often referred 
to the existence of more than one interpretation that is “not wholly 
implausible.”165 Even after Gaines, though, the courts appear to apply 
the same conception of “ambiguity.”166 
2. What Is a Statute’s “Text”?
The answer to this question may seem obvious. But there’s actually
quite a bit to think about when considering what constitutes a statute’s 
“text.” That’s especially true in Oregon, where the courts tend to 
emphasize the importance of a statute’s text in statutory construction 
cases. 
a. The Words of the Statute
Let’s begin with the obvious: a statute’s “text” consists of the words
actually enacted into law. It doesn’t include words the legislature, 
either by choice or accident, did not put in the statute. Courts must “take 
a statute as [they] find it,” without adding to, or taking from, the actual 
words enacted into law.167  
After PGE and Gaines, Oregon courts—especially the Oregon 
Supreme Court—consider this point central to their statutory 
construction analysis. Often, courts will refer to the legislature’s own 
declaration that “[i]n the construction of a statute, the office of a judge 
is simply to ascertain and declare what is, in terms or in substance, 
164 Rooklidge, 217 Or. App. at 180, 174 P.3d at 1126. 
165 See, e.g., Owens v. MVD, 319 Or. 259, 268, 875 P.2d 463, 468 (1994); State v. Blair, 
230 Or. App. 36, 50–51, 214 P.3d 47, 54–55 (2009), aff’d, 348 Or. 72 (2010); State v. 
Rodriguez, 217 Or. App. 24, 28, 175 P.3d 471, 474 (2007) (en banc); State v. Stamper, 197 
Or. App. 413, 417, 106 P.3d 172, 174, review denied, 339 Or. 230 (2005); State v. Walker, 
192 Or. App. 535, 542, 86 P.3d 690, 694, review denied, 337 Or. 327 (2004). 
166 See, e.g., State v. Cloutier, 351 Or. 68, 95, 261 P.3d 1234, 1249 (2011) (“On the bare 
face of the statute itself, defendant’s reading of the statute is not wholly implausible.”). 
167 Wyers v. Am. Med. Response Nw., Inc., 360 Or. 211, 221, 377 P.3d 570, 576 (2016). 
618 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97, 583 
contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted or to omit what 
has been inserted.”168 That statute, in fact, is probably the single most 
frequently cited statute of the interpretive provisions of ORS chapter 
174.169 
But the focus on the text has constitutional dimensions as well. The 
Oregon Supreme Court emphasized this point at some length in Gaines, 
and the explanation is worth quoting in full: 
[A]s this court and other authorities have long observed, there is no
more persuasive evidence of the intent of the legislature than the
words by which the legislature undertook to give expression to its
wishes. Only the text of a statute receives the consideration and
approval of a majority of the members of the legislature, as required
to have the effect of law. The formal requirements of lawmaking
produce the best sources from which to discern the legislature’s
intent, for it is not the intent of the individual legislator that governs,
but the intent of the legislature as formally enacted into law:
[N]ot only is it important that the will of the law-makers be
expressed, but it is also essential that it be expressed in due form of
law; since nothing is law simply and solely because the legislators
will that it shall be unless they have expressed their determination to
that effect, in the mode pointed out by the instrument which invests
them with the power, and under all the forms which that instrument
has rendered essential.
168 OR. REV. STAT. § 174.010 (2017). 
169 See, e.g., Comcast Corp. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 363 Or. 537, 545, 423 P.3d 706, 710 
(2018) (“Yet taxpayer’s proposed construction of the statute would require this court to 
insert similar provisions, contrary to the legislature’s directive that, in construing statutes, 
courts are to ‘ascertain and declare what is, in terms or in substance, contained therein, not 
to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted.’ See ORS 174.010.”); 
State v. McNally, 361 Or. 314, 328, 392 P.3d 721, 729 (2017) (“It is axiomatic that this 
court does not insert words into a statute that the legislature chose not to include. See ORS 
174.010.”); Owens v. Maas, 323 Or. 430, 435, 918 P.2d 808, 811 (1996) (“The state’s 
proposed interpretation of section 5 conflicts with the general rule of construction contained 
in ORS 174.010, which provides that, when construing a legislative enactment, this court 
may not ‘insert what has been omitted’ nor ‘omit what has been inserted.’”); Local No. 290, 
Plumbers & Pipefitters v. Or. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 323 Or. 559, 567, 919 P.2d 1168, 
1172 (1996) (“We are admonished not to add to a statute words that the legislature has 
omitted. ORS 174.010.”); State v. Berry, 293 Or. App. 717, 729, 429 P.3d 1011, 1018 (2018) 
(“[The state’s view] contradicts the available legislative history and, even more 
significantly, would require us to impermissibly ‘insert what has been omitted’ into the 
statute. ORS 174.010.”); McLaughlin v. Wilson, 292 Or. App. 101, 105, 423 P.3d 133, 135 
(2018) (“In construing the text and context, we neither ‘insert what has been omitted’ nor 
‘omit what has been inserted.’ ORS 174.010.”). A recent Westlaw check revealed that the 
statute had been cited 967 times by the Oregon Supreme Court and the Oregon Court of 
Appeals. 
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For those reasons, text and context remain primary, and must be 
given primary weight in the analysis.170 
A good example of this principle applied is Monaco v. U.S. Fidelity 
& Guaranty Co.171 In that case, the plaintiff was a passenger who was 
injured in a car crash.172 The driver was not insured.173 The defendant 
did have insurance.174 The insurer, however, offset its uninsured 
motorist payout by medical payments to the plaintiff.175 The plaintiff 
sued, arguing that the statute should be read to prohibit such offsets.176 
In support, the plaintiff cited the legislative history of the statute 
governing mandated uninsured motorist coverage.177 The Oregon 
Supreme Court, however, rejected the argument, finding no wording in 
the statute capable of being read to impose such a requirement.178 
“Whatever the legislative history of an act may indicate,” the court 
explained, “it is for the legislature to translate its intent into operational 
language.”179 “This court cannot correct clear and unambiguous 
language for the legislature so as to better serve what the court feels 
was, or should have been, the legislature’s intent.”180 
170 State v. Gaines, 346 Or. 160, 171, 206 P.3d 1042, 1050 (citations omitted) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
171 275 Or. 183, 550 P.2d 422 (1976). 
172 Id. at 185, 550 P.2d at 423. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
176 Id. at 187, 550 P.2d at 424. 
177 Id. at 187–88, 550 P.2d at 424. 
178 Id. at 188, 550 P.2d at 424. 
179 Id. 
180 Id.; see also, e.g., Bauder v. Farmers Ins. Co., 301 Or. 715, 718–22, 724–26, 725 
P.2d 350, 351–53, 355–56 (1986) (quoting Monaco); Staiger v. Burkhart, 299 Or. 49, 53,
698 P.2d 487, 488–89 (1985); State v. Martin, 298 Or. 264, 268, 691 P.2d 908, 910 (1984);
Lane County v. R.A. Heintz Constr. Co, 228 Or. 152, 157, 364 P.2d 627, 630 (1961) (“[T]he
court is not authorized to rewrite a statute or to ignore the plain meaning of unambiguous
words to correct the action of the legislature.”); Dilger v. Sch. Dist. 24 CJ, 222 Or. 108, 112,
352 P.2d 564, 566 (1960) (“It is axiomatic that the courts cannot in the guise of construction
supply an integral part of a statutory scheme omitted by the legislature.”); State ex rel.
Everding v. Simon, 20 Or. 365, 373–74, 26 P. 170, 173 (1891) (“[W]hen a provision is left
out of a statute, either by design or mistake of the legislature, the courts have no power to
supply it. To do so would be to legislate and not to construe.”); State v. Patton, 237 Or. App.
46, 50–51, 238 P.3d 439, 441 (2010) (“We are prohibited, by statutory command and by
constitutional principle, from adding words to a statute that the legislature has omitted.”),
review denied, 350 Or. 131 (2011); Fernandez v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision,
137 Or. App. 247, 252 n.2, 904 P.2d 1071, 1073 n.2 (1995) (“Intentions of the legislature
that have not found expression in actual statutory language have not satisfied the
constitutional requirements for enactment and simply are not law.”); Faverty v. McDonald’s
Rests. of Or., Inc., 133 Or. App. 514, 533, 892 P.2d 703, 714 (1995) (“Inchoate intentions
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Perhaps even more well known is the Oregon Court of Appeals’ 
decision in Young v. State.181 The case involved the state’s overtime 
compensation law, which included a fairly obvious mistake.182 In 
1995, the legislature amended the statute to include public employees 
in the overtime compensation law.183 At the same time, it enacted a list 
of excepted salaried managers from that overtime compensation 
requirement; the list exempted overtime “[b]y a county, municipality, 
municipal corporation, school district or subdivision because of the 
executive, administrative, supervisory or professional nature of their 
employment.”184 What about state executives, administrators, 
supervisors, and professionals? The statute omitted any reference to 
them, by all accounts, entirely accidentally. Thus, as passed, the law 
exempted county, municipal, and school district administrators from 
overtime compensation, but not state administrators.185  
One such state salaried professional initiated a class action for 
overtime compensation under the 1995 amendments.186 His employer 
argued that the law obviously was intended to include such state 
salaried professionals in the list of exemptions from overtime 
compensation, and to read the statute as written would thwart 
legislative intent and lead to an obviously absurd result.187 The court 
of appeals rejected the argument. Writing for the court, Judge (later 
Chief Justice) Paul De Muniz explained that “PGE demarcated a clear 
boundary line between the powers of the legislature and those of the 
court, and, in doing so, circumscribed the court’s authority to construe 
a statute.”188 The legislature’s authority, Judge De Muniz noted, 
are not law, only those intentions that are manifested in language that is enacted.”), review 
dismissed, 326 Or. 530 (1998). 
181 161 Or. App. 32, 983 P.2d 1044, review denied, 329 Or. 447 (1999). 
182 Id. at 40, 983 P.2d at 1049 (Landau, J., concurring) (“Our decision recognizes the 
uncontested fact that, in this case, the legislature made a significant mistake in its enactment 
of ORS 279.340 . . . .”).  
183 OR. REV. STAT. § 279.340(1) (1995). 
184 OR. REV. STAT. § 279.342(5)(a) (1995). 
185 The legislature quickly discovered and remedied the mistake at the next opportunity. 
One of the first bills introduced and passed in the succeeding legislative session inserted the 
word “state” into the list of salaried professionals exempted from the overtime compensation 
statute. Compare OR. REV. STAT. § 279.342(5)(a) (1995), with OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 279.342(5)(a) (1997); see Young v. State, 221 Or. App. 146, 149 n.2, 188 P.3d 476, 478
n.2 (2008), rev’d, 346 Or. 507 (2009) (acknowledging the legislature’s “exten[sion] to all
public employees”).
186 161 Or. App. at 34–35, 983 P.2d at 1045–46. 
187 Id. at 35, 983 P.2d at 1046. 
188 Id. at 38, 983 P.2d at 1047. 
2019] Oregon Statutory Construction 621
“includes the authority to write a seemingly absurd law, so long as the 
intent to do that is stated clearly.”189 There was simply no principled 
way, he concluded, to read the words that the legislature enacted into 
law to say that state salaried professionals were exempt from the 
overtime compensation requirement.190  
There have been a few exceptions to the textual, positivistic view 
reflected in such cases. And they are, frankly, hard to explain. Most 
predate PGE and can be written off as examples of the sort of willy-
nilly application of statutory construction rules that appeared in early 
to mid-twentieth-century cases in this state. Johnson v. Star Machinery 
Co. is a good example.191 The issue in that case was whether the 
plaintiff’s product liability claim, which arose out of the manufacture 
of a piece of defective industrial machinery, was subject to the general 
statute of ultimate repose of ten years.192 The statute of ultimate repose 
provided that “[i]n no event shall any action for negligent injury to 
person or property of another be commenced more than 10 years from 
the date of the act or omission complained of.”193 The plaintiff argued 
that, strictly speaking, the statute applied only to negligence actions, 
not strict product liability actions in which negligence is not at issue.194 
The Oregon Supreme Court conceded that the plaintiff had a point as 
to the wording of the statute. It nevertheless concluded that the statute 
of ultimate repose applied to strict product liability actions: “[T]he rule 
requiring the court to follow the plain meaning of seemingly 
unambiguous language,” the court said, “is not inflexible and not 
without exceptions.”195 According to the court, one such exception 
applied “if the literal import of the words is so at variance with the 
apparent policy of the legislature as a whole as to bring about an 
unreasonable result.”196 In such cases, the court has declared that it is 
authorized to “look beyond the words of the act.”197  
Turning to the case at hand, the court concluded that the policy 
underpinnings of the statute of ultimate repose—preserving the 
reliability of evidence and preventing the burden of protracted potential 
189 Id. at 38, 983 P.2d at 1048. 
190 Id. at 39, 983 P.2d at 1048. 
191 270 Or. 694, 530 P.2d 53 (1974). 
192 Id. at 697, 530 P.2d at 54. 
193 OR. REV. STAT. § 12.115(1) (1973).  
194 Johnson, 270 Or. at 697–98, 530 P.2d at 55. 
195 Id. at 703–04, 530 P.2d at 57. 
196 Id. at 704, 530 P.2d at 57. 
197 Id.  
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liability—“is applicable to both theories of recovery alike,” that is, to 
both negligence and strict product liability.198 As a result, the court 
held that the statute of ultimate repose applied, even though the 
statute’s wording suggested the contrary.199  
Johnson wasn’t very persuasive. Its statutory analysis was a mash-
up of a variety of precedents and sources that didn’t quite fit together. 
At one point, for instance, the court quoted the United States Supreme 
Court’s famous decision in Church of the Holy Trinity v. United 
States,200 in which the Court said that a thing may be within the letter 
of a broadly worded statute and yet not fall within the embrace of that 
statute, which is pretty much the opposite of what the Oregon court was 
doing in Johnson.201 In any event, Johnson’s application of the so-
called absurd result exception to the plain-meaning rule was expressly 
abrogated after PGE, in State v. Vasquez-Rubio, which I will discuss in 
greater detail when we get to second-level maxims of construction.202  
Even after PGE, an occasional exception has cropped up. A notable 
example is the Oregon Supreme Court’s decision in Stevens v. 
Czerniak.203 At issue in that case was whether the Oregon Rules of 
Civil Procedure permit discovery of expert witnesses.204 By its terms, 
Rule 36 B would appear to clearly sanction such discovery. It says that 
“[u]nless otherwise limited by order of the court in accordance with 
these rules . . . parties may inquire regarding any matter not privileged 
that is relevant to a claim or defense of the party seeking discovery.”205 
There is no other rule limiting the discovery of expert witnesses. 
Nevertheless, the court concluded that the rule prohibited expert 
discovery.206 The court acknowledged that the text, “in isolation,” did 
appear to permit expert discovery.207 But, in the court’s view, the 
legislative history suggested that the legislature intended to preclude 
such discovery.208 The court reasoned that the original bill that the 
198 Id. at 707, 530 P.2d at 59. 
199 Id. at 709, 530 P.2d at 60. 
200 143 U.S. 457, 459 (1892) (quoted by Johnson, 270 Or. at 706, 530 P.2d at 58). 
201 In Johnson, the court extended the meaning of a statute well beyond its wording. 270 
Or. at 703–04, 530 P.3d at 57–58. In Church of the Holy Trinity, the Court significantly 
narrowed the effect from its ordinary meaning. 143 U.S. at 459. 
202 See infra text at notes 708–28. 
203 336 Or. 392, 84 P.3d 140 (2004).  
204 Id. at 400, 84 P.3d at 144.  
205 OR. R. CIV. P. 36 B(1). 
206 336 Or. at 401–05, 84 P.3d at 144–47. 
207 Id. at 401, 84 P.3d at 144. 
208 Id. at 403–04, 84 P.3d at 145–47. 
2019] Oregon Statutory Construction 623
legislature ultimately adopted as Rule 36 B included a provision 
expressly authorizing expert discovery, and the legislature deleted that 
provision.209 Of course, the court neglected to account for the fact that, 
once that provision was deleted, what was left in the bill was a 
declaration that “parties may inquire regarding any matter, not 
privileged.”210 
Stevens is even less persuasive than Johnson was. There was no 
wording of the applicable rule that could reasonably be construed to 
limit expert discovery. The court certainly identified none. Instead, the 
court permitted legislative history in effect to trump an absence of 
operable text, which is precisely what Monaco said courts lack 
authority to do.211  
b. Prior Judicial Construction
To say that the “text” of a statute consists of its words leads to a 
secondary issue: what if a court already has interpreted it? The answer 
turns out to be a bit complicated. It depends, in part, on the court’s view 
about the precedential effect of its prior interpretations. It also depends 
on which court—whether it was the Oregon Supreme Court, the 
Oregon Court of Appeals, or the court of another jurisdiction—has 
interpreted the statute and when it did so. 
(i) Precedent and Statutory Construction
Let’s begin with the issue of precedent and statutory construction.
For quite a while, the Oregon Supreme Court adopted a remarkably 
strict view of the effect of its statutory construction decisions. Once the 
court construed a statute, the court viewed that interpretation as having 
the effect of becoming a part of the statute itself, which only the 
legislature could alter thereafter. The court explained this unusual view 
in State v. King as follows: “When this court interprets a statute, the 
209 Id. at 404, 84 P.3d at 146–47. 
210 Id. at 401–05, 84 P.3d at 145–47 (quoting OR. R. CIV. P. 36 B(1)). 
211 It’s interesting to note that, since Stevens in Gwinn v. Lynn, 344 Or. 65, 72, 176 P.3d 
1249, 1253 (2008), the court held that, notwithstanding Stevens, experts may be deposed as 
“fact” witnesses. More recently, in Ransom v. Radiology Specialists of the Northeast, 363 
Or. 552, 566–67, 425 P.3d 412, 420–21 (2018), the court held that, again, notwithstanding 
Stevens, experts whose conduct is the very issue in the case (in that instance, a malpractice 
action), could be questioned about the exercise of their expertise in the case. I joined the 
opinion of the court, but wrote separately to suggest that perhaps the court should reconsider 
Stevens itself. Id. at 573, 425 P.3d at 424 (Landau, J., concurring). No one said I was 
incorrect. Then again, no one joined my opinion, either. Too much water over the dam, 
perhaps.  
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interpretation becomes a part of the statute, subject only to a revision 
by the legislature.” 212  
There is perhaps no better example of the court’s adherence to this 
unusual view than Palmer v. State of Oregon.213 The issue in that case 
was whether a post-conviction petitioner may assert a claim that could 
have been asserted at the underlying criminal trial but wasn’t. The 
Oregon Post-Conviction Hearing Act would seem to speak clearly to 
just that issue. It says that “[t]he failure of [a] petitioner . . . to have 
raised matters alleged in the petition at the trial . . . shall not affect the 
availability of relief under” the act.214 The statutory text should have 
made the court’s answer easy. But wait. There’s more.  
In 1969, in North v. Cupp, the Oregon Supreme Court had issued 
one of those pre-PGE decisions that were hard to reconcile with the 
plain text of the statute. 215 The court had conceded that “[i]f the statute 
is interpreted literally,” the failure to raise an issue at trial does not 
foreclose raising it for the first time in a post-conviction petition.216 
But, the court said, taking the statute as a whole and in light of its 
underlying policies, it just didn’t make sense to read the statute as 
written. In effect, the court read “not” out of the act.217 
In Palmer, the trial court dutifully followed North and dismissed 
Palmer’s claim, because he had failed to raise the issue during the 
underlying criminal proceeding. Interestingly, the Oregon Court of 
Appeals disagreed. Relying on the plain language of the statute, the 
court said Palmer’s failure to raise the issue during the criminal 
proceeding did not impede Palmer’s ability to raise the issue in a post-
conviction petition.218 (The court went on to affirm the dismissal on 
the merits).219  
The Oregon Supreme Court didn’t agree. The court began by 
conceding that “[o]n its face, [the statute] might appear to support the 
212 316 Or. 437, 445, 852 P.2d 190, 195 (1993); see also State v. Sullens, 314 Or. 436, 
443, 839 P.2d 708, 712 (1992) (“When this court interprets a statute, that interpretation 
becomes part of the statute, as if written into it at the time of enactment.”); Walther v. SAIF 
Corp., 312 Or. 147, 149, 817 P.2d 292 (1991) (per curiam); State v. Clevenger, 297 Or. 234, 
244, 683 P.2d 1360, 1366 (1984). 
213 318 Or. 352, 867 P.2d 1368 (1994). 
214 OR. REV. STAT. § 138.550(1) (1993). 
215 254 Or. 451, 461 P.2d 271 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1054 (1970). 
216 Id. at 454–55, 461 P.2d at 273. 
217 Id. 
218 Palmer v. State of Oregon, 121 Or. App. 377, 379–84, 854 P.2d 955, 956–59 (1993), 
aff’d in part on different grounds and remanded, 318 Or. 352 (1994). 
219 Id. at 381–84, 854 P.2d at 957–59. 
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conclusion reached by the court of appeals.”220 The problem, the court 
explained, was that the court of appeals didn’t account for the supreme 
court’s prior construction of the statute in North, which held the statute 
meant precisely the opposite of what the court of appeals believed it 
said.221 Citing King, the court declared, “When this court interprets a 
statute, that interpretation becomes part of the statute, subject only to 
amendment by the legislature.”222  
The supreme court never explained the origin of its view that, once 
it announces the meaning of a statute—even mistakenly—the court 
somehow loses authority to correct the mistake. A few years after 
Palmer, I found where the court came up with this notion of prior 
construction.223 The court’s case citation for the rule of prior 
construction is from a 1954 decision, State v. Elliot.224 That decision, 
in turn, cited as authority for the statement of law a 1914 Missouri case, 
Harvey v. Missouri Athletic Club225 and a 1944 American 
Jurisprudence article,226 the former of which cited the rule but declined 
to follow it and the latter of which actually recounted an entirely 
different proposition of law—namely, when a court interprets a statute 
borrowed from another jurisdiction and, at the time of the borrowing, 
the statute had been interpreted by the highest court in that other 
jurisdiction, that other state’s court interpretation is regarded as 
“integral.”227 That is known as the “borrowed statute” rule, which I 
will discuss later. The point here is that the borrowed statute rule 
supplies no authority at all for the Oregon Supreme Court’s rule of prior 
construction. The court’s rule, in other words, appears to have been 
predicated on a legal research error. 
That doesn’t mean that the rule was without foundation. Many 
courts—including, at least on occasion, the United States Supreme 
Court228—have adopted, as a matter of policy, the idea that, if the 
220 Palmer v. State of Oregon, 318 Or. 352, 356, 867 P.2d 1368, 1370 (1994). 
221 Id. 
222 Id. at 358, 867 P.2d at 1371 (citing State v. King, 316 Or. 437, 445, 852 P.2d 190, 
195 (1993)). 
223 See Landau, supra note 76, at 17–19. 
224 204 Or. 460, 277 P.2d 754 (1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 929 (1955). 
225 170 S.W. 904 (Mo. 1914). 
226 50 AM. JUR. Statutes, § 221 (1944). 
227 Id. 
228 My favorite example is Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972). The question in that 
case was whether Major League Baseball was “interstate commerce” subject to the nation’s 
antitrust laws. Id. at 268–69. In an earlier decision, the Court had concluded that baseball 
was the national pastime, not commerce. Fed. Baseball Club v. Nat’l League, 259 U.S. 200, 
208–09 (1922). In the following years, though, the courts concluded that football, basketball, 
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legislature fails to alter a statute in response to a court’s interpretation 
of it, the legislature may fairly be taken to have acquiesced in that 
interpretation.229 Still, the idea of legislative acquiescence is a rank 
fiction. It assumes that legislatures keep track of each judicial 
interpretation of their legislative handiwork. It further assumes that if a 
legislature fails to act in response to such interpretation, the reason for 
that inaction must be the legislature’s agreement with the court’s 
interpretation. It ignores the possibility that the legislature perhaps had 
other more pressing matters to deal with, that it ran out of time to 
respond, or that it was merely indifferent to the court’s decision, among 
other things. 
Some members of the court eventually began to push back against 
the rigid rule of prior construction. In State ex rel. Huddleston v. 
Sawyer, the Oregon Supreme Court cited King and its rule of prior 
construction in a case involving whether the matter was properly before 
the court under the statute allowing for extraordinary relief by means 
of a petition for a writ of mandamus.230 Justice Robert Durham 
concurred, but he wrote separately to suggest that the time had come to 
rethink King and its rule. Justice Durham suggested that there is reason 
to question “the accuracy of the majority’s statement regarding the 
perpetual effect of this court’s prior interpretation of a statute.”231 As 
Justice Durham saw it, “[T]he rule of prior interpretation fairly is open 
to scrutiny, particularly on the question whether it has introduced 
needless and harmful rigidity into this court’s methodology of statutory 
construction.”232 Interestingly, the majority relegated its response to a 
brief footnote, in which it stated that there were “sound prudential 
hockey, golf, and other sports were commerce subject to the antitrust statutes. Flood, 407 
U.S. at 282–83 & nn.19–20 (hockey and golf); Haywood v. Nat’l Basketball Assn., 104 U.S. 
1204, 1205 (1971) (basketball); Radovich v. Nat’l Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 450 
(1957) (football); United States v. Int’l Boxing Club of N.Y., 348 U.S. 236, 242 (1955) 
(boxing). That left baseball as something of an anomaly, to say the least. Nevertheless, the 
Court held that, given its earlier decision, baseball remained exempt. Flood, 407 U.S. at 284. 
229 That appears to be the underlying basis for the Oregon Supreme Court’s rule of prior 
construction as well. In Younger v. City of Portland, 305 Or. 346, 350 n.5, 752 P.2d 262, 
264 n.5 (1988), the question arose whether prior interpretations of the Oregon Court of 
Appeals have the same effect. The court rejected the idea, commenting that “because finality 
of interpretation rests with this court, care should be taken in according significance to 
legislative inaction in the face of statutory interpretations by the Court of Appeals.” Id. 
The implicit message was that legislative inaction had greater significance in the face of 
statutory interpretations by the state’s highest court.  
230 324 Or. 597, 608, 932 P.2d 1145, 1152 (1997). 
231 Id. at 638, 932 P.2d at 1168 (Durham, J., concurring). 
232 Id. at 643, 932 P.2d at 1171. 
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reasons for following the principle.”233 Among those reasons, the court 
said, were “a need for stability and certainty in the understanding of 
statutes and a respect for the interplay between the roles of the 
legislative and judicial branches of government in the context of 
statutory construction.”234  
Of course, the majority was correct about the importance of stability 
and certainty in the law, as well as respect for the role of coordinate 
branches of government. But, although those values certainly counsel 
a court to be cautious in overruling a prior interpretation, they surely 
don’t explain King’s more sweeping assertion that, once the court 
interprets a statute, it will never reconsider it, and, indeed, it’s 
powerless to do so.  
Over the course of the following decade and a half, the rigid rule of 
prior construction quietly loosened its grip on the Oregon Supreme 
Court. In a number of cases, the court overruled a prior decision 
interpreting a statute. For example, in State v. Barnum, the court 
addressed whether a criminal defendant could be convicted of two 
separate burglary charges arising out of the same incident.235 
The court—somewhat summarily—answered the question in the 
affirmative, because the statute defining the offense merely referred to 
a defendant entering and remaining unlawfully in a dwelling with the 
intent to commit a crime, and because there was evidence that 
defendant had entered a dwelling with the intent to commit two 
different crimes.236 Four years later, in State v. White, the court 
overruled Barnum, commenting that the earlier decision had failed 
adequately to determine the legislature’s intent in enacting the statutory 
definition of the offense.237 “By assuming, rather than searching for, 
the legislative intent behind the burglary statutes,” the court explained, 
“this court in Barnum short-circuited the process.”238 White was 
undoubtedly correct in overruling Barnum, but the court’s failure to 
mention King or the rule of prior construction was something of an 
anomaly.  
Then, in 2011, the court finally overruled King and dispensed with 
its remarkable rule of prior construction altogether. In Farmers 
Insurance v. Mowry, the court was asked to reconsider a prior decision 
233 Id. at 608 n.7, 932 P.2d at 1152 n.7 (majority opinion). 
234 Id. 
235 333 Or. 297, 302–03, 39 P.3d 178, 182–83 (2002). 
236 Id. at 302–03, 39 P.3d at 181. 
237 341 Or. 624, 635–37, 147 P.3d 313, 319–20 (2006). 
238 Id. at 635, 147 P.3d at 319. 
628 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97, 583 
interpreting the state’s financial responsibility law.239 In that prior 
decision, Collins v. Farmers Insurance Co., the issue was what happens 
when the court invalidates an exclusion in a motor vehicle policy.240 
Does the invalidation have the effect of eliminating it entirely (and 
entitling a claimant to the stated policy limits), or does it instead simply 
not operate to exclude whatever minimum amount of coverage the law 
requires? Collins held that the applicable statutes required the latter 
answer.241 Twenty years later, Mowry presented pretty much the same 
case. The plaintiff’s argument was that Collins had been wrongly 
decided. The plaintiff insurer cited King and the court’s rule of prior 
construction, arguing that the court lacked authority to reconsider its 
earlier decision.242  
In an opinion by Justice (later Chief Justice) Balmer, the court in 
Mowry first addressed the legitimacy of King and its rigid rule of prior 
construction. The court noted that “[t]he strict application of the rule of 
prior construction has long been criticized as wrong in principle and 
unduly restrictive in practice,” citing Justice Durham’s separate 
opinion in Huddleston.243 It further noted that the rule appears to be 
based on a theory of legislative acquiescence, which the court 
dismissed as a “legal fiction that assumes, usually without foundation 
in any particular case, that legislative silence is meant to carry a 
particular meaning—as relevant here, affirmation of the judicial 
decision at issue.”244 Accordingly, the court concluded that “we 
disavow the inflexible rule of prior construction as set out in cases such 
as . . . King.”245 Instead, the court said, it would consider its prior 
decisions in light of the “prudential” doctrine of stare decisis, “defined 
by the competing needs for stability and flexibility in Oregon law.”246  
Turning to whether Collins needed to be overruled, the court 
answered that issue in the negative. It concluded that there were 
perfectly good arguments on the statutory construction question in 
dispute, all of which had been addressed in Collins.247 The parties in 
239 350 Or. 686, 688, 695–96, 261 P.3d 2, 2, 6–7 (2011). 
240 312 Or. 337, 822 P.2d 1146 (1991). 
241 Id. at 347, 822 P.2d at 1151. 
242 Mowry, 350 Or. at 692, 699, 261 P.3d at 5, 8.  
243 Id. at 695, 261 P.3d at 6 (citing State ex rel. Huddleston v. Sawyer, 324 Or. 597, 638–
44, 932 P.2d 1145, 1168–72 (1997) (Durham, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)). 
244 Id. at 696, 261 P.3d at 7. 
245 Id. at 697, 261 P.3d at 7.  
246 Id. at 697–98, 261 P.3d at 8. 
247 Id. at 699–700, 261 P.3d at 9. 
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Mowry had submitted no new arguments and no new evidence that the 
earlier decision was clearly incorrect.248  
The upshot of all this is that the Oregon Supreme Court’s prior 
construction will always be a relevant consideration in the first level of 
analysis of a statute’s text.249 But it doesn’t have the effect of 
unalterably determining the meaning of the statute. If a party believes 
that a prior decision was reached in error, that party has the tough 
burden of demonstrating a clear mistake. But prior judicial construction 
no longer has the rigid effect that it did in earlier years.  
(ii) Pre-PGE Cases and Their Relevance
To say that prior judicial construction always will be a relevant
consideration leads to a number of additional questions. First, does the 
fact that an earlier decision had been rendered without the benefit of 
PGE and Gaines detract from the relevance of the earlier decisions? 
Said another way, do pre-PGE decisions carry the same weight as post-
PGE decisions? In Mastriano v. Board of Parole, the supreme court 
categorically rejected the idea that, merely because a given prior 
construction predated PGE, it was less authoritative.250 The fact that a 
decision predates PGE, the court said, “provides no basis, in and of 
itself, to disregard its interpretation.”251 
An earlier decision seemed to suggest otherwise. In Morales v. SAIF, 
the court was confronted with several pre-PGE cases interpreting a 
provision of the workers’ compensation statutes.252 The court said that 
the earlier decisions were not controlling, because “this court did not 
analyze [the statute] under the now-familiar methodology for 
construing statutes that this court summarized in PGE. . . . This case 
presents the opportunity to do so.”253 There followed quite a number 
248 Id. at 704, 261 P.3d at 11. 
249 See, e.g., State v. Cloutier, 351 Or. 68, 100, 261 P.3d 1234, 1251 (2011) (“Our 
analysis of [the statute] is also informed by this court’s prior construction of that statute or 
its predecessors.”); Blacknall v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 348 Or. 131, 142, 
229 P.3d 595, 601 (2010) (“As context, those [prior] cases may illuminate or explain the 
meaning of the statutory text.”); Liberty Nw. Ins. Corp. v. Watkins, 347 Or. 687, 692, 227 
P.3d 1134, 1137 (2010) (“As part of that first level of analysis, this court considers its prior
interpretations of the statute.”); Mastriano v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 342
Or. 684, 693, 159 P.3d 1151, 1155 (2007) (“[W]e generally presume that the legislature
enacts statutes in light of existing judicial decisions that have a direct bearing on those
statutes.”).
250 342 Or. at 691–92, 159 P.3d at 1154–55. 
251 Id. at 692, 159 P.3d at 1155. 
252 339 Or. 574, 579, 124 P.3d 1233, 1236 (2005). 
253 Id. at 578–79, 124 P.3d 1235. 
630 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97, 583 
of cases in which parties argued that Morales, in effect, declared open 
season on any pre-PGE case. Mastriano, however, expressly 
disclaimed such a broad reading of Morales.254 
(iii) Prior Court of Appeals Decisions
There is also the issue of the significance of prior interpretations by
the Oregon Court of Appeals. The answer to that also is 
straightforward: at least in cases before the court of appeals, that court’s 
interpretations will have precedential effect and thus always will be a 
relevant consideration there. As the court of appeals has noted in many 
cases, “Prior construction of a statute by this court is always relevant 
to our analysis of the statute’s text.”255 When the case reaches the 
supreme court, the lower court’s interpretations are still of interest, 
though obviously in no way controlling. 
(iv) Prior Supreme Court Dicta
What about prior interpretations of the Oregon Supreme Court that
are merely dicta?256 After all, it is not unusual for the court to make an 
observation about the meaning of a statute that is not at issue in the 
course of deciding a case. It is common to see a statement that the court 
is not bound by a prior decision expressing a view about the meaning 
254 342 Or. at 691–92, 159 P.3d at 1154–55. 
255 State v. Bryan, 221 Or. App. 455, 459, 190 P.3d 470, 472 (2008), review denied, 347 
Or. 290 (2009); see also Waite v. Dempsey, 203 Or. App. 136, 141, 125 P.3d 788, 791 
(2005); Liberty v. State Dep’t of Transp., 200 Or. App. 607, 613, 116 P.3d 902, 905, adhered 
to as modified on reconsideration, 202 Or. App. 355 (2005), rev’d on other grounds, 342 
Or. 11, 148 P.3d 909 (2006); State v. Stubbs, 193 Or. App. 595, 600, 91 P.3d 774, 777, 
appeal decided, 195 Or. App. 762, review denied, 337 Or. 669 (2004). 
256 Defining precisely what constitutes dictum has proved difficult for courts and 
commentators alike. See generally Ryan S. Killian, Dicta and the Rule of Law, 41 PEPP. L. 
REV. 1, 7–8 (2013) (“[T]here is no real consensus on the correct definition.”). The classical 
formulation is that dictum is any statement in a judicial opinion that is not necessary to the 
outcome. See, e.g., JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 261 
(1921) (“In order that an opinion may have the weight of a precedent . . . it must be an 
opinion the formation of which is necessary to the decision of a particular case; in other 
words, it must not be obiter dictum.”). That’s the definition commonly cited by the Oregon 
Supreme Court. See, e.g., State ex rel. Huddleston v. Sawyer, 324 Or. 597, 621 n.19, 932 
P.2d 1145, 1159 n.19 (1997) (“[T]hat statement [was] dictum because it was not necessary
to the outcome of the case.”). But what is “necessary” to the decision can, sometimes, be
debatable. See, e.g., Engweiler v. Persson, 354 Or. 549, 558, 316 P.3d 264, 270 (2013)
(“Occasionally, it can be difficult to identify dictum in a court’s opinion, because
nonessential legal analysis and the assertions of immaterial legal propositions can be
shrouded by the certitude of the court’s views.”).
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of a statute when that expression is mere dictum.257 But there’s a bit 
more to it than that.  
The Oregon Supreme Court addressed the issue in some depth in 
Halperin v. Pitts.258 In that case, the question was whether a statute 
providing for an award of attorney fees in small tort actions required a 
prevailing defendant to make a timely written demand.259 The statute, 
ORS 20.080, includes two sections.260 The first section provides for an 
award of attorney fees to a plaintiff, if the plaintiff prevails in the 
action. It also spells out certain procedural prerequisites to such an 
award, including that the plaintiff make a timely written demand to the 
defendant before initiating the underlying action.261 The second 
subsection of the statute provides for an award of attorney fees to a 
defendant, if the defendant prevails in the action.262 But that second 
subsection says nothing about any procedural prerequisites, such as 
making a timely written demand on the plaintiff. In Halperin, the 
defendant prevailed by getting the plaintiffs’ claims for trespass 
dismissed.263 When the defendant asked for attorney fees, though, the 
plaintiffs objected that the defendant had not previously sent a demand 
letter. In support of their assertion, the plaintiffs relied on an earlier 
supreme court decision,264 Bennett v. Minson, in which the court had 
said that both plaintiffs and defendants must file written demands as 
prerequisites to an award of attorney fees.265  
The supreme court acknowledged that it had plainly said in Bennett 
what the plaintiffs had argued: both parties must file written demands 
to be entitled to an award of attorney fees.266 But, the court observed, 
in Bennett the only issue properly before the court was different from 
the issue in Halperin. The issue in Bennett, the court explained, was 
what the statute meant when it provided for attorney fees to a party that 
257 See, e.g., SAIF Corp. v. Allen, 320 Or. 192, 204, 881 P.2d 773, 780 (1994) (“[T]his 
court has declined to apply the doctrine of stare decisis to dictum in earlier statutory 
construction cases.” (citing Cutright v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 299 Or. 290, 301, 702 P.2d 403, 
409 (1985))); Godfrey v. Fred Meyer Stores, 202 Or. App. 673, 680, 124 P.3d 621, 625 
(2005), review denied, 340 Or. 672 (2006); State v. Thompson, 166 Or. App. 370, 375, 998 
P.2d 762, 765, review denied, 331 Or. 192 (2000).
258 352 Or. 482, 287 P.3d 1069 (2012).
259 Id. at 484, 287 P.3d at 1070.
260 OR. REV. STAT. § 20.080 (2007).
261 Id. § 20.080(1).
262 Id. § 20.080(2).
263 Halperin, 352 Or. at 485, 287 P.3d at 1071.
264 Id.
265 309 Or. 309, 315–16, 787 P.2d 481, 484 (1990).
266 Halperin, 352 Or. at 493–94, 287 P.3d at 1075.
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“prevailed,” not whether a written demand was required.267 Thus, the 
court concluded, when it expressed a view about whether the statute 
required a written demand by defendants, it expressed pure dictum, 
which had no precedential value:  
[A] court may consider itself bound to follow a prior construction as
a matter of stare decisis.
When the court’s prior construction is mere dictum, however, it 
has no such precedential effect. “Dictum” is short for “obiter 
dictum,” Latin for “something said in passing.” In judicial opinions, 
it commonly refers to a statement that is not necessary to the decision. 
. . . 
The fact that a prior construction amounts to dictum does not, by 
itself, mean that it was incorrect and without any force whatsoever. 
It merely means that we are not required to follow it as precedent. 
The prior construction, even if dictum, could have persuasive force 
because of the soundness of its reasoning.268 
With those principles in mind, the court turned to the question whether 
Bennett had such persuasive force. It readily concluded that the earlier 
case did not, because the wording of the second section could in no way 
reasonably be read to impose the requirement that Bennett had 
suggested.269  
In short, prior supreme court dictum may or may not have persuasive 
force, depending on the soundness of its analysis. But it does not have 
the precedential force of a prior construction of a statute squarely at 
issue before the court. 
(v) Cases From Other Jurisdictions: The “Borrowed Statute Rule”
Often the Oregon Legislature borrows phrasing from a statute that
originated in another jurisdiction. That makes sense. The wording of 
another jurisdiction’s statutes already has been carefully considered by 
the legislature that adopted it. And often that legislation has been 
interpreted by the courts of that jurisdiction. When the Oregon 
Legislature borrows statutory language, and when the borrowed statute 
already has been interpreted by the courts of that jurisdiction, the 
question arises: what is the value of those cases from the other 
jurisdiction?  
267 Id. 
268 352 Or. at 492–94, 287 P.3d at 1074–76 (emphasis omitted). 
269 Id. at 494–95, 287 P.3d at 1075–76. 
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The general rule is that when the Oregon Legislature borrows a 
statute from another jurisdiction, and that statute has been interpreted 
by the highest court in that jurisdiction, courts in Oregon will regard 
any such interpretation as authoritative.270 It’s hard to know where the 
“borrowed statute rule” came from. Certainly, it entails a significant 
fiction that the legislature of the borrowing state was even aware of the 
case law from the lending jurisdiction and intended to adopt it along 
with the borrowed statutory language. As I have noted above with 
respect to the rule of prior construction, it’s a bit whimsical to assume 
that the legislature of a given state is aware of its own state’s case law. 
It’s even more so to assume that a legislature is aware of another state’s 
case law. Still, the rule is fairly well established in Oregon and 
practically everywhere else. 
Some cases frame the rule as a “presumption.”271 At least then, the 
likelihood that the legislature intended to borrow another state’s case 
law can be rebutted. Other cases more appropriately refer to the rule as 
providing “useful context,”272 or as simply being “persuasive,” 
depending on the strength of reasoning involved,273 which is even 
better. Other cases, however, state the principle as an outright rule or 
“assumption.”274  
The borrowed-statute rule does come with a couple of important 
qualifications. First, and foremost, the rule applies only to the extent 
that the legislature actually borrowed statutory language from another 
jurisdiction’s laws; there is no basis to infer that the Oregon Legislature 
intended to borrow another jurisdiction’s case law interpreting a statute 
270 State v. Walker, 356 Or. 4, 23–24, 333 P.3d 316, 327 (2014) (“Oregon’s ORICO 
statute . . . was modeled on the federal RICO statute. . . . [F]ederal case law predating the 
enactment of ORICO therefore can provide useful context for interpreting our statute.”). 
271 Lindell v. Kalugin, 353 Or. 338, 355, 297 P.3d 1266, 1276 (2013) (“As a general 
rule, when the Oregon legislature borrows wording from a statute originating in another 
jurisdiction, there is a presumption that the legislature borrowed controlling case law 
interpreting the statute along with it.”). 
272 Walker, 356 Or. at 23–24, 333 P.3d at 327. 
273 BRS, Inc. v. Dickerson, 278 Or. 269, 275, 563 P.2d 723, 725–26 (1977) (“When one 
state borrows a statute from another state, the interpretation of the borrowed statute by the 
courts of the earlier enacting state ordinarily is persuasive.”). 
274 See, e.g., Jones v. Gen. Motors Corp., 325 Or. 404, 418, 939 P.2d 608, 616 (1997) 
(“If the Oregon legislature adopts a statute from another jurisdiction’s legislation, we 
assume that the Oregon legislature also intended to adopt the construction of the legislation 
that the highest court of the other jurisdiction had rendered before adoption of the legislation 
in Oregon.”); State v. Willy, 155 Or. App. 279, 284, 963 P.2d 739, 741 (1998) (“[I]n 
borrowing a statute from another state, the legislature is assumed to adopt the then existing 
case law interpretation of that statute . . . .” (quoting State v. Clark, 39 Or. App. 63, 65, 591 
P.2d 752, 754, review denied, 286 Or. 303 (1979))).
634 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97, 583 
if the Oregon Legislature didn’t actually borrow the other jurisdiction’s 
statute.275 That doesn’t mean that the Oregon Legislature has to borrow 
another jurisdiction’s statutory phrasing verbatim. The rationale of the 
rule would seem to suggest that the strength of the rule will vary 
depending on just how similar the borrowed language is. The greater 
identity of phrasing between the Oregon statute and its source, the 
stronger the likelihood that the legislature intended to borrow with it 
any controlling case law from the lending jurisdiction.276 If there is no 
similarity, there is no basis for the rule to apply at all.  
For example, in Taylor v. Baker, the court once again confronted 
Oregon’s summary judgment rule.277 The court noted that part of 
Oregon’s rule had been patterned after Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure. But one section of the federal rule—Rule 56(d)—the 
legislature did not adopt.278 The Oregon Supreme Court concluded that 
it was obliged to give weight to “federal cases interpreting those aspects 
of Rule 56, other than subsection (d) thereof, and decided prior to the 
enactment of this state’s summary judgment rule statute.”279 Federal 
cases interpreting the part that the Oregon Legislature chose not to 
adopt, in other words, weren’t considered at all.  
Unfortunately, the Oregon Supreme Court hasn’t been entirely 
consistent in adhering to that important qualification of the borrowed 
statute rule. In American Federation of State, County, and Municipal 
Employees, Council 75 v. City of Lebanon, the court applied federal 
case law construing parts of the National Labor Relations Act that the 
Oregon Legislature chose not to adopt when it enacted the state’s 
Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act, erroneously citing the 
borrowed statute rule.280 At issue in that case was whether a city was 
responsible for the actions of one of its council members when the 
council member wrote a letter to the local newspaper encouraging the 
275 See, e.g., State v. Nascimento, 360 Or. 28, 42 n.4, 379 P.3d 484, 491 n.4 (2016) (“We 
do not rely on federal court interpretations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act . . . 
because the text of the federal and state statutes have some differences . . . .”); Alfieri v. 
Solomon, 358 Or. 383, 410–11, 365 P.3d 99, 115 (2015) (declining to consider federal case 
law construing a part of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that the Council on Court 
Procedures chose not to adopt in drafting OR. R. CIV. P. 25 A). 
276 As the United States Supreme Court explained the rule in Carolene Products Co. v. 
United States, 323 U.S. 18, 26 (1944), the borrowed statute rule “varies in strength with the 
similarity of language.”  
277 279 Or. 139, 142–43, 566 P.2d 884, 887 (1977). 
278 Id. at 142 n.2, 566 P.2d at 886 n.2. 
279 Id. (emphasis added). 
280 360 Or. 809, 815–32, 388 P.3d 1028, 1032–41 (2017). 
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decertification of a labor union.281 There was no question that a public 
employer making such anti-labor statements amounts to a violation of 
the state law. There was a question, though, whether the council 
member’s statements could be attributed to the city, especially when 
the council member said that she was expressing her personal 
opinion.282 The statute defines a “public employer” as a government 
entity or “its designated representative.”283 It was undisputed that the 
council member was neither.284  
The court nevertheless concluded that the city was responsible for 
her statements, because city employees might reasonably believe she 
was speaking for the city.285 In reaching that conclusion, the majority 
relied on a line of cases interpreting the portion of the National Labor 
Relations Act defining who may commit an unfair labor practice under 
that law, which includes “any person acting as an agent of an employer, 
directly or indirectly.”286 The problem was, the Oregon Legislature 
omitted any reference to an “agent of the employer” in adopting the 
state law, and it was that phrase that was the basis for the federal court 
decisions on which the majority relied.287 Thus, the court relied on 
cases interpreting the part of the law that the Oregon Legislature chose 
not to borrow, directly contrary to Taylor. It remains to be seen whether 
the court’s decision will be regarded as an unfortunate aberration or a 
significant watering down of the borrowed-statute rule. 
281 Id. at 811, 388 P.3d at 1029. 
282 Id. at 811–13, 388 P.3d 1029–30. 
283 OR. REV. STAT. § 243.650(20) (2017) defines a “public employer” as “the State of 
Oregon and the following political subdivisions: Cities, counties, community colleges, 
school districts, special districts, mass transit districts, metropolitan service districts, public 
service corporations or municipal corporations and public and quasi-public corporations.” 
A “public employer representative” includes “any individual or individuals specifically 
designated by the public employer.” Id. § 243.650(21). OR. REV. STAT. § 243.672(1) (2017) 
then makes it unlawful for a public employer “or its designated representative” to engage in 
an unfair labor practice.  
284 Am. Fed’n of State, Cty., & Mun. Emps., Council 75, 360 Or. at 820–35, 388 P.3d at 
1034–42. 
285 Id. at 833–35, 388 P.3d at 1041. 
286 Id. at 824–33, 388 P.3d at 1036–41 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (2012)). 
287 The federal labor law defines an “employer” to include “any person acting as an agent 
of an employer, directly or directly.” 29 U.S.C. § 152(13). The federal cases construing that 
phrase have concluded that an “agent” of an employer includes any persons whom 
“employees could reasonably believe [were] reflecting company policy and speaking and 
acting for management.” Am. Door Co., 181 N.L.R.B. 37, 43 (1970). The court relied on 
those cases in construing the definition of “public employer” in ORS 243.650(2), despite 
the fact that the Oregon statute did not adopt the agency phrasing of the federal law. 
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A third qualification of the borrowed-statute rule is that it applies 
only to case law from the highest court in the lending jurisdiction. 
Lower court decisions may be regarded as persuasive, but they do not 
carry the same force as superior court decisions for obvious reasons.288 
A fourth qualification of the rule is that it applies only to decisions 
from the lending jurisdiction that existed when the Oregon Legislature 
enacted the statute. The rationale is that, at least theoretically, the 
legislature could have been aware of the case law that existed at the 
time it borrowed the language from the other jurisdiction’s law. That is 
not so with case law that did not yet exist at the time of enactment. 
In Oregon Occupational Safety & Health Division (OR-OSHA) v. 
CBI Services, Inc.,289 for example, the issue was what the Oregon Safe 
Employment Act means when it says that an employer is not liable for 
a serious violation if the employer “did not, and could not with the 
exercise of reasonable diligence,” know of the violation.290 The 
Oregon Court of Appeals concluded that, because the Oregon law was 
taken from the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act, it was 
appropriate to look to federal case law interpreting the federal law.291 
And that federal case law—much of it dating after the adoption of the 
Oregon statute—interpreted the federal law not to excuse an 
employer’s serious violation if the employer knew or should have 
known of the violation, taking into account a list of relevant factors.292 
On review, the Oregon Supreme Court concluded that the court of 
appeals had erred in relying on the federal case law that was published 
after the enactment of the Oregon statute: 
Court decisions that existed at the time that the legislature enacted a 
statute—and that, as a result it could have been aware of—may be 
consulted in determining what the legislature intended in enacting the 
law as part of the context for the legislature’s decision. That is so 
especially as to case law interpreting the wording of a statute 
borrowed from another jurisdiction. Case law published after 
enactment—of which the legislature could not have been aware—is 
another matter. That is not to say that later-decided federal cases 
cannot be persuasive. Decisions from other jurisdictions may carry 
288 See, e.g., Lindell v. Kalugin, 353 Or. 338, 355–56, 297 P.3d 1266, 1276 (2013) 
(stating that lower court decisions construing borrowed federal rules “are at least highly 
persuasive as to the intentions of the Oregon legislation in borrowing from the federal 
rules.”). 
289 356 Or. 577, 341 P.3d 701 (2014). 
290 Id. at 586–87, 341 P.3d at 707 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 654.086(2) (2013)). 
291 OR-OSHA v. CBI Services, Inc. 254 Or. App. 466, 476–77, 295 P.3d 660, 667 
(2013), aff’d on other grounds, 356 Or. 577 (2014). 
292 Id. at 476–78, 295 P.3d at 667–68. 
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weight, based on the force of the reasoning and analysis that supports 
them. But the fact that they involve similarly worded statutes, by 
itself, does not make the decisions controlling.293 
A final question arises concerning the application of the borrowed 
statute rule: whether it always applies or applies only when the statute 
is ambiguous. Some state courts have taken the latter position, resorting 
to the rule only when a statute has been determined to be ambiguous.294 
Oregon’s courts take the other approach, applying the rule and 
considering other jurisdiction’s cases as part of the textual analysis of 
the statute.295  
3. What Is Included In a Statute’s “Context”?
It wouldn’t be much of an overstatement to say that the meaning of
a statute can never be determined by examining its text alone. The 
meaning of words—in a statute or anywhere else—always is informed 
by the context in which they are used. The word “foul,” for example, 
can mean any number of different things in isolation—an offensive 
odor, a violation of rules, or a stray baseball.296 Depending on its 
context, the same word may be used as an adjective (a foul odor), a 
noun (a foul in basketball play), an adverb (that was foul), or a verb 
(the factory fouled the air).297 In interpreting the meaning of words, 
context can be everything.298  
293 356 Or. at 593, 341 P.3d at 710–11 (citation omitted); see also Hillenga v. Dep’t of 
Revenue, 358 Or. 178, 188, 361 P.3d 598, 603 (2015) (“Even if the [later] federal cases are 
not binding, their reasoning is persuasive.”); State v. Walker, 356 Or. 4, 24, 333 P.3d 316, 
328 (2014) (“Cases that came later, however, still may be consulted for their persuasive 
value.”). 
294 See, e.g., Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. State Tax Comm’n, 426 P.2d 231, 232 (Utah 1967) 
(“In the first place, [the borrowed statute rule] is applicable only where the terms of the 
statute are of doubtful import, so as to require construction; the rule will not be followed 
where the language of the statute is plain and free from ambiguity . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
295 See supra text at notes 270–74. 
296 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 897 (unabridged ed. 2002) 
[hereinafter WEBSTER’S THIRD]. 
297 Id. 
298 See, e.g., Vsetecka v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 337 Or. 502, 508, 98 P.3d 1116, 1119–
20 (2004) (“Viewed in isolation, that text provides support for employer’s position. 
Ordinarily, however, ‘text should not be read in isolation but must be considered in 
context.’” (quoting Stevens v. Czerniak, 336 Or. 392, 401, 84 P.3d 140, 144 (2004))); Lane 
County v. Land Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 325 Or. 569, 578, 942 P.2d 278, 283 (1997) 
(“[W]e do not look at one subsection of a statute in a vacuum; rather, we construe each part 
together with the other parts in an attempt to produce a harmonious whole.”); State v. Meek, 
266 Or. App. 550, 556, 338 P.3d 767, 770 (2014) (“Text, however, cannot be viewed in 
isolation, but must, instead, be considered in the totality of the statutory framework.”); Suchi 
v. SAIF Corp., 238 Or. App. 48, 54, 241 P.3d 1174, 1177 (2010) (“It is an elementary
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But what may fairly be considered a statute’s context? To answer 
that question, recall that Oregon statutory construction focuses, if 
possible, on the actual, specific intentions of the legislature that enacted 
a statute into law.299 That means that the “context” for a statute is 
essentially anything of which the legislature could have been aware at 
the time of a given enactment.  
I hasten to point out the use of the word “could” in that last 
statement. Even though Oregon statutory construction focuses on 
actual, specific legislative intent, the courts tend to be somewhat lax in 
their consideration of what constitutes evidence of that actual, specific 
intent. The courts tend to indulge some fairly broad—and, frankly, 
questionable—assumptions about what legislatures are aware of at the 
time of enactment. In general, whether or not there is evidence of what 
a given legislature actually was aware of at the time of enactment, 
Oregon law assumes that it was aware of a whole lot.300  
That doesn’t mean that all context is of equal weight. Even taking 
into account the generous assumptions that Oregon courts are willing 
to indulge in considering a statute’s context, there remains a sense that 
some context can be more persuasive than others. For example, it’s well 
established that a statute’s context includes other provisions of the 
same act.301 That is the sort of context the legislature is most likely to 
have been aware of and therefore is usually given the most weight. In 
contrast, other provisions of unrelated statutes that use the same terms 
as those in dispute may be considered a statute’s context, but it is so 
unlikely that the legislature was aware of such things that they tend to 
be given less weight. 
The focus on the legislature’s actual, specific intentions or 
understandings has another implication. Just as “context” generally 
consists of anything the legislature could have been aware of, it also 
does not include what the legislature could not have been aware of. 
That means that a statute’s context has a temporal component: it cannot 
include information that did not exist when the statute at issue was 
enacted. As the Oregon Supreme Court explained in Holcomb v. 
Sunderland, “The proper inquiry focuses on what the legislature 
principle of statutory construction in this state that we examine the meaning of a phrase in 
its context.”), review denied, 350 Or. 231 (2011). 
299 See supra text at notes 113–59. 
300 See supra text at notes 113–59. 
301 See infra text at notes 455–67. 
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intended at the time of enactment and discounts later events.”302 
Consequently, a statute’s context does not include laws that did not yet 
exist when the statute in dispute was enacted. Given the focus of the 
courts on the legislature’s actual, specific intentions, this temporal 
limitation makes sense. Although the courts are willing to indulge some 
significant fictions in defining a statute’s context, time travel is not one 
of them.  
That doesn’t mean that later-enacted statutes are completely 
irrelevant. Not infrequently, Oregon courts refer to later-enacted 
statutes for the purpose of demonstrating that the legislature has 
consistently used a term or terms over time. That pattern of consistent 
usage, the courts reason, provides at least indirect evidence of 
legislative intent.303 
a. Other Provisions of the Same Statute
Probably the most important type of context to consider in statutory
construction is other parts of the same statute. This is often referred to 
as the “whole act rule.”304 It’s one of the oldest statutory construction 
rules. Sir Edward Coke wrote in 1628 that “[i]t is the most natural and 
genuine exposition of a statute to construe one part of the statute by 
another part of the same statute, for that best express[es] the meaning 
302 321 Or. 99, 105, 894 P.2d 457, 460 (1995); see also State v. Gaines, 346 Or. 160, 
177 n.16, 206 P.3d 1042, 1054 n.16 (2009) (“Ordinarily, only statutes enacted 
simultaneously with or before a statute at issue are pertinent context for interpreting that 
statute.”); Stull v. Hoke, 326 Or. 72, 79–80, 326 P.2d 722, 725–26 (1997) (“[E]ven assuming 
that the present version of [the statute] provides contextual support for [amicus’s] position, 
it did not exist at the time that plaintiff filed his complaint . . . . Therefore, it cannot be 
context for what the legislature intended . . . .”). 
303 Halperin v. Pitts, 352 Or. 482, 490–91, 287 P.3d 1069, 1073–74 (2012); Clackamas 
Cty. Assessor v. Vill. at Main St. Phase II, 349 Or. 330, 345, 245 P.3d 81, 89 (2010) 
(examining exceptions to the 1907 statute adopted years later confirmed the meaning of the 
original statute); Gaines, 346 Or. at 177 n.16, 206 P.3d at 1054 n.16 (noting that “later 
enacted statutes can be of some aid in interpreting an earlier one” for the purpose of 
demonstrating the legislature’s consistent word usage or adherence to drafting conventions); 
Nibler v. Or. Dep’t of Transp., 338 Or. 19, 22–23, 105 P.3d 360, 361 (2005) (examining 
later-enacted statutes to determine whether the legislature intended to alter the well-
established meaning of a statutory term); Gladhart v. Or. Vineyard Supply Co., 332 Or. 226, 
234, 26 P.3d 817, 821 (2001) (examining contrasting phrasing of later-enacted statutes as 
“strong evidence” of what the legislature intended an earlier statute to mean). 
304 See, e.g., James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Canons of Construction and the Elusive 
Question for Neutral Reasoning, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1, 12–13 (2005) (discussing the “whole 
act rule”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in Statutory Interpretation, 137 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1007, 1037–39 (1989); John Morris, What Tautology?: How the Whole Act Rule Could 
Inform CERCLA’s Ownership Definition and Limit Lessees’ Liability, 44 TEX. ENVT’L L.J. 
267, 280–84 (2014). 
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of the makers.”305 It’s also one of the most frequently noted principles 
of construction by Oregon courts.306 The underlying rationale is that 
the legislature is most likely to have been aware of the other provisions 
of the same law, and it is reasonable to assume that the legislature 
intended each provision to be read in the context of the others, so as to 
make the law as a whole sensible. As assumptions about the legislature 
go, this one is among the more commonsensical.  
The idea that the legislature was likely aware of other parts of the 
“same statute” refers to other parts of the same bill, although the 
various parts might later be codified in different chapters or sections of 
the Oregon Revised Statutes.307 It also refers to other parts of the same 
chapter in which a disputed provision has been codified, even though 
other parts of the statute may have originated in other bills.308 
Occasionally, a law will include a statement of “findings” or 
legislative policy that expresses some of the factual predicates for the 
legislation or some overarching policy objectives.309 Courts will not 
hesitate to consider such statements as part of the context of a given 
statute.310 This practice, too, is commonsensical. The statements of 
305 1 EDWARD COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
381 (1628). 
306 See, e.g., Unger v. Rosenblum, 362 Or. 210, 221, 407 P.3d 817, 823 (2017) (“[W]e 
consider all relevant statutes together, so that they may be interpreted as a coherent, 
workable whole.”); State v. February, 361 Or. 544, 550–51, 396 P.3d 894, 900 (2017) (“Our 
consideration of context includes the structure of a statute as a whole.”); Wetherell v. 
Douglas County, 342 Or. 666, 678, 160 P.3d 614, 620 (2007) (“This court does not look at 
one subsection of a statute in a vacuum; rather, we construe each part together with the other 
parts in an attempt to produce a harmonious whole.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Lane County v. Land Conservation Dev. Comm’n, 325 Or. 569, 578, 942 P.2d 278, 283 
(1997) (“[W]e construe each part [of a statute] together with the other parts in an attempt to 
produce a harmonious whole.”); Morgan v. Jackson County, 290 Or. App. 111, 116, 414 
P.3d 917, 921 (“[W]e do not ordinarily focus on a single word or phrase in isolation.”),
review denied, 362 Or. 860 (2018).
307 See, e.g., State v. Ortiz, 202 Or. App. 695, 698–700, 124 P.3d 611, 612–13 (2005). 
308 Morsman v. City of Madras, 203 Or. App. 546, 561–62, 126 P.3d 6, 14–15, review 
denied, 340 Or. 483 (2006). 
309 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 308A.400(1) (2017) (“The Legislative Assembly finds 
that the State of Oregon has a rich diversity of plants, animals and other natural resources 
on private lands. Conservation and careful management of these resources is evident in 
Oregon’s working landscape and is essential to the economic and ecological health of 
Oregon.”); OR. REV. STAT. § 807.745(1) (2017) (“The Legislative Assembly finds that 
Oregon recognizes the importance of protecting the confidentiality and privacy of an 
individual’s personal information contained in driver licenses, driver permits and 
identification cards.”). 
310 See, e.g., Sundermier v. State ex rel. Pub. Emps. Ret. Sys., 269 Or. App. 586, 595, 
344 P.3d 1142, 1147 (“Statements of statutory policy are also considered useful for 
interpreting a statute.”), review denied, 357 Or. 415 (2015); Or. Cable Telecomms. v. Dep’t 
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policy are direct evidence of the legislature’s larger policy objectives, 
which can serve as a useful basis for sorting through competing 
interpretations of a statute.  
b. Other Statutes “In Pari Materia”
The “context” of a statute includes not just the statute that a disputed
provision is a part of, but also other statutes “in pari materia,” that is, 
on the same or a related subject.311 The rationale is that the legislature, 
in enacting a given statute, is likely to have been aware of other statutes 
on the same subject or on related subjects and intended all the related 
statutes to be interpreted consistently. This is stretching things just a 
bit, given how many statutes could be related to a given enactment. At 
the same time, it is not outrageous to assume that the legislature intends 
a statute and related other statutes to be construed together as a 
workable whole.  
The Oregon Supreme Court’s decision in Association of Unit 
Owners of Timbercrest Condominiums v. Warren provides a good 
illustration.312 The issue in that case was whether a motion for 
of Revenue, 237 Or. App. 628, 641, 240 P.3d 1122, 1129–30 (2010) (“The preamble to the 
bill further informs our understanding of the legislature’s intention . . . .”); Havi Grp. LP v. 
Fyock, 204 Or. App. 558, 564, 131 P.3d 793, 795 (2006) (statutory statement of general 
policy of workers’ compensation statutes provides context for particular substantive 
provisions); State v. McBroom, 179 Or. App. 120, 124 n.2, 39 P.3d 226, 228 n.2 (2002) 
(statutory statement of general policy of vehicle code is context for interpretation of specific 
provision pertaining to offense of failure to drive within a lane); Dep’t of Land Conservation 
& Dev. v. Jackson County, 151 Or. App. 210, 218, 948 P.2d 731, 736 (1997) (“Statutes and 
rules often contain statements of general policy, like the statement that DLCD cites in this 
rule. Such expressions can serve as contextual guides to the meaning of particular provisions 
of the statutes or rules, as much as any other parts of the enactment can.”), review denied, 
327 Or. 620 (1998). 
311 See, e.g., State v. Klein, 352 Or. 302, 309, 283 P.3d 350, 354 (2012) (a statute’s 
context includes “related statutes”); State v. Cloutier, 351 Or. 68, 98–100, 261 P.3d 1234, 
1250–51 (2011) (examining other sentencing statutes’ use of the word “maximum” to 
inform meaning of the word used in sentencing appellate review statute); Weems v. Bd. of 
Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 347 Or. 586, 595, 227 P.3d 671, 676 (2010) (relying on 
other, related statutes); State v. Carr, 319 Or. 408, 411–12, 877 P.2d 1192, 1194 (1994) 
(“Context includes other related statutes.”); see also State v. Werdell, 340 Or. 590, 596, 136 
P.3d 17, 20 (2006) (chiding court of appeals for reading a statutory word “in isolation, rather
than reading that word in pari materia with the wording of” other relevant subsections);
Springfield Util. Bd. v. Emerald People’s Util. Dist., 339 Or. 631, 643–44, 125 P.3d 740,
747 (2005) (noting “whether PUDs are ‘municipalities’ within the meaning of a particular
statute, [depends upon] the specific statutory context at issue”); State v. Hansen, 253 Or.
App. 407, 413, 290 P.3d 847, 850 (2012) (providing other provisions of the criminal code);
Simpson v. Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife, 242 Or. App. 287, 298, 255 P.3d 565, 570 (2011)
(looking at other related statutes to determine that “property” had a specialized meaning).
312 352 Or. 583, 595, 288 P.3d 958, 964 (2012). 
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reconsideration of an order granting summary judgment is a motion for 
a “new trial.”313 Oregon statutes provide different deadlines for filing 
a notice of appeal, depending on whether a motion for a “new trial” has 
been filed.314 The court noted that the statute did not define the term 
“new trial.” But the statute did expressly cross-reference Rule 64 of the 
Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs the procedure for 
obtaining a “new trial.”315 That rule, the court noted, also defined the 
term “new trial” as a “re-examination of an issue of fact in the same 
court after judgment,” which suggested something other than a request 
for reconsideration of a summary judgment ruling.316 Moreover, the 
court observed that “the manner in which the word ‘trial’ is used 
throughout the Oregon Rules of Civil Procedure makes clear that the 
word is used to connote something distinct from a summary 
judgment.”317 For example, Rule 47 C provides that a summary 
judgment motion has to be filed a specified number of days “before the 
date set for trial,” indicating that summary judgment and trials are 
distinct events.318 Thus, the way in which the key terms “new trial” and 
“trial” are used in related provisions was key to the court’s decision.319 
The opinion of the Oregon Court of Appeals in Rogozhnikov v. Essex 
Insurance Co. provides another good illustration.320 In that case, a cab 
driver’s customer pulled a gun on him and fatally shot him.321 The 
estate of the cab driver claimed uninsured motorist benefits from his 
automobile liability insurance company.322 The insurer was required 
by statute to provide such coverage when the insured was injured by 
the “operator” of an uninsured vehicle.323 The estate argued that the 
carjacker was, in effect, the “operator” of the cab, for which he had not 
313 Id. at 585, 288 P.3d at 959. 
314 Under ORS 19.255(1), subject to exceptions, “a notice of appeal must be . . . filed 
within thirty days after the judgment” has been entered. OR. REV. STAT. § 19.255(1) (2011). 
One exception is set out in ORS 19.255(2)(a), which provides that, when a motion for a new 
trial “is filed and serviced within the time allowed by ORCP 64,” the deadline is thirty days 
after the order disposing of that motion is entered. ORCP 64 F(1), in turn, says that the 
motion for a new trial must be filed no later than ten days after the entry of the judgment to 
be set aside.  
315 352 Or. at 591, 288 P.3d at 962. 
316 Id. (quoting OR. R. CIV. P. 64 A). 
317 Id. at 595, 288 P.3d at 964. 
318 Id. (quoting OR. R. CIV. P. 47 C). 
319 Id. 
320 222 Or. App. 565, 195 P.3d 400 (2008). 
321 Id. at 567, 195 P.3d at 401. 
322 Id. 
323 Id. at 567–58, 195 P.3d at 402. 
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obtained insurance.324 Is a carjacker, in other words, an “operator” of 
the car? 
The court of appeals said no. The court noted that the term 
“operator” had not been defined in the relevant insurance statutes, but 
that it had been defined in the state’s Motor Vehicle Code.325 That 
statute defined an “operator” of a motor vehicle as one “who is in actual 
physical control of a vehicle.”326 The court explained, “While that 
definition of ‘operator’ does not apply to the [insurance] statutes, it 
provides useful context, because the Motor Vehicle Code and the 
automobile insurance statutes both address the operation of motor 
vehicles.”327 Where the legislature uses the same term in different 
statutes on the same subject, the court explained, it is reasonable to 
infer that the term has the same meaning in all the related statutes.328 
A corollary to the principle that the context of a statute includes other 
related statutes is that it also includes judicial interpretations of those 
other related statutes.329 That makes sense. If the judicial construction 
of the statute itself is always relevant, it would seem to follow that 
judicial construction of related statutes is always relevant as well.  
Sometimes, the courts go even further and include as part of a 
statute’s context the legislative history of the related statutes. It’s 
difficult to explain the basis for that extension of the principle, given 
the likelihood that any member of the legislature (much less a majority) 
was aware not only of related legislation but also of the legislative 
history of that related legislation. Still, it is not uncommon for courts 
to refer to such material as part of a statute’s “context.”330  
324 Id. at 568, 195 P.3d at 402. 
325 Id. at 569, 195 P.3d at 403. 
326 Id. (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 483.008(2) (1967)). 
327 Id. at 569–70, 195 P.3d at 403. 
328 Id. (citing PGE v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 317 Or. 606, 611, 859 P.2d 1143, 1146 
(1993)). 
329 See, e.g., Keller v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 342 Or. 23, 35, 147 P.3d 1154, 
1161 (2006) (in construing statutes of limitation, the court considered its prior construction 
of other, similarly worded, statutes of limitation); Or. Cable Telecomms. v. Dep’t of 
Revenue, 237 Or. App. 628, 637–38, 240 P.3d 1122, 1127–28 (2010) (analyzing prior court 
interpretation of related statute as part of contextual analysis); Doe v. Medford Sch. Dist. 
549C, 232 Or. App. 38, 55, 221 P.3d 787, 796 (2009) (“Also relevant to our analysis of the 
statute is any prior judicial construction of it or related statutes.”); State v. Bryan, 221 Or. 
App. 455, 459, 190 P.3d 470, 472 (2008) (“Prior construction of a statute by this court is 
always relevant to our analysis of the statute’s text.”), review denied, 347 Or. 290 (2009). 
330 See, e.g., State v. Ofodrinwa, 353 Or. 507, 517, 300 P.3d 154, 159 (2013); Goodyear 
Tire & Rubber Co. v. Tualatin Tire & Auto, Inc., 322 Or. 406, 415–16, 908 P.2d 300, 306 
(1995), modified on reconsideration, 325 Or. 46, (1997); Lamb v. Coursey, 238 Or. App. 
647, 655, 243 P.3d 130, 134–35 (2010), review denied, 350 Or. 230 (2011); State v. Stamper, 
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I hasten to add at this juncture that, although the courts may look to 
the legislative history of related statutes as context, courts may only 
look to related statutes that the legislature actually enacted into law. A 
statute’s “context” doesn’t include the legislative history of related 
statutes that the legislature decided not to enact.331 
Whether a given statute is sufficiently “related” to form the 
“context” for a statute at issue is an interesting question. The answer 
appears to be that there’s no bright line between related statutes that 
may be referred to as “context” and unrelated statutes that may not. In 
fact, the courts sometimes cast a fairly wide net in examining other 
statutes as context in statutory construction cases. For instance, in Elk 
Creek Management Co. v. Gilbert, the court addressed the meaning of 
the term “retaliate” as it is used in the state’s landlord-tenant law in the 
context of “retaliatory eviction” claims.332 Specifically, the court 
determined whether the statute required the tenant to establish that, in 
retaliating, the landlord intended to cause the tenant some form of 
injury.333 The court’s analysis of the statute included an examination 
of the use of the word “retaliate” in a wide variety of other statutes, 
including those concerning retaliatory action against hospital 
employees,334 against public utility customers,335 against persons 
making child support payments,336 and against milk producers.337 The 
court observed that, throughout the statutes, the legislature appeared to 
use the term consistently.338 
Similarly, in State v. Holloway, the court addressed the meaning of 
a criminal statute involving manufacture and distribution of a 
controlled substance on “public land.”339 Finding no definition of the 
term in the criminal statutes, the court looked elsewhere. The court 
197 Or. App. 413, 420, 106 P.3d 172, 176 (“Also considered part of the broader context of 
a statute is the legislative history of related statutes.”), review denied, 339 Or. 230 (2005). 
331 See, e.g., Ofodrinwa, 353 Or. at 522 n.15, 300 P.3d at 162 n.15 (“Ordinarily, the 
failure to enact legislation, such as a proposed definition, does not provide persuasive 
evidence of the legislature’s intent.”); Berry v. Branner, 245 Or. 307, 311, 421 P.2d 996, 
998 (1966). 
332 353 Or. 565, 580–82, 303 P.3d 929, 938–39 (2013). 
333 Id. at 582, 303 P.3d at 939. 
334 Id. at 581, 303 P.3d at 938 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 441.174 (2013)). 
335 Id. at 581 n.13, 303 P.3d at 938 n.13 (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 774.140(1) (2013)). 
336 Id. (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 25.337(2) (2013)). 
337 Id. (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 430.673(3) (2013)).  
338 Id. at 580–81, 303 P.3d at 938. 
339 138 Or. App. 260, 262, 908 P.2d 324, 325 (1995). 
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observed that the term appeared in some 600 other statutes, all in a 
consistent manner.340 
The basic idea emerging from the cases is that the weight to assign 
to a statute’s context is relative. The closer the context is to the subject 
of the statute at issue, the stronger the inference that the legislature was 
probably aware of it and the greater weight it is likely to be given.341 
But just because some statutes do not directly concern the one in 
dispute does not necessarily mean that they are not relevant. Especially 
if they demonstrate a consistent pattern of usage across different 
subjects, as in the Elk Creek Management and Holloway cases, those 
statutes still may be very informative. 
c. Prior Versions of the Same Statute
Often, a statute is the latest version of one that has been subject to
amendments over the course of many years. In such cases, courts 
readily look to the history of those changes over time as part of the 
context of the statute, because the history of those changes in a statute’s 
phrasing can shed light on the meaning of the most recent version.342  
340 Id. at 265–67, 908 P.2d at 327–28. 
341 See, e.g., State v. Bailey, 346 Or. 551, 561 & n.4, 213 P.3d 1240, 1245 & n.4 (2009) 
(relying heavily on “closely” related statute as context); Herring v. Am. Med. Response 
Nw., Inc., 255 Or. App. 317, 320, 297 P.3d 9, 13 (remotely related statutes are not as 
persuasive), review denied, 353 Or. 867 (2013). 
342 See, e.g., Kohring v. Ballard, 355 Or. 297, 307–09, 325 P.3d 717, 724–26 (2014) 
(tracing history of venue legislation); State v. Ziska, 355 Or. 799, 806, 334 P.3d 964, 967–
68 (2014) (“Analysis of the context of a statute may include prior versions of the statute.”); 
Weldon v. Bd. of Licensed Prof’l Counselors & Therapists, 353 Or. 85, 92–93, 293 P.3d 
1023, 1027–28 (2012) (tracing enactment history of occupational licensing statutes); State 
ex rel. Portland Habilitation Ctr. v. Portland State Univ., 353 Or. 42, 54–55, 292 P.3d 537, 
544–45 (2012) (recounting history of various versions of mandamus statutes); State v. 
Cloutier, 351 Or. 68, 76–94, 261 P.3d 1234, 1239–48 (2011) (tracing ORS 138.050 from 
the Deady Code to present version); In re Marriage of Harris, 349 Or. 393, 402, 244 P.3d 
801, 807 (2010) (“[T]he context of a statutory provision, including its prior versions, is 
helpful in determining [the statute’s] reach.”); State v. Blair, 348 Or. 72, 76, 228 P.3d 564, 
566 (2010) (“[T]he context that we consider along with the text [of the criminal code] 
includes the law as it existed before the adoption of the 1971 criminal code.”); Dep’t of 
Revenue v. Faris, 345 Or. 97, 102, 190 P.3d 364, 366 (2008) (examining predecessor statutes 
as part of the context of the statute in dispute); Krieger v. Just, 319 Or. 328, 336, 876 P.2d 
754, 758 (1994) (“[W]ording changes adopted from session to session are a part of context 
of the present version of the statute being construed.”); see also Ware v. Hall, 342 Or. 444, 
449–51, 154 P.3d 118, 121–22 (2007); Nibler v. Or. Dep’t of Transp., 338 Or. 19, 22–23, 
105 P.3d 360, 361 (2005); State v. Murr, 254 Or. App. 456, 461–62, 295 P.3d 122, 126, 
review denied, 358 Or. 788 (2013); State ex rel. Juv. Dept. v. Z.D.B., 238 Or. App. 377, 
381, 242 P.3d 714, 716 (2010) (“[The statutory construction] analysis is informed by, among 
other things, prior versions of the statute[.]”); Belinskey v. Clooten, 237 Or. App. 106, 110, 
239 P.3d 251, 255 (2010) (“That [interpretation] is bolstered by consideration of the . . . 
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Again, the underlying rationale is that the legislature was, or at least 
could have been, aware of those changes when it enacted the most 
recent version into law. And, again, that can seem like a bit of a stretch. 
That said, statutes aren’t usually enacted in a vacuum; it’s common for 
the legislature to receive background information on the earlier history 
of a statute in hearings on its most recent iteration.343 
In re Marriage of Harris illustrates the principle.344 In that case, the 
Oregon Supreme Court resolved a dispute about the meaning of a 
statute authorizing a court in a dissolution of marriage case to award 
spousal support to compensate a spouse for contributing to another’s 
earning capacity.345 The court compared earlier versions of the statute 
with the most recent amendments and saw a “broadening of the types 
of contributions by one spouse that will qualify for an award of 
compensatory spousal support.”346 
d. The Common Law at the Time of Enactment
It’s not unusual for the legislature to enact a statute against a
backdrop of existing common law. In such cases, Oregon courts 
frequently state that they assume that the legislature was aware of that 
common law when it enacted the statute at issue.347 This principle, like 
context, which includes wording changes between that version and its predecessor.”), review 
denied, 349 Or. 601 (2011); Pete’s Mountain Homeowners Ass’n v. Or. Water Res., 236 Or. 
App. 507, 520, 238 P.3d 395, 402 (2010) (“Consideration of prior versions of a statute 
certainly is appropriate as part of a statute’s context.”); Montgomery v. City of Dunes City, 
236 Or. App. 194, 199, 236 P.3d 750, 752 (2010) (“Changes in the text of a statute over time 
are context for interpreting the version at issue in a given case.”); Farmers Ins. Co. of Or. v. 
Conner, 219 Or. App. 337, 343, 182 P.3d 878, 881 (noting that review of earlier versions of 
statute in dispute “is particularly instructive”), review denied, 345 Or. 94 (2008). 
343 See, e.g., State v. McNally, 361 Or. 314, 326–28, 392 P.3d 721, 728–29 (2017) 
(including testimony during legislative committee hearings concerning earlier versions of 
statute under consideration); Tharp v. Psychiatric Sec. Review Bd., 338 Or. 413, 426–30, 
110 P.3d 103, 109–12 (2005) (detailing legislative history that included consideration of 
earlier versions of legislation). 
344 349 Or. 393, 244 P.3d 801. 
345 Id. at 416–18, 244 P.3d at 815.  
346 Id. at 408, 244 P.3d at 810. 
347 See, e.g., Johnson v. Gibson, 358 Or. 624, 635, 369 P.3d 1151, 1157 (2016) (“We 
presume that the legislature was aware of that existing [common] law.”); Montara Owners 
Assn. v. La Noue Dev., LLC, 357 Or. 333, 341, 353 P.3d 563, 568 (2015) (“The context for 
interpreting a statute’s text includes the preexisting common law, and we presume that the 
legislature was aware of that existing law.”); State v. Nix, 355 Or. 777, 790–97, 334 P.3d 
437, 444–47 (2014) (interpreting animal cruelty statute in light of common-law history and 
prior versions of legislation), vacated, 356 Or. 768 (2015); Blachana, LLC v. Bureau of 
Labor & Indus., 354 Or. 676, 691, 318 P.3d 735, 744 (2014) (“We presume that the 
legislature was aware of existing law.”); Chase v. Chase, 354 Or. 776, 782–83, 323 P.3d 
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others I have mentioned with respect to a statute’s context, is predicated 
on a fiction of legislative omniscience. It’s a questionable assumption 
as an empirical matter, especially in the case of a citizen legislature 
with relatively few law-trained members. But the courts show no signs 
of backing down.  
To say that the courts assume that the legislature was “aware” of the 
common law doesn’t quite give a complete picture of what inferences 
the courts will draw from that awareness. Most often, the courts will 
assume that the legislature intended to incorporate any relevant 
common law in the absence of evidence to the contrary.  
Thus, for example, in Joshi v. Providence Health System of Oregon, 
the court construed the provision in the state’s wrongful death statute 
that requires proof that a defendant “caused” the death of the 
decedent.348 The decedent had arrived at a hospital complaining of a 
headache, blurred vision, and dizziness. The emergency room 
physician conducted some tests and eventually discharged the decedent 
with a prescription for pain medication. Several days later, the decedent 
returned to the hospital, where it was determined that he had suffered a 
stroke. Treatment was unsuccessful. When he later died, his estate 
brought a wrongful death action, claiming that had the emergency room 
physician given the decedent aspirin, it would have substantially 
266, 270 (2014) (“[T]he statutory history of ORS 82.010 and the case law underlying its 
evolution provide a clearer contextual picture.”); State v. Ofodrinwa, 353 Or. 507, 512, 300 
P.3d 154, 156 (2013) (“The context for interpreting a statute’s text includes the preexisting
common law.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Lindell v. Kalugin, 353 Or. 338, 349,
297 P.3d 1266, 1272 (2013) (“Case law existing at the time of the adoption” of the rule or
statute “forms a part of the context.”); Comcast of Oregon II, Inc. v. City of Eugene, 346
Or. 238, 254, 209 P.3d 800, 809 (2009) (“[W]e must be mindful of . . . settled law as part of
our analysis of statutory context.”); Mastriano v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision,
342 Or. 684, 693, 159 P.3d 1151, 1155 (2007) (“[W]e generally presume that the legislature
enacts statutes in light of existing judicial decisions that have a direct bearing on those
statutes.”); Fresk v. Kraemer, 337 Or. 513, 520–21, 99 P.3d 282, 286 (2004) (“Statutory
context includes other provisions of the same statute and other related statutes, as well as
the preexisting common law and the statutory framework within which the statute was
enacted.”); In re Marriage of Weber, 337 Or. 55, 67, 91 P.3d 706, 713 (2004) (“[T]his court
presumes that the legislature enacts statutes in light of existing judicial decisions that have
a direct bearing upon those statutes.”); State v. Pusztai, 269 Or. App. 893, 897–900, 348
P.3d 241, 243–44 (2015) (describing common-law background of statutory offense of
unlawful use of a vehicle); State v. Dasa, 234 Or. App. 219, 230–32, 227 P.3d 228, 234–35
(stating that preexisting felony murder case law provides context for determining the
meaning of current felony murder statute), review denied, 349 Or. 173 (2010); State v.
Spears, 223 Or. App. 675, 684–85, 196 P.3d 1037, 1041–42 (2008) (reviewing common-
law definition of larceny, including references to Blackstone and Bishop, as background for
Oregon’s statutory definition of the offense).
348 342 Or. 152, 155, 149 P.3d 1164, 1165–66 (2006). 
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increased his chances of surviving the stroke. At trial, the court directed 
a verdict for the defendant because the estate could not prove that it 
was reasonably probable that the defendant “caused” the decedent to 
die, only that it reduced his chances of surviving the stroke.349 On 
appeal, the estate argued that it should not be required to prove that it 
was reasonably probable that the defendant’s negligence caused the 
decedent to die.350  
The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed. The court noted that the term 
“cause” was not defined in the wrongful death statute, but it 
nevertheless had been enacted against a backdrop of case law 
concerning the issue of causation.351 “We assume that, in using the 
term ‘caused,’” the court explained, “the legislature intended to 
incorporate the legal meaning of that term that this court has developed 
in its cases.”352 Under those cases, the court observed, a standard of 
reasonable probability applied.353 
Once again, however, the courts aren’t consistent in treating the 
common-law context of statutes in this way. Take, for example, State 
v. Couch.354 Couch was charged with multiple violations of the state
wildlife laws for importing exotic species of deer not indigenous to
Oregon and then permitting hunting of those deer without a hunting
license. The case turned on whether the imported, nonindigenous deer
were “wildlife” within the meaning of the statutes that authorized the
state to regulate wildlife hunting.355
The Oregon Court of Appeals concluded that the nonindigenous deer 
were not “wildlife” within the meaning of the relevant statutes.356 The 
court began by observing that the only statutory definition of “wildlife” 
tautologically referred to “wild mammals.”357 So the court looked to 
the broader context of the state’s wildlife laws, including common-law 
conceptions of “wildlife” dating from the English common law and 
earlier. The court noted that, at common law, the only wildlife that was 
considered subject to state regulation were animals that were running 
349 Id. at 155–56, 149 P.3d at 1166.  
350 Id. at 159, 149 P.3d at 1168. 
351 Id. at 158, 149 P.3d at 1167. 
352 Id. 
353 Id. 
354 196 Or. App. 665, 103 P.3d 671 (2004), aff’d, 341 Or. 610 (2006). 
355 Id. at 670–71, 103 P.3d at 674–75.  
356 Id. at 678, 103 P.3d at 678.  
357 Id. at 673, 103 P.3d at 675–76. 
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wild in the jurisdiction, known by the Latin phrase “ferae naturae.”358 
The court noted that its understanding of common-law authority of the 
state was confirmed by Belanger v. Howard,359 an Oregon Supreme 
Court on all fours (sorry) with Couch.360  
The supreme court disagreed.361 The court noted that the statutes 
defined “wildlife” to include “wild mammals” and that the ordinary 
definitions of those words did not say anything about the animals 
needing to be wild in the jurisdiction that was regulating their 
capture.362 The court ignored the common-law context on which the 
court of appeals had relied and did not mention its earlier decision in 
Belanger. Go figure. 
Sometimes, the courts rely on the common-law context of a statute 
not to establish the assumed meaning of a statute but rather to show 
that the legislature intended to depart from it. That occurs when the 
common law stands in marked contrast to the wording of a statute on 
the same matter.363 
4. What Rules Apply to the Analysis of a Statute’s Text?
When courts examine the text of a statute in its relevant context, they
bring to the task a number of well-established “rules,” “canons,” or 
“maxims” of statutory construction. There’s no difference between a 
rule, a canon, and a maxim, by the way. They are all words for the same 
thing.  
There are a lot of these rules. Scalia and Garner, in their book 
Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, list sixty-one 
canons,364 and they are being quite selective, as textualists are wont to 
358 Id. at 673–76, 103 P.3d at 675–77. 
359 Id. at 677–78, 103 P.3d at 677–78 (citing Belanger v. Howard, 166 Or. 408, 112 P.2d 
1022 (1941)). 
360 196 Or. App. at 677, 103 P.3d at 677–78. In Belanger, the defendants bred “Yukon 
brood” minks without a license. 166 Or. at 412, 417, 112 P.2d at 1024–25. When they sold 
their farm along with the minks, the buyers alleged fraud. Id. at 410, 112 P.2d at 1023. The 
buyers argued that, because the defendants had bred the minks without a license, they lacked 
lawful title to the animals. Id. at 418–19, 112 P.2d at 1026. The supreme court disagreed, 
reasoning that, because the particular breed of minks was not indigenous to Oregon, they 
were not part of the wildlife subject to state regulation. Id. at 420, 112 P.2d at 1027. 
361 341 Or. 610, 147 P.3d 322 (2006). 
362 Id. at 617–18, 147 P.3d at 326. 
363 See, e.g., Gragg v. Hutchinson, 217 Or. App. 342, 350, 176 P.3d 407, 411 (2007) 
(noting that, in contrast with broader common-law rule, legislature enacted collateral source 
statute without an exception for evidence of collateral benefits to show bias or interest of a 
witness), review denied, 344 Or. 401 (2008). 
364 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 48. 
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do.365 The classic work on the subject, Sutherland on Statutory 
Construction, fills eight volumes cataloging practically every canon 
ever mentioned (and, as we’ll see shortly, making up some, as well).366 
I will not plow through them all. Instead, I will discuss several of the 
textual canons that are most frequently cited by Oregon courts. 
The textual canons of construction are rooted in assumptions about 
the ways that language works, as well as assumptions about what 
legislatures know and intend. Those assumptions can be problematic. 
Some of the canons assume that language works in ways that make 
linguists cringe. The rule of consistency is one example. The rule of the 
last antecedent is another. Other canons are predicated on assumptions 
about legislatures that, as in the case of context, are somewhat 
unrealistic. That legislators are aware of, and intend courts to honor, 
the rules of ejusdem generis or expressio unius, for instance, is highly 
unlikely. The same holds true of the assumption that legislators are 
familiar with abstruse principles of grammar and syntax. That does not 
stop the courts from relying on those assumptions, however. 
The canons have been subjected to withering criticism over the years 
for being not only of questionable validity but also contradictory. The 
great Karl Llewellyn authored perhaps the most cited law review article 
on statutory construction ever concerning the contradictory nature of 
the so-called rules of construction.367 He listed twenty-eight pairs of 
seemingly contradictory canons of statutory construction, citing 
authorities for each.368 Thus, for example, Llewellyn cited the familiar 
canon that “[a] statute cannot go beyond its text” and then paired it with 
the opposing canon that “[t]o effectuate its purpose, a statute may be 
implemented beyond its text.”369 Ever the realist, Llewellyn’s thesis 
was that, because every canon had an opposite, judicial decisions 
obviously are not driven by such rules but by unspoken grounds for 
selecting one over the other.370  
365 See Bradford Mank, Textualism’s Selective Canons of Statutory Construction: 
Reinvigorating Individual Liberties, Legislative Authority, and Deference to Executive 
Agencies, 86 KY. L.J. 527 (1997–98). 
366 1–8 SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION (Norman J. Singer 
ed., 6th ed. 2002). 
367 Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decisions and the Rules or 
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950). 
368 Id. at 401–06. 
369 Id. at 401. 
370 As Llewellyn put it, “Plainly, to make any canon take hold in a particular instance, 
the construction contended for must be sold, essentially by means other than the use of the 
canon . . . .” Id.  
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Llewellyn’s critique never took hold in the judiciary. As Judge 
Richard Posner quipped, “Although there is a fine literature debunking 
the canons of construction, one has only to skim any recent volume of 
the Federal Reporter or the United States Reports to discover that it 
has had little impact on the judicial reading of statutes.”371 Even among 
legal scholars, there has emerged something of a consensus that 
Llewellyn probably exaggerated, that the rules are not so much 
contradictory as qualified under appropriate circumstances.372 
That consensus strikes me as undoubtedly correct. Still, I think that 
a fair measure of skepticism is in order whenever applying these rules 
of textual construction. They are, as I said, assumptions about language 
and legislative intentions. Those assumptions should readily give way 
when more persuasive evidence of legislative intent is available. 
Moreover, as I’ll discuss in greater detail as we get to the individual 
rules, the textual canons of construction are based on rationales that, 
when properly understood, should serve to limit their application. It’s 
important not to get carried away when applying these rules.  
a. Ordinary Meaning Rule
If the legislature defines a term, then that’s what it means. Period. It
doesn’t matter whether the legislature’s definition comports with our 
understanding of what words ordinarily mean or how they function in 
a sentence or a paragraph.373 Remember, the goal of statutory 
371 Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—in the Classroom and in the 
Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 801 (1983).  
372 See, e.g., Anita S. Krishnakumar & Victoria F. Nourse, The Canon Wars, 97 TEX. L. 
REV. 163, 163 (2018) (“Canons are taking their turn down the academic runway in ways 
that no one would have foretold just a decade ago.”); John F. Manning, Legal Realism and 
the Canons’ Revival, 5 GREEN BAG 2D 283, 284 (2002) (“[A] large and growing number of 
academics (and academics-turned-judges) now believe in the utility of canons of 
construction . . . .”); Michael Sinclair, “Only a Sith Thinks Like That”: Llewellyn’s “Dueling 
Canons,” One to Seven, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 919 (2005) (examining Llewellyn’s first 
seven pairs of canons and finding little real conflict); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes 
in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 452 (1989) (“In fact, however, 
[Llewellyn’s] claim of indeterminacy and mutual contradiction was greatly overstated.”). 
Justice Hans Linde echoed that sentiment in Davis v. Wasco Intermediate Education 
District, 286 Or. 261, 274, 593 P.2d 1152, 1158 (1979), in noting of the canons that “[e]ach 
of these common sense approaches fits some cases but not others, each has ‘exceptions’ and 
opposite-and-equal counterparts, and each causes more harm than it is worth if it is not 
cheerfully ignored whenever it is an obstacle to understanding what the legislature enacted.” 
373 See, e.g., Patton v. Target Corp., 349 Or. 230, 239, 242 P.3d 611, 616 (2010) (“Of 
course, the legislature is free to define words to mean anything that it intends them to mean, 
including defining words in a manner that varies from a dictionary definition or common 
understanding.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).  
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construction is legislative intent. If the legislature defined a term, then 
it’s clear what it intended the term to mean. So, for instance, if the 
legislature chooses to define the term “doctor” for purposes of the 
state’s workers’ compensation statutes to include nurse practitioners, 
then that’s what the statute means, even though in ordinary parlance it 
would be unusual to equate the two.374 
Problems arise when the legislature doesn’t define its terms. In such 
cases—and that’s most statutory construction cases—courts will 
invoke an assumption that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, 
the legislature intended that words mean what they ordinarily mean.375 
The rationale here is pretty obvious: legislators are ordinary people, 
an assumption that seems especially fair in the case of a 
nonprofessional, citizen legislature like Oregon’s. And ordinary people 
tend to communicate by means of a set of shared understandings about 
the meaning of words. Moreover, the ordinary legislators enact laws 
that are designed to be understood, at least in most cases, by ordinary 
people.  
I’m aware of the fact that there is a fair amount of academic literature 
that contests the very idea that any word has an ordinary meaning.376 
Common experience would seem to refute that, though. The fact is that, 
day in and day out, human affairs are conducted by means of a 
374 Cook v. Workers’ Comp. Dep’t, 306 Or. 134, 143 n.5, 758 P.2d 854, 859 n.5 (1988). 
375 State v. Eastep, 361 Or. 746, 751, 399 P.3d 979, 982 (2017) (“When statutes do not 
define their terms, we assume that the legislature intended them to have their plain, ordinary 
meanings.”); State v. Dickerson, 356 Or. 822, 829, 345 P.3d 447, 452 (2015) (“When the 
legislature does not provide a definition of a statutory term, we ordinarily look to the plain 
meaning of the statute’s text to determine what particular terms mean.”); Ogle v. Nooth, 355 
Or. 570, 578, 330 P.3d 572, 578 (2014) (“We give words of common usage their plain 
ordinary meaning.”); State v. Walker, 356 Or. 4, 14, 333 P.3d 316, 322 (2014) (“Because 
the term ‘enterprise’ is not otherwise defined, we also consider its ordinary meaning.”); 
Stuart v. Pittman, 350 Or. 410, 418, 255 P.3d 482, 486 (2011) (“Words of common usage, 
such as ‘clear’ and ‘express,’ should be given their plain and ordinary meaning.”); Haynes 
v. Tri-Met, 337 Or. 659, 663, 103 P.3d 101, 104 (2004); State v. Powell, 242 Or. App. 645,
653, 256 P.3d 185, 190 (2011); Barrett v. Dep’t of Corr., 203 Or. App. 196, 200, 125 P.3d
98, 100 (2005), review denied, 341 Or. 197 (2006); Guild v. Baune, 200 Or. App. 397, 403,
115 P.3d 249, 253, adhered to on reconsideration, 201 Or. App. 514, (2005).
376 See, e.g., Stanley E. Fish, Normal Circumstances, Literal Language, Direct Speech 
Acts, the Ordinary, the Everyday, the Obvious, What Goes Without Saying, and Other 
Special Cases, 4 CRITICAL INQUIRY 625 (1978), reprinted in STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A 
TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES 269 (1980); 
Thomas R. Lee & Stephen C. Mouritsen, Judging Ordinary Meaning, 127 YALE L.J. 788 
(2018); Stephen C. Mouritsen, Hard Cases and Hard Data: Assessing Corpus Linguistics 
as an Empirical Path to Plain Meaning, 13 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 156, 178 (2011) 
(explaining that it is a “fiction” that “an objective measure for the ‘ordinary meaning of a 
given’ term may be determined through ‘judicial introspection’”). 
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generally accepted set of understandings about language. Moreover, 
whatever its theoretical plausibility, the idea of unavoidable 
indeterminacy doesn’t help much in the real world, where judges have 
to decide what statutes mean and how they apply. Not surprisingly, 
judges throughout the country tend to be untroubled by theoretical 
indeterminacy and embrace instead the ordinary meaning rule.377  
The real challenge posed by the ordinary meaning rule is 
determining what the ordinary meaning of a given statutory word or 
term actually is. Judges are not inclined simply to assert that the 
ordinary meaning of a statute is “obvious” and leave it at that.378 
Instead, they tend to look to some external sources that establish the 
ordinary meaning of terms in dispute.  
The external source of choice in Oregon is a dictionary.379 And not 
just any dictionary. At least since PGE, the courts have shown a marked 
377 See, e.g., BRIAN G. SLOCUM, ORDINARY MEANING: A THEORY OF THE MOST 
FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLE OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 4 (2015) (“[T]hat language in legal 
texts should be interpreted in accordance with its ordinary meaning is a uniformly accepted 
presumption among judges. In fact, it is perhaps the most widely cited axiom of legal 
interpretation.”); SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 48, at 69 (“The ordinary-meaning rule is 
the most fundamental semantic rule of interpretation.”). 
378 For an amusing, and unusual, example to the contrary, see the United States Supreme 
Court’s decision in Nix v. Hedden, 149 U.S. 304 (1893), in which the Court determined it 
was obvious that—contrary to dictionary definitions—a tomato is a vegetable and not a fruit. 
379 Jenkins v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 356 Or. 186, 194, 335 P.3d 828, 
833 (2014) (“Because the legislature has not expressly defined the words in the disputed 
phrase, dictionary definitions . . . can be useful.”); State v. Newman, 353 Or. 632, 641, 302 
P.3d 435, 440 (2013) (“We have recognized that ‘conscious’ . . . is a word of common
usage. Accordingly, we turn to the dictionary for further guidance.” (citation omitted));
Dep’t of Revenue v. Faris, 345 Or. 97, 101, 190 P.3d 364, 365 (2008) (“The word ‘certify’
is not statutorily defined. Thus, we look to the dictionary.”); State v. Murray, 340 Or. 599,
604, 136 P.3d 10, 12 (2006) (“Absent a special definition, we ordinarily would resort to
dictionary definitions, assuming that the legislature meant to use a word of common usage
in its ordinary sense.”); In re Marriage of Massee, 328 Or. 195, 202, 970 P.2d 1203, 1209
(1999) (“The statute provides no definition of [“homemaker”]. Thus, we rely for the
meaning of the term “homemaker” on its common dictionary definition . . . .”); State v.
Kimble, 236 Or. App. 613, 618, 237 P.3d 871, 874 (2010) (“When the legislature has not
provided an express definition for a particular term, we generally look to the term’s plain
and ordinary meaning.”); see also Pete’s Mountain Homeowners Ass’n v. Or. Water Res.
Dep’t, 236 Or. App. 507, 516–17, 238 P.3d 395, 400 (2010) (“The usual source for
determining the ordinary meaning of statutory terms is a dictionary of common usage.”).
Since the 1990s, dictionaries have also become more commonly cited in United States
Supreme Court opinions, a fact that has generated quite a bit of scholarly commentary. See,
e.g., Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress:
The United States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 227 (1999); Note,
Looking It Up: Dictionaries and Statutory Interpretation, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1437 (1994).
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preference for Webster’s Third New International Dictionary,380 so 
much so that I once authored an only slightly tongue-in-cheek article 
characterizing Noah Webster as the Oregon Supreme Court’s “eighth 
justice.”381  
Why Webster’s and not, say, the American Heritage or the Oxford 
dictionary? Fair question. The answer lies in recognizing that not all 
dictionaries are the same. Some take what lexicographers call a 
“prescriptive” approach and report the “correct” usage of words. Others 
adopt a “descriptive” approach and simply report actual, ordinary 
usage, whether or not it is in some sense “correct.”382 Before 1961, 
most dictionaries purported to be prescriptive. But in 1961, the editors 
of Webster’s Third New International Dictionary decided to take a 
different approach and describe actual usage. The literary world was 
appalled. The editors of the august New York Times refused even to call 
Webster’s Third a “dictionary.”383 (They referred to it as a “word 
book.”384) To this day, Webster’s Third has its critics. Scalia and 
Garner, for example, complain that it is a “notoriously permissive” 
dictionary that includes “doubtful, slipshod meanings without adequate 
usage notes.”385 (They prefer the more prescriptive American Heritage 
Dictionary.) 
When it’s recalled that the object of statutory construction in Oregon 
is to determine what the state’s legislators actually intended, resorting 
to Webster’s Third seems sound enough. If it’s assumed that those 
legislators use words in their ordinary senses, then it’s understandable 
380 WEBSTER’S THIRD, supra note 296. A recent Westlaw search revealed that, since 
1993, the Oregon courts have cited Webster’s Third in 1465 cases.  
381 Jack L. Landau, The Eighth Justice? Webster, His Dictionary, and Its Influence on 
Oregon Law, 2007 OR. APP. ALMANAC 65. For a detailed history of the use of dictionaries 
in Oregon appellate court case law, see generally Nora Coon, 161 Years of Dictionary Use 
in the Oregon Appellate Courts, 55 WILLAMETTE L. REV. (forthcoming 2019). 
382 For a more detailed description of the history of the role of “correctness” in 
lexicography, see generally SIDNEY I. LANDAU, DICTIONARIES: THE ART AND CRAFT OF 
LEXICOGRAPHY 244–54 (2d ed. 2001). 
383 DICTIONARIES AND THAT DICTIONARY 78 (James Sledd & Wilma Ebbitt eds. 1962). 
The Times was not alone in condemning Webster’s Third. The Washington Post called it a 
“monstrosity.” Id. at 125. Garry Wills, writing for the National Review, referred to it as 
“madness.” Id. at 131. 
384 Id. at 78. The Times charged that “Webster’s has, it is apparent, surrendered to the 
permissive school that has been busily extending its beachhead on English instruction in the 
schools. This development is disastrous because, . . . it serves to reinforce the notion that 
good English is whatever is popular.” Id. 
385 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 48, at 418, 422. Justice Scalia vented about Webster’s 
Third in MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. A.T. & T. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 228 n.3 (1994), noting that 
it cited as proper usage of “infer” to mean “imply.” The horror.  
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that the court would look to a dictionary that reports ordinary usage. In 
any event, that’s the explanation that the Oregon Supreme Court 
offered in Kohring v. Ballard.386 
In most cases, it won’t make much difference which dictionary gets 
consulted. It’s going to be an unusual case in which the meaning of a 
statute will turn on whether a word is defined by what it is supposed to 
mean, as opposed to what it commonly is taken to mean. My own 
practice—and my advice to other judges and advocates—is always to 
cite more than one dictionary.387 Doing that is more persuasive. 
Demonstrating that a word or phrase is consistently defined across 
multiple sources makes it more likely that you have identified its 
“ordinary” usage and avoids the possibility that dictionary selection 
affects the argument. 
Especially when a statute is of more ancient vintage, it seems 
important to canvas a variety of sources to establish the ordinary 
meaning of a term at the time. Seventeenth-, eighteenth-, and 
nineteenth-century dictionaries were notoriously idiosyncratic.388 
Samuel Johnson’s famous dictionary refused to ever quote Thomas 
Hobbes.389 Noah Webster’s original 1828 dictionary reflected his 
unique patriotic and overtly religious notions of what he thought 
English should look like.390 When construing an old statute, it’s always 
best to cast a wide lexicographical net. 
386 355 Or. 297, 304 n.2, 325 P.3d 717, 722 n.2 (2014). 
387 See, e.g., State v. Lane, 357 Or. 619, 626, 355 P.3d 914, 919 (2015) (citing Webster’s 
Third, American Heritage Dictionary, and The Oxford Dictionary); State v. Ziska, 355 Or. 
799, 805, 334 P.3d 966, 967 (2014) (citing the 1910 edition of Webster’s, The Encyclopaedic 
Dictionary, and The Century Dictionary); State v. Nix, 355 Or. 777, 782–83, 334 P.3d 437, 
440 (2014) (citing Webster’s Third, The Oxford English Dictionary, and The American 
Heritage Dictionary), vacated on other grounds, 356 Or. 768 (2015). 
388 For a terrific critique of relying on old dictionaries for determining the meaning of 
old statutes, see generally Rickie Sonpal, Note, Old Dictionaries and New Textualists, 71 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2177 (2003). For a more in-depth history of lexicography, see generally 
JONATHON GREEN, CHASING THE SUN: DICTIONARY MAKERS AND THE DICTIONARIES 
THEY MADE (1996). 
389 And it is chock-full of his nationalist prejudices. Consider, for instance, his definition 
of “oats”: “A grain, which in England is generally given to horses, but in Scotland supports 
the people.” SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (unpaginated) 
(1755). Bill Bryson reports that Johnson similarly called “colonists” a “race of convicts” 
who “ought to be grateful for anything we allow them short of hanging.” BILL BRYSON, 
MADE IN AMERICA: AN INFORMAL HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE IN THE UNITED 
STATES 73 (1994).  
390 Webster, whom Bryson describes as a “severe, correct, humorless, religious, 
temperate man who was not easy to like, even by other severe, religious, temperate, 
humorless people,” was disdainful of dictionaries (like Johnson’s) that included references 
to such “low” authors as Shakespeare, and preferred examples taken from the King James 
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There’s much more to using a dictionary than just looking up a word, 
though.  
First, there’s a temporal variable. Recall again that the object of 
statutory construction is to determine what the Oregon Legislature 
actually intended a statute to mean. As we have already seen with 
respect to determining a statute’s context, that focus on the legislature’s 
actual intentions necessarily means that those intentions must be 
defined as of a specific point in time—the date of enactment. In other 
words, determining the ordinary meaning of otherwise undefined 
statutory terms is to determine that ordinary meaning at the time of 
enactment.  
Looking at the ordinary meaning at the time of enactment is 
important because the meaning of words can change over the years. 
Once upon a time, the word “meat” referred to any sort of food391 
(“meat and drink”);392 now it refers to animal flesh.393 Once, the word 
“nice” meant foolish;394 now it means pleasant or agreeable.395  
Such changes in meaning occur in the law. My favorite example is 
a United States Supreme Court decision in Saint Francis College v. Al-
Khazaraji.396 The issue in that case was whether a college had violated 
the 1876 Civil Rights Act when it denied a professor tenure because he 
had been born in Iraq.397 The professor argued that he had been 
Bible. BILL BRYSON, THE MOTHER TONGUE: ENGLISH AND HOW IT GOT THAT WAY 154–
57 (1990). That would seem to make Webster’s 1828 dictionary a poor indicator of common 
usage, given that so many of the examples were taken from a source that was more than 200 
years old at the time. I would venture to guess that few if any Americans in the 1820s were 
going around saying Jacobean things like, “Anon, anon, sir—Score a pint of bastard in the 
Half-moon.” WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE FIRST PART OF KING HENRY THE SIXTH act 1, 
sc. 2.  
391 The Oxford English Dictionary, for example, lists the original meaning of the word 
as “[f]ood in general; anything used as nourishment for men or animals”). IX OXFORD 
ENGLISH DICTIONARY 530 (2d ed. 1989); see also WEBSTER’S THIRD, supra note 296, at 
1400 (defining “meat” as “something eaten by man or beast for nourishment”). 
392 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, AS YOU LIKE IT, act 5, sc. 1 (“It is meat and drink to me to 
see a clown.”). 
393 WEBSTER’S THIRD, supra note 296, at 1400 (“animal tissue used as food”). 
394 Interestingly, the Oxford English Dictionary lists the earliest meaning of the word 
“nice” as “foolish, stupid, senseless.” X OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 391, at 
386. Webster’s Third, on the other hand, lists the earliest meaning of the word as “lewd,
wanton, dissolute.” WEBSTER’S THIRD, supra note 296, at 1523.
395 WEBSTER’S THIRD, supra note 296, at 1523 (defining the word “nice” as “pleasant 
and satisfying”). 
396 481 U.S. 604 (1987). 
397 Id. at 608. 
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unlawfully discriminated against because of his “race.”398 The college 
argued discrimination on the basis of ancestry is not the same thing as 
discrimination on the basis of “race.”399 The Supreme Court sided with 
the professor, noting that, although the college was correct that modern 
conceptions of “race” did not include mere ancestry, the fact remained 
that, when Congress enacted the law in the late nineteenth century, 
“race” was understood in a much broader, inclusive sense.400 
Closer to home, the Oregon Court of Appeals faced a similar 
problem in State v. Leslie.401 In that case, the defendant had been 
charged with unlawful possession of a firearm, which the police had 
found concealed in a truck where he had been living.402 The defendant 
argued that the charges should have been dismissed because of a 
statutory exemption for firearms found in a “place of residence.”403 He 
argued that he had been living in his truck, and it was his “place of 
residence.”404 He cited Webster’s Third, which broadly defined a 
“residence” as the place “where one actually lives.”405 The court, 
however, noted that the statute had been enacted nearly a hundred years 
earlier, and contemporaneous dictionaries defined the word 
“residence” in a narrower sense of a “fixed and permanent abode.”406  
Because the legislature enacts legislation at specific points in time, 
and because the meaning of words can change with time, when looking 
for evidence of the “ordinary meaning” of a statute, it’s important to 
consult dictionaries that will show the meaning of words at the time of 
enactment.407  
Second, dictionaries will hardly ever report a single, settled meaning 
of a given term. The English language is simply too complex and 
398 Id. at 606. 
399 Id. at 609. 
400 Id. at 610–13. 
401 204 Or. App. 715, 132 P.3d 37 (2006). 
402 Id. at 717, 132 P.3d at 38. 
403 OR. REV. STAT. § 166.250(2)(b) (2005). 
404 204 Or. App. at 718–19, 132 P.3d at 38–39. 
405 Id. at 719–20, 132 P.3d at 39. 
406 Id. at 722–23, 132 P.3d at 40–41. 
407 See, e.g., Nw. Nat. Gas Co. v. City of Gresham, 359 Or. 309, 327–28, 374 P.3d 829, 
840–41 (2016) (examining 1914 and 1930 dictionaries in construing 1911 statute); Comcast 
Corp. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 356 Or. 282, 296 n.7, 337 P.3d 768, 776 n.7 (2014) (“In 
consulting dictionaries, however, it is important to use sources contemporaneous with the 
enactment of the statute.”); State v. Glushko, 351 Or. 297, 312, 266 P.3d 50, 57–58 (2011) 
(rejecting use of modern dictionary definitions of term in 1864 statute); State v. Perry, 336 
Or. 49, 52, 77 P.3d 313, 314–15 (2003) (“In interpreting the words of a statute enacted many 
years ago, we may seek guidance from dictionaries that were in use at the time.”). 
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subtle. The Oxford English Dictionary reports over 400 different 
definitions of the single word “set,” running 60,000 words long.408 The 
question arises as to which of the different definitions will apply. It is 
tempting to assume that the first definition in a list of several reported 
in the dictionary is the preferred one. And I certainly have seen a 
number of appellate briefs that have succumbed to that temptation. 
Unfortunately, it is usually wrong. Different dictionaries may have 
different conventions when it comes to the order in which they list their 
“senses,” or definitions.409 Webster’s Third, for example, lists its 
senses in historical order; the first sense in the list is simply the 
oldest.410 
Third, it’s crucial to remember what dictionaries do and do not 
accomplish. They do not—and cannot—tell us what the words of a 
statute mean. What dictionaries do is provide a range of definitional 
possibilities. They establish what a given word used in a statute could 
reasonably mean. Whether the word used in a statute actually lines up 
with one dictionary definition or another depends on the context in 
which it is used.411  
408 XV OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 391, at 50–75. 
409 Dictionary definitions may be listed in historical order, or in order of usage 
frequency, or any number of other variables. See generally Robert Lew, Identifying 
Ordering and Defining Senses, in THE BLOOMSBURY COMPANION TO LEXICOGRAPHY 
(Howard Jackson ed. 2013). 
410 WEBSTER’S THIRD, supra note 296, at 19a (“The order of senses is historical: the one 
known to have been first used in English is entered first.”). Oxford English Dictionary, 
likewise, lists its definitions historically. I OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 391, 
at xxxi (explaining “that sense is placed first which was actually the earliest in the language; 
the others follow in the order in which they appear to have arisen”). In contrast, The 
American Heritage Dictionary, which takes a more prescriptive approach, lists the “central 
and often the most commonly sought meaning” first. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE 
DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE xxiv (5th ed. 2011). 
411 See, e.g., Alfieri v. Solomon, 358 Or. 383, 393, 365 P.3d 99, 105 (2015) (“[I]n 
construing statutes, we should not simply consult dictionaries and interpret words in a 
vacuum.”); Jenkins v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 356 Or. 186, 194, 335 P.3d 
828, 833 (2014) (context and legislative history determine which among dictionary 
definitions the legislature most likely intended); Elk Creek Mgmt. Co. v. Gilbert, 353 Or. 
565, 574, 303 P.3d 929, 934 (2013) (“The correct construction of [a statute] does not, 
however, turn only on the dictionary definition of one of its words. We also must consider 
the context in which the legislature used the word . . . .”); State v. Cloutier, 351 Or. 68, 96, 
261 P.3d 1234, 1249 (2011) (“In construing statutes, we do not simply consult dictionaries 
and interpret words in a vacuum. Dictionaries, after all, do not tell us what words mean, only 
what words can mean, depending on their context and the particular manner in which they 
are used.”); State v. Fries, 344 Or. 541, 546, 185 P.3d 453, 456 (2008) (explaining that 
context determines which of multiple definitions is the one the legislature intended); State 
ex rel. Dep’t of Transp. v. Stallcup, 341 Or. 93, 99–100, 138 P.3d 9, 13 (2006) (dictionary 
definitions give way to meaning suggested by statutory context); State v. Glaspey, 337 Or. 
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In State v. Gonzalez-Valenzuela,412 for example, the question for the 
court was whether a person who knowingly possessed drugs in her 
purse while in a car with her two children committed the offense of 
reckless endangerment. The statute defining that offense requires proof 
that the defendant knowingly permitted a minor to be in a “place” 
where unlawful activity involving controlled substances is “maintained 
or conducted.”413 The defendant argued that a car used to transport her 
children was not such a “place.” The state argued that the ordinary 
meaning of the words controlled and that Webster’s Third defined a 
“place” as a “physical environment,” or a “space,” or an “area.”414 A 
car, argued the state, certainly fits those definitions.415 Defendant 
pointed out, however, that the same Webster’s Third also defined a 
“place” as “a building or locality used for a special purpose” and argued 
that a car certainly does not fit that definition.416  
The Oregon Supreme Court noted the competing definitions and 
commented, “Although dictionaries may provide a useful starting point 
to identifying the plain meaning of a statute, this case highlights their 
limitations.”417 A dictionary definition, the court explained, “should 
not be relied on to resolve a dispute about plain meaning without 
critically examining how the definition fits into the context of the 
statute itself.”418 The court then turned to the immediate context—the 
accompanying reference to a place where illegal drug activity is 
“maintained or conducted”—as well as other statutes in pari materia 
558, 564–65, 100 P.3d 730, 733 (2004) (rejecting dictionary definition of term in favor of 
narrower meaning suggested by context); State v. J.C.N.-V., 268 Or. App. 505, 515, 342 
P.3d 1046, 1053 (2015) (“We are mindful, however, that the meaning of the statute does not
turn only on the dictionary definition of one of its words; we must examine how each word
is used in context.” (internal quotation marks omitted)), rev’d, 359 Or. 559, 380 P.3d 248
(2016); State v. Urie, 268 Or. App. 362, 364, 341 P.3d 855, 856 (2014) (“However, we do
not simply consult dictionaries and interpret words in a vacuum; dictionaries do not tell us
what words mean, only what words can mean, depending on their context.”); Larsen v. Bd.
of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 231 Or. App. 59, 63–64, 219 P.3d 28, 30 (2009) (after
noting several possible definitions of statutory term, stating that “[w]e look to the context in
which the word appears to determine which meaning the legislature intended”), review
denied, 348 Or. 13 (2010); State v. Oliver, 221 Or. App. 233, 237–38, 189 P.3d 1240, 1242
(explaining that the relevant dictionary definition is the one that makes sense in the context
of the statute), review denied, 345 Or. 318 (2008).
412 358 Or. 451, 461, 365 P.3d 116, 122 (2015). 
413 OR. REV. STAT. § 163.575(1)(b) (2017). 
414 Gonzalez-Valenzuela, 358 Or. at 467, 365 P.3d at 125. 
415 Id. 
416 Id.  
417 Id. at 461, 365 P.3d at 122. 
418 Id.  
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and cases construing those other statutes to resolve the ambiguity. The 
court noted, in particular, how the offense of child endangerment was 
intended to fill gaps in existing criminal nuisance law, which pertained 
to maintaining drug houses. Under the circumstances, the court 
concluded the legislature more likely intended the narrower 
definition.419 
When consulting dictionaries to determine the meaning of statutory 
words, remember to limit the definitions to the appropriate part of 
speech.420 The part of speech can make a difference in the word’s 
definition. In State v. Glushko/Little,421 the question was whether the 
defendant had given “consent” to a delay of his trial within the meaning 
of the state speedy trial statute when he failed to appear at a scheduled 
hearing. The state cited a dictionary definition of the verb consent—“to 
allow”—and argued that, by failing to show up, the defendant had 
consented. The Oregon Supreme Court rejected the argument, noting 
that the definition on which the state had relied referred to the verb 
form of the word.422 The noun form of the word, the court noted, 
referred to a sequence of events in which there is an affirmative 
response to a proposal.423  
Finally, it’s important to understand how definitions work. Each 
dictionary employs a variety of shorthand symbols, abbreviations, 
typefaces, and fonts to communicate a lot of information about the 
meaning of a given word. It pays to know such things. The outcome of 
Edwards v. Riverdale School District turned on precisely that 
information.424 The issue was whether Edwards, a school athletic 
director, was an “administrator.” Administrators were not subject to the 
procedures that apply to the dismissal of teachers. Edwards supervised 
419 Id. at 470, 365 P.3d at 127. 
420 See, e.g., State v. Marshall, 350 Or. 208, 218 n.9, 253 P.3d 1017, 1023 n.9 (2011) 
(noting as relevant to the analysis that “compel” is a transitive verb); State v. Bray, 342 Or. 
711, 719 n.6, 160 P.3d 983, 988 n.6 (2007) (rejecting a party’s proposed dictionary 
definition of a term because the definition refers to the use of the term as a noun, when the 
statute uses the term as a transitive verb); State v. Rowland, 245 Or. App. 240, 245, 262 
P.3d 1158, 1161 (2011) (discussing importance of use of the article “the”); State v. Cox, 219
Or. App. 319, 322, 182 P.3d 259, 261 (2008) (stating that whether a word in a statute is used
in its noun or verb form can make a definitional difference), superseded by statute, Or. Laws
2011, ch. 675, as recognized in State v. Streeter III, 270 Or. App. 441, 444 n.2, 348 P.3d
290, 292 n.2 (2015).
421 351 Or. 297, 311, 266 P.3d 50, 57 (2011). 
422 Id. 
423 Id. 
424 220 Or. App. 509, 188 P.3d 317 (2008), review dismissed, 346 Or. 66 (2009). 
2019] Oregon Statutory Construction 661
coaches, organized the coach selection committee, and played a role in 
monitoring the department’s budget.425 
The applicable statute stated that an “administrator” included one 
whose work was primarily service as a “supervisor, principal, vice-
principal, or director of a department.”426 There was no contention that 
Edwards was a supervisor, principal, or vice-principal; the dispute 
centered on whether he was a “director” of a department. The Fair 
Dismissal Appeals Board looked at the definition of the word in 
Webster’s Third: “one that directs as a : the head or chief of an 
organized occupational group.” The board drew from that definition 
that a “director” must be the “head” or “chief” of an organization. It 
then looked up the definition of “chief,” which it found to be “accorded 
highest rank, office or rating.”427 The board then concluded that, 
because Edwards was not the highest rank within a department, he was 
not a “director” within the meaning of the law. 
The Oregon Court of Appeals reversed. The problem with the 
board’s conclusion was that it was based on a misunderstanding of how 
definitions work. The definition of the term “director,” the court 
explained, was “one that directs.”428 The material that followed the 
definition was what is known as a series of “coordinate subsenses,” 
signified by the lightface colon.429 Those coordinate subsenses 
function as examples of the definition that precedes them, not as the 
definition itself.430 Thus, the reference to a “head” or “chief” merely 
served as illustrations, not as requirements.431 That Edwards was not a 
“head” or “chief” simply established that he did not qualify as one of 
the examples of a director, not that he was not a director. Given his 
supervisory responsibilities, the court concluded, it was clear that he 
was, in fact, a “director,” and thus an “administrator” within the 
meaning of the statute.432  
b. Terms of Art
There’s an exception to the ordinary meaning rule: when otherwise
undefined statutory terms are obviously of a sort that have acquired 
425 Id. at 511–12, 188 P.3d at 318. 
426 OR. REV. STAT. § 342.815(1) (2017). 
427 Edwards, 220 Or. App. at 512–13, 188 P.3d at 318–19. 
428 Id. at 515, 188 P.3d at 320. 
429 Id. at 515–16, 188 P.3d at 320. 
430 Id. 
431 Id. 
432 Id. at 516, 188 P.3d at 320. 
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particular meanings when used by professionals in particular 
disciplines—law, medicine, or engineering, for instance—courts 
assume that the legislature intended those words to have that particular 
meaning.433 The practice of giving terms of art their specialized 
meaning is one that dates back at least a couple of centuries. Blackstone 
explained in his Commentaries that “terms of art, or technical terms, 
must be taken according to the acceptation of the learned in each art, 
trade, and science.”434 And for just about as long, courts have been 
vexed by two subsidiary problems: how do you know if a given word 
or phrase has a technical meaning, and how do you determine what that 
technical meaning is? 
Let’s begin with the first of those problems, determining precisely 
when a word has a non-ordinary, technical meaning. Sometimes the 
answer is obvious from the face of the statute’s wording, as when the 
legislature uses terms that are familiar to lawyers as having 
particularized legal meaning. In Dess Properties, LLC v. Sheridan 
Truck & Heavy Equipment, LLC, for instance, the court readily 
concluded that a statute’s reference to a “void contract” referred to a 
legal phrase with a settled meaning.435  
433 See, e.g., State v. Dickerson, 356 Or. 822, 829, 345 P.3d 447, 452 (2015) (“Because 
‘legal interest’ and ‘equitable interest’ are legal terms, however, we give those terms their 
established legal meanings . . . .”); Comcast Corp. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 356 Or. 282, 296, 
337 P.3d 768, 776 (2014); Zimmerman v. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 354 Or. 271, 280, 
311 P.3d 497, 502 (2014) (“When the term has acquired a specialized meaning in a particular 
industry or profession, however, we assume that the legislature used the term consistently 
with that specialized meaning.”); Dep’t of Revenue v. Croslin, 345 Or. 620, 628, 201 P.3d 
900, 904 (2009) (explaining that the term “damages” is a legal term of art as used in statute 
authorizing Tax Court to award damages and attorney fees); Zottola v. Three Rivers Sch. 
Dist., 342 Or. 118, 122, 149 P.3d 1151, 1153 (2006) (determining the ordinary meaning of 
“back pay” by referring to Black’s Law Dictionary); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. City of Central 
Point, 341 Or. 393, 398, 144 P.3d 914, 916 (2006) (“The word ‘service’ is a term of art with 
a specific, legal meaning.”); State ex rel. Dep’t of Transp. v. Stallcup, 341 Or. 93, 99, 138 
P.3d 9, 12 (2006) (“[W]e give words that have well-defined legal meanings those
meanings.”); Tharp v. Psychiatric Sec. Review Bd., 338 Or. 413, 423, 110 P.3d 103, 108
(2005) (explaining that “terms of art that are used in the context of professional disciplines”
are not given their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning); Mueller v. Psychiatric Sec. Review
Bd., 325 Or. 332, 339, 937 P.2d 1028, 1031–32 (1997); Or. Cable Telecomms. v. Dep’t of
Revenue, 237 Or. App. 628, 634, 240 P.3d 1122, 1126 (2010) (“[W]ords that have well-
defined legal meanings are given those specialized meanings.”).
434 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *59. 
435 220 Or. App. 336, 115 P.3d 1115 (2008); see also State v. Hess, 342 Or. 647, 650, 
159 P.3d 309, 310–11 (2007) (resorting to Black’s Law Dictionary to define the term 
“stipulation,” which the court characterized as a “legal term”); State v. Bassett, 234 Or. App. 
259, 265, 228 P.3d 590, 593 (referring to Black’s Law Dictionary to determine the meaning 
of the statutory phrase “element of the crime”), review denied, 348 Or. 461 (2010). 
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In other cases, though, whether a word or phrase is a term of art is 
not so clear. In State ex rel. Engweiler v. Cook, the Oregon Court of 
Appeals concluded that the phrase “term of incarceration” as used in 
state sentencing statutes was a term of art with a particularized 
meaning.436 The Oregon Supreme Court disagreed, interpreting the 
phrase in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the component 
words.437 
Usually, whether a term has acquired some specialized meaning is 
determined by resorting to ordinary rules of statutory construction and 
examining the text in context and in light of relevant legislative history. 
Department of Consumer & Business Services v. Muliro is a good 
example.438 The state workers’ compensation statutes require an 
injured worker with more than one employer to provide notice of 
secondary employment as a condition for receiving certain benefits.439 
The question in Muliro was whether the “notice” requirement referred 
to actual notice, as opposed to constructive notice. The Oregon 
Supreme Court noted that, as “notice” was undefined in the statute 
itself, the court must interpret the word according to its plain, ordinary 
meaning unless it is clear that the word is used as a term of art.440 The 
court observed that whether the word should be treated as a term of art 
could make a difference because the ordinary meaning of the term 
connotes actual notice, while the term’s technical, legal meaning could 
also include constructive or imputed knowledge.441 Ultimately, the 
court concluded that the legislature intended the word to have its 
ordinary meaning because of the way “notice” was used in context.442 
The statute referred to notice having been “received,” which suggests 
actual notice, given that constructive notice is not actually received.443 
That leaves the issue of determining what a term of art actually 
means. The general rule is that courts determine the meaning of 
technical terms by resort to references that are regularly consulted 
within the relevant discipline.444 If a term is one of legal usage, courts 
436 197 Or. App. 32, 38–41, 103 P.3d 1205, 1208–09 (2005). 
437 State ex rel. Engweiler v. Cook, 340 Or. 373, 378–79, 133 P.3d 904, 906–07 (2006). 
438 359 Or. 736, 380 P.3d 270 (2016). 
439 OR. REV. STAT. § 656.210(2)(b) (2017). 
440 Muliro, 359 Or. at 745–46, 380 P.3d at 275. 
441 Id. 
442 Id. 
443 Id. 
444 See, e.g., Comcast Corp. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 356 Or. 282, 296, 337 P.3d 768, 776 
(2014) (“An exception [to the ordinary-meaning assumption] arises when the legislature 
uses technical terminology—so-called ‘terms of art’—drawn from a specialized trade or 
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routinely quote Black’s Law Dictionary or relevant case law.445 If a 
term is medical, courts will cite Stedman’s Medical Dictionary or some 
other medical dictionary.446 
Once again, remember that Oregon statutory construction is a 
temporally focused exercise: courts seek the meaning of a statute that 
the legislature most likely intended at the particular moment in time 
when the statute was enacted. This means that, as with ordinary 
meaning, references to specialized meaning also must relate to the 
meaning of the term at the time of enactment. The Oregon Supreme 
Court’s decision in Comcast Corp. v. Department of Revenue illustrates 
this principle.447 Oregon statutes subject “data transmission services” 
to a special method of taxation.448 The issue in this case was whether 
Comcast’s cable television and internet access services qualified as 
“data transmission services,” which are subject to the special method 
of taxation.449 There was no question that the term “data transmission 
services” is a term of art.450 The question was what the term of art 
meant when the statute was enacted in 1973, long before the digital 
revolution.451 Comcast argued that, at the time of enactment, the term 
referred to a limited universe of point-to-point, private-line microwave 
communication networks.452 After consulting telecommunications 
engineering textbooks from the early 1970s, contemporaneous articles, 
field. In that circumstance, we look to the meaning and usage of those terms in the discipline 
from which the legislature borrowed them.”). 
445 See, e.g., Alfieri v. Solomon, 358 Or. 383, 407, 365 P.3d 99, 113 (2015) (citing 
Black’s Law Dictionary to determine the meaning of “allow[ing]” a motion); Powerex Corp. 
v. Dep’t Revenue, 357 Or. 40, 61–62, 346 P.3d 476, 489 (2015) (citing Black’s Law
Dictionary to determine meaning of “tangible property”); State v. Dickerson, 356 Or. 822,
829–30, 345 P.3d 447, 452 (2015) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary to define a legal or
equitable “interest” in property); Dep’t of Revenue v. Croslin, 345 Or. 620, 628, 201 P.3d
900, 904 (2009) (citing Black’s Law Dictionary for the word “damages”).
446 See, e.g., Hopkins v. SAIF Corp., 349 Or. 348, 361, 245 P.3d 90, 97 (2010) (citing 
Stedman’s Medical Dictionary and Dorland’s Illustrated Medical Dictionary in construing 
statutory reference to “arthritis”); Barrett v. Coast Range Plywood, 294 Or. 641, 643–44, 
661 P.2d 926, 928 (1983) (citing Stedman’s Medical Dictionary to construe “functional” 
overlay); Landis v. Liberty Nw. Ins. Corp., 281 Or. App. 639, 648 n.6, 383 P.3d 349, 355 
n.6 (2016) (citing Stedman’s Medical Dictionary to define “prosthesis”).
447 356 Or. 282, 337 P.3d 768 (2014).
448 ORS 308.505 to ORS 308.665 provide for what is known as “central assessment,”
which applies to “communication” services. OR. REV. STAT. § 308.515(1)(h) (2017). Under 
ORS 308.505(2), “communication” is defined to include “data transmission services,” a 
term that is not further defined. 
449 Comcast Corp., 356 Or. at 301, 337 P.3d at 779. 
450 Id.  
451 Id. 
452 Id. at 289, 337 P.3d at 772. 
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Federal Communications Commission decisions from the era, and 
similar sources, the Oregon Supreme Court rejected Comcast’s 
proposed definition.453  
Similarly, in cases involving legal terminology from times past, 
courts will examine editions of law dictionaries and case law from the 
relevant era to determine the meaning that the legislature most likely 
intended.454 
c. The “Whole Act” Rule Redux
In the earlier discussion of a statute’s context,455 I mentioned the
much-cited “whole act” rule, which states that statutory construction 
should always take into account the statute as a whole, not just 
particular words in a vacuum. This idea that statutes must be examined 
as a whole gives rise to a number of corollary interpretive principles—
a rule against surplusage, an assumption of consistency, and an 
assumption that different words mean different things. Courts are very 
fond of each of those principles. But I think those principles need to be 
applied with a measure of caution. Let me explain why. 
(i) Everything Must Mean Something: The Rule Against Surplusage
Statutes are always enacted as part of a larger whole—never word-
by-word and rarely section-by-section. It stands to reason that the 
legislature can be assumed to have intended for the parts of every 
statute to be read in context so that each part means something and 
serves the larger purpose that animates the statute as a whole.456  
453 Id. at 295–301, 337 P.3d at 777–79. 
454 See, e.g., State v. Clemente-Perez, 357 Or. 745, 764, 359 P.3d 232, 245 (2015) (citing 
the 1891 edition of Black’s Law Dictionary and the 1926 edition of Bouvier’s Law 
Dictionary to determine the meaning of a 1910 criminal statute). 
455 See supra text at notes 301–10. 
456 Force v. Dep’t of Revenue, 350 Or. 179, 190, 252 P.3d 306, 312 (2011) (“Statutory 
provisions, however, must be construed, if possible, in a manner that ‘will give effect to all’ 
of them.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Liles v. Damon Corp., 345 Or. 420, 424, 198 
P.3d 926, 928 (2008) (“We begin with the text and context of the statutes and endeavor to
give meaning to all parts of those statutes.”); Hazell v. Brown, 238 Or. App. 487, 508, 242
P.3d 743, 755 (2010) (“Accordingly, if . . . [plaintiffs] were correct, [the provision] would
be meaningless, because its prerequisites would be illusory. We are constrained from
attributing such an intent . . . .”); Wilson v. Tri-County Metro. Transp. Dist., 234 Or. App.
615, 625, 228 P.3d 1225, 1230 (“[S]tatutory provisions must be construed, if possible, in a
manner that ‘will give effect to all’ of them.” (quoting Powers v. Quigley, 345 Or. 432, 438,
198 P.3d 919, 922 (2008))), review denied, 348 Or. 669 (2010); State v. L.C., 234 Or. App.
347, 355, 228 P.3d 594, 598 (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 174.010 (2017)), review allowed, 349
Or. 171, 243 P.3d 69 (2010), review dismissed, 349 Or. 603, 249 P.3d 124 (2011); Waxman
v. Waxman & Assocs., Inc., 224 Or. App. 499, 508, 198 P.3d 445, 451 (2008) (requiring
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That commonsense notion has led courts to adopt the “general rule” 
that the legislature intends each and every word of a statute to be given 
meaning, if possible.457 Said another way, when construing a statute, 
courts will take pains to avoid leaving any part of the statute as 
surplusage.458 The legislature itself has expressed a similar sentiment, 
declaring that “[w]here there are several provisions or particulars, such 
construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.”459  
It’s important, though, not to get carried away with the idea that 
every single word of a statute has to have meaning. It’s not a hard-and-
fast rule. Redundancy is simply too common a feature of ordinary 
communication,460 and it is no less common in the law. The 
multilingual roots of English legal vocabulary have resulted in a 
centuries-long tradition of lawyers using two or three words when one 
might suffice.461 Quite a few statutes, for example, refer to “clear and 
convincing” evidence.462 That doesn’t mean that “clear” must mean 
courts to give effect to all relevant provisions); City of Eugene v. Nalven, 152 Or. App. 720, 
725–26, 955 P.2d 263, 266 (noting “our obligation to give full meaning and effect to all 
relevant statutory provisions”), review denied, 327 Or. 431 (1998). 
457 Crystal Commc’ns, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 353 Or. 300, 311, 297 P.3d 1256, 1261 
(2013) (“As a general rule, we construe a statute in a manner that gives effect, if possible, 
to all its provisions.”); see also Vill. at Main St., Phase II, LLC v. Dep’t of Revenue, 356 
Or. 164, 175, 339 P.3d 428 (2014); Nw. Nat. Gas Co. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 347 Or. 536, 
556, 226 P.2d 28 (2010). 
458 Blachana, LLC v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 354 Or. 676, 692, 318 P.3d 735, 745 
(2014) (“[R]edundancy, of course, is a consequence that this court must avoid if possible.”); 
State v. Kellar, 349 Or. 626, 636, 247 P.3d 1232, 1237 (2011) (“Defendant’s interpretation 
results in a redundancy, something that we seek to avoid in interpreting statutes.”); Powers 
v. Quigley, 345 Or. 432, 438, 198 P.3d 919, 922 (2008); State v. Connally, 339 Or. 583,
593, 125 P.3d 1254, 1259 (2005); Bolt v. Influence, Inc., 333 Or. 572, 581, 43 P.3d 425,
429 (2002); Quintero v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 329 Or. 319, 324, 986
P.2d 575, 577 (1999) (referring to “this court’s stated goal of giving effect to every provision
of a statute”); State v. Hansen, 253 Or. App. 407, 414, 290 P.3d 847, 851 (2012) (“[C]ourts
normally seek to avoid an interpretation of a statute that results in a redundancy.”); State v.
Donovan, 243 Or. App. 187, 196, 256 P.3d 196, 201 (2011) (“Any other interpretation
would mean the amendments were merely redundant of what was already in the statute.”);
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London & Excess Ins. Co. v. Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co.,
235 Or. App. 99, 129, 230 P.3d 103, 129 (rejecting the argument that would make another
statutory provision “meaningless surplusage”), review denied, 349 Or. 173 (2010), adhered
to as modified on reconsideration, 245 Or. App. 101 (2011); State v. Stamper, 197 Or. App.
413, 418, 106 P.3d 172, 175 (“[W]e assume that the legislature did not intend any portion
of its enactments to be meaningless surplusage.”), review denied, 339 Or. 230 (2005).
459 OR. REV. STAT. § 174.010. 
460 THE NEW FOWLER’S MODERN ENGLISH USAGE 661 (R.W. Burchfield ed., 3rd 
ed.1996) (“Actual or concealed redundancy occurs with great frequency in the language.”). 
461 See generally DAVID MELLINKOFF, THE LANGUAGE OF THE LAW 120–22 (1963). 
462 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 125.400 (2017) (stating that court must find “by clear 
and convincing evidence that the respondent is a minor or financially incapable”); OR. REV. 
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something distinct from “convincing.” The fact is that the phrase dates 
back centuries to a time when, to avoid any misunderstanding of what 
the law required, lawmakers would commonly pair an English or 
French word with a Latin word that meant the same thing.463 Even 
today, legislatures engage in redundancy out of caution, in an apparent 
desire to leave no doubt as to a particular point. For instance, the 
statutory definition of theft, states that a person commits the offense if 
he or she “[t]akes, appropriates, obtains, or withholds” property from 
its owner.464 It would be foolish to attempt to parse some distinction 
between “tak[ing],” “appropriat[ing],” and “obtain[ing]” property. All 
three words are obviously synonyms. Similarly, the crime of forgery 
includes an element that the defendant has falsely “uttered” an 
instrument.465 The statutory definition of “utter” is to “issue, deliver, 
publish, circulate, disseminate, transfer, or tender.”466 On the face of 
things, it’s clear that the legislature was not attempting to draw 
distinctions among each and every one of those definitional 
components. Rather, the legislature was trying to be careful and 
comprehensive. That’s the way legislative drafting sometimes works.  
It’s better to think of the rule against surplusage as only an 
assumption, born of deference to the legislature and tempered by an 
understanding that the rule is not set in stone. As the Oregon Supreme 
Court said in State v. Cloutier: 
[T]he fact that a proposed interpretation of a statute creates some
measure of redundancy is not, by itself, necessarily fatal.
Redundancy in communication is a fact of life and of law. . . . But, at
the least, an interpretation that renders a statutory provision
meaningless should give us pause, both as a matter of respect for a
coordinate branch of government that took the trouble to enact the
provision into law and as a matter of complying with the interpretive
STAT. § 192.363(2) (2017) (stating that a party seeking disclosure of certain public records 
“shall show by clear and convincing evidence that the public interest requires disclosure); 
OR. REV. STAT. § 426.130(1)(a) (2017) (determining whether a person suffers a mental 
illness is “based upon clear and convincing evidence”); OR. REV. STAT. § 464.280(1) (2017) 
(stating that applicants for bingo, lotto, or raffle licenses must establish qualifications “by 
clear and convincing evidence”); OR. REV. STAT. § 723.478(1) (2017) (stating that joint 
accounts belong to parties in proportion to net contributions “unless there is clear and 
convincing evidence of a different intent”). 
463 Riley Hill Gen. Contractor v. Tandy Corp., 303 Or. 390, 395–97, 737 P.2d 595, 599–
601 (1987) (explaining historical origins of the phrase “clear and convincing evidence”). 
464 OR. REV. STAT. § 164.015(1) (2017). 
465 OR. REV. STAT. § 165.007(1)(b) (2017). 
466 OR. REV. STAT. § 165.002(7) (2017). 
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principle that, if possible, we give a statute with multiple parts a 
construction that will give effect to all of those parts.467 
(ii) The Assumption of Consistency
Also flowing from the whole act rule is the idea that the same words
in the same or related statute can fairly be assumed to mean the same 
thing.468 Certainly nothing precludes the legislature from using the 
same word to mean different things. Homographs and heteronyms, 
after all, are common features of the English language. (“She had to 
crane her neck to see the crane sitting on the crane.”) But statutes are 
the products of deliberation, and it seems fair to think that, if the 
legislature had intended to communicate different ideas, then it would 
have used different words.  
This rule, too, needs to be taken with a proverbial grain of salt, 
though; the legislature has not been so careful at times. I have found 
that to be especially true when a particular statute has been amended a 
number of times over the years. Drafting inconsistencies work their 
way into the law without anyone noticing, which can prove vexing 
when it comes to interpreting the law as a whole.  
The poster child for this problem is Brown v. SAIF Corp.469 The 
issue in that case was whether the phrase “compensable injury,” as it is 
467 351 Or. 68, 97–98, 261 P.3d 1234, 1250 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(citations omitted); see also Thomas Creek Lumber & Log Co. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 344 
Or. 131, 138, 178 P.3d 217, 220 (2008) (“[N]othing prohibits the legislature from saying the 
same thing twice . . . .”); Friends of Yamhill Cty. v. Yamhill County, 229 Or. App. 188, 195, 
211 P.3d 297, 300 (2009) (“[I]n both ordinary day-to-day communication and in legal 
drafting, redundancy is a fairly common phenomenon.”). 
468 See, e.g., Vill. at Main St., Phase II, LLC v. Dep’t of Revenue, 356 Or. 164, 175, 339 
P.3d 428, 434 (2014) (“[T]he general assumption of consistency counsels us to assume that
the legislature intended the same word to have the same meaning throughout related statutes
unless something in the text or context of the statute suggests a contrary intention.”);
Cloutier, 351 Or. at 99, 261 P.3d at 1251 (“Although, in the abstract, there is nothing that
precludes the legislature from defining the same terms to mean different things in the same
or related statutes, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we ordinarily assume that the
legislature uses terms in related statutes consistently.”); Force v. Dep’t of Revenue, 350 Or.
179, 189, 252 P.3d 306, 311–12 (2011); Ware v. Hall, 342 Or. 444, 449, 154 P.3d 118, 121
(2007); State v. Meek, 266 Or. App. 550, 556, 338 P.3d 767, 770 (2014) (stating the “general
assumption that, when the legislature employs different terms within the same statute, it
intends different meanings for those terms” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Pete’s
Mountain Homeowners Ass’n v. Or. Water Res. Dep’t, 236 Or. App. 507, 518, 238 P.3d
395, 401 (2010) (“It is a longstanding principle of statutory construction that words may be
assumed to be used consistently throughout a statute.”); Aronson v. Pub. Emps. Ret. Bd.,
236 Or. App. 17, 24–25, 236 P.3d 731, 734–35 (2010); State v. Ferguson, 228 Or. App. 1,
6, 206 P.3d 1145, 1148 (2009).
469 361 Or. 241, 391 P.3d 773 (2017). 
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used in the state workers’ compensation statutes, refers to either a 
“medical condition” or a “workplace accident that produces a medical 
condition.”470 The phrase itself had not been defined in the statute. The 
claimant nevertheless argued that other provisions of the same law 
made clear that “compensable injury” referred to a workplace accident, 
while the employer argued that different other provisions of the same 
law made clear that the term referred to an accepted medical 
condition.471 The court (with just a hint of exasperation) said that both 
parties were right. And wrong: 
Both parties contend that their arguments are supported by the “plain 
text” of the statute. In that respect, both parties are mistaken. There 
is little that is “plain” about this state’s workers’ compensation 
statutes. In fact, there appears to be a tendency on the part of the 
legislature to use a number of different terms in not altogether 
consistent fashion, sometimes treating them as essentially 
synonymous and at other times treating them as signifying different 
things.472 
The court noted that one provision of the workers’ compensation 
statute, for example, expressly equated an “injury or disease” with a 
“condition,” while another referred to a condition that resulted from an 
injury.473 The court ultimately interpreted the term “compensable 
injury” to mean an accepted medical condition, concluding that this 
meaning best effectuated the workings of the statute as a whole.474 
The bottom line is that the assumption of consistency is just that—
an assumption. This principle of construction gives way to persuasive 
evidence that the legislature intended that the same words have 
different meanings.475 
(iii) Different Words Mean Different Things
The assumption of consistency gives rise to the related notion that
when the legislature uses different words in a statute, courts should 
470 Id. at 243, 391 P.3d at 774. 
471 Id. at 252–53, 391 P.3d at 778–79. 
472 Id. at 253, 391 P.3d at 779. 
473 Id.  
474 Id. at 254–55, 391 P.3d 779–80. 
475 See, e.g., Mid-Century Ins. Co. v. Perkins, 344 Or. 196, 211–12, 179 P.3d 633, 642 
(2008) (“[The court is] not bound by [the] assumption [of consistency] if an examination of 
the text and context of the statutes reveals that the word, in fact, does have more than one 
meaning.”). 
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assume that the words have different meanings.476 This rule, like the 
assumption of consistency, is not absolute. Although the assumption 
that different words mean different things makes sense as a starting 
proposition, it should always be abandoned in the face of contrary 
evidence of legislative intent.477 
d. Rules of Grammar, Syntax, and Punctuation
Courts generally assume that legislatures intend that statutes be read
in a manner consistent with settled rules of grammar, syntax, and 
punctuation.478 At least in the abstract, the assumption seems fair; to 
the extent that there are such settled rules that govern ordinary 
communication, it makes sense that legislatures draft their statutes 
consistently with those rules.  
The problem is that there are few such settled rules that govern our 
language.479 Many of the so-called rules that our middle-school 
grammar teachers tried to drum into our heads are not really rules at 
all.480 The rule against splitting infinitives, for instance, is something 
that English grammarians made up in the nineteenth century, born of a 
476 See, e.g., Baker v. Croslin, 359 Or. 147, 157–58, 376 P.3d 267, 273 (2016) 
(explaining that alternative terms do not mean the same thing, unless there is evidence in 
the statute to the contrary); State ex rel. Dep’t of Transp. v. Stallcup, 341 Or. 93, 101, 138 
P.3d 9, 14 (2006) (explaining that the use of different terms in real estate appraisal statute
suggests that each term was intended to have a different meaning); State v. Glaspey, 337 Or.
558, 564–65, 100 P.3d 730, 732–33 (2004) (use of different terms in assault statute—
“victim” in one provision and “victim’s child” in the other—means that one is not the same
as the other); State v. Keeney, 323 Or. 309, 316, 918 P.2d 419, 423 (1996); Johnson v. Dep’t
of Pub. Safety Standards & Training, 253 Or. App. 307, 313–14, 293 P.3d 228, 232 (2012);
Carrillo v. City of Stanfield, 241 Or. App. 151, 158–59, 255 P.3d 491, 495 (2011); State v.
Newell, 238 Or. App. 385, 392, 242 P.3d 709, 713 (2010) (“If the legislature uses different
terms in statutes, we generally will assume ‘that the legislature intends different meanings’
for those terms.” (quoting Stallcup, 341 Or. at 101, 138 P.3d at 14)).
477 State v. Lane, 357 Or. 619, 629, 335 P.3d 914, 920 (2015) (“Such ‘rules’ of 
interpretation are mere assumptions that always give way to more direct evidence of 
legislative intent.”). 
478 See, e.g., State v. English, 269 Or. App. 395, 399, 343 P.3d 1286, 1288 (2015) 
(relying on the “grammatical structure” of the statute in dispute); Brock v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 195 Or. App. 519, 526, 98 P.3d 759, 763 (2004) (“[W]e do not construe 
statutes in a manner that is grammatically untenable.”). 
479 See generally Terri LeClerq, Doctrine of the Last Antecedent: The Mystifying Morass 
of Ambiguous Modifiers, 2 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 81, 86 (1996) (“The English language 
has fewer absolute ‘rules’ than most other languages. Most of what information we learn 
about the rules of English grammar is a fusion of stylistic advice and rules for classical 
languages that evolved into English.”); KORY STAMPER, WORD BY WORD: THE SECRET 
LIFE OF DICTIONARIES 46 (2017) (“So where do these rules come from, if not from actual 
use? Most of them are the personal peeves, codified into law, of dead white men of yore.”). 
480 See generally LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES (1993). 
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neoclassical desire to emulate the structure of Latin.481 Most modern 
usage guides have long since abandoned it.482  
Aside from that, a good number of the so-called rules of grammar, 
syntax, and punctuation are fairly arcane, and it seems unlikely as an 
empirical matter that legislators—ordinary persons as they are 
supposed to be—are familiar with them. I daresay that few, if any, 
legislators have even heard of the “rule of the last antecedent,” much 
less had it in mind when drafting legislation. Yet the rule crops up quite 
often in statutory construction opinions. In a similar vein, at least one 
Oregon case noted a distinction between “dynamic” and “stative” 
verbs.483 I confess that I had to look that one up, and I expect that any 
legislators who happened to read the opinion had to do the same. In 
spite of such examples, judges adhere to the fiction that such rules exist, 
that they are in fact rules, and that the legislature enacted legislation 
with these rules in mind. Scalia and Garner go so far as to assert that 
the presumption that legislators are schooled in the rules of grammar 
and punctuation is “unshakable.”484  
481 The earliest record of someone declaring the existence of a rule against splitting 
infinitives is JOHN COMLY, ENGLISH GRAMMAR MADE EASY TO THE TEACHER AND PUPIL 
192 (1803) (“An adverb should not be placed between a verb of the infinitive mood and the 
preposition to which governs it.”). The rule against splitting infinitives similarly derives 
from a neoclassical desire to emulate Latin. STAMPER, supra note 479, at 46–47. The 
problem, of course, is that English isn’t Latin. You can’t split a Latin infinitive, and you 
can’t end a Latin sentence with a preposition. As Stamper comments, “Blending 
grammatical systems from two languages on different branches of the Indo-European 
language tree is a bit like mixing orange juice and milk: you can do it, but it’s going to be 
nasty.” Id. at 47.  
482 Bill Bryson sums up the state of affairs very nicely: 
I can think of two very good reasons for not splitting an infinitive. 
1. Because you feel that the rules of English ought to conform to the
grammatical precepts of a language that died a thousand years ago.
2. Because you wish to cling to a pointless affectation of usage that is without
the support of any recognized authority of the last 200 years, even at the cost
of composing sentences that are ambiguous, inelegant, and patently contorted.
It is exceedingly difficult to find any authority who condemns the split infinitive—
Theodore Bernstein, H.W. Fowler, Ernest Gowers, Eric Partridge, Rudolph Flesch, 
Wilson Follett, Roy H. Copperud, and others too tedious to enumerate here all 
agree that there is no logical reason not to split an infinitive. 
BILL BRYSON, THE MOTHER TONGUE: ENGLISH AND HOW IT GOT THAT WAY 144 (1990). 
And, in any event, it appears that the Oregon Legislature does not follow it. See, e.g., OR. 
REV. STAT. § 124.005(1)(g) (2017) (defining “abuse” of an elder to include “conveying a 
threat to wrongfully take or appropriate money”). 
483 State v. Gonzalez-Valenzuela, 358 Or. 451, 457, 365 P.3d 116, 120 (2015). 
484 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 48, at 140. 
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I would be less dogmatic about such things. As with other rules of 
statutory construction, the assumption of legislative familiarity with 
principles of grammar, punctuation, and syntax should be applied with 
a certain amount of skepticism, flexibility, and common sense. The 
overriding objective is to determine the meaning of a statute most likely 
intended by those who enacted it, not to blindly follow (or, perhaps, not 
“blindly to follow”) so-called rules. 
Still, courts continue to rely on the assumption that legislatures are 
familiar with the rules of grammar, syntax, and punctuation. So it 
makes sense to more thoroughly discuss which of those rules the courts 
tend to invoke. 
(i) Verb Tense
Oregon courts regularly cite the tense of verbs used in statutes as a
“significant indicator” of the legislature’s intended meaning.485 For 
example, Cuff v. Department of Public Safety Standards & Training486 
concerned the interpretation of a 1999 law that authorized the 
Department of Public Safety Standards and Training to revoke the 
certification of a public safety officer if it finds that the officer “does 
not meet the applicable minimum standards, minimum training or the 
terms and conditions established” by law.487 The question arose 
whether that statute was retroactive—that is, whether the statute 
authorized the department to revoke an officer’s certification based on 
a finding that, before the statute was enacted in 1999, the officer did 
not meet applicable standards. The court concluded that the statute did 
not have that effect. “As a matter of simple grammar,” the court 
explained, “the key phrases of [the statute’s] provisions are worded in 
the present tense.”488 The court’s analysis precluded an interpretation 
of the statute as authorizing the department to revoke certification 
based on pre-enactment conduct.  
485 Brownstone Homes Condo. Ass’n. v. Brownstone Forest Heights LLC, 358 Or. 223, 
232, 363 P.3d 467, 472 (2015); see also Washburn v. Columbia Forest Prods., Inc., 340 Or. 
469, 479, 134 P.3d 161, 166 (2006) (verb tense of statute is dispositive); V.L.Y. v. Bd. of 
Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 338 Or. 44, 50, 106 P.3d 145, 147–48 (2005) (verb tense 
of statute is dispositive). 
486 345 Or. 462, 198 P.3d 931 (2008). 
487 OR. REV. STAT. § 181A.640(1)(c) (2017). 
488 Cuff, 345 Or. at 470, 198 P.3d at 936. 
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(ii) Passive or Active Voice
Statutes drafted in the passive voice have proven something of a
challenge to courts.489 By its nature, the passive voice introduces 
ambiguity into almost any sentence because it makes the object of the 
sentence its subject and leaves unstated the identity of the actor. Courts 
sometimes reason that, because a statute drafted in the passive voice 
leaves the actor’s identity unstated, the statute is intended to apply 
broadly without regard to who the actor may be.490 In other cases, 
though, courts say that the use of passive voice merely aggravates 
ambiguity, which requires examination of other contextual clues to 
resolve the statute’s meaning.491  
(iii) The Rule of the “Last Antecedent”
This is an obscure rule that crops up surprisingly often in case law.
The rule of the last antecedent actually isn’t much of a rule at all, at 
least not among linguists. Rather, it was invented in 1891 by a lawyer 
named Jabez Sutherland, the original author of the now famous 
multivolume treatise on statutory construction.492 The first edition of 
the treatise explains that “[r]eferential and qualifying phrases, where 
no contrary intention appears, refer solely to the last antecedent. The 
last antecedent is the last word, phrase, or clause that can be made an 
antecedent without impairing the meaning of the sentence.”493 
Sutherland was trying to address how to resolve the problem that occurs 
when a modifier at the end of a sentence can plausibly be read to apply 
to more than one preceding subject.494 Consider, for instance, the 
statement of a parent to a teenager: “You will be punished if you throw 
489 For a critical analysis of the way the United States Supreme Court has treated 
statutory passive-voice references, see generally Anita S. Krishakumar, Passive-Voice 
References in Statutory Construction, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 941 (2011). 
490 Powerex Corp. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 357 Or. 40, 46–47, 346 P.3d 476, 481 (2015) 
(stating that passive voice indicates that application of a statute does not depend on identity 
of actor); State v. J.L.S., 268 Or. App. 829, 835, 343 P.3d 670, 674 (2015) (noting that the 
statute is set out in passive voice and therefore does not identify an actor). 
491 State v. Serrano, 346 Or. 311, 322, 210 P.3d 892, 899 (2009) (explaining that statute’s 
use of passive voice is not dispositive); Brentmar v. Jackson County, 321 Or. 481, 487, 900 
P.2d 1030, 1033 (1995) (noting that the use of passive voice creates ambiguity in statute).
492 See Terri LeClerq, Doctrine of the Last Antecedent: The Mystifying Morass of
Ambiguous Modifiers, 2 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 81 (1996). For more on the origins of the 
rule, see generally Jeremy L. Ross, A Rule of Last Resort: A History of the Doctrine of the 
Last Antecedent in the United States Supreme Court, 39 S.W. L. REV. 325 (2009).  
493 JABEZ SUTHERLAND, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 267 (1st ed. 
1891). 
494 Id. 
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a party or engage in any other activity that damages the house.”495 
What happens if the son or daughter throws a party but does not damage 
the house? Does the modifier “that damages the house” apply only to 
“other activity,” or does it also apply to “throw a party”? The rule of 
the last antecedent posits that, in the absence of any contrary indication, 
the modifier applies only to the subject immediately preceding it—the 
last antecedent. 
The seminal Oregon case applying the rule of the last antecedent is 
State v. Webb.496 The statute at play in Webb concerned the jurisdiction 
of the state’s district courts (which have since been merged with the 
circuit courts).497 That statute provided that “[d]istrict courts shall have 
the same criminal and quasi-criminal jurisdiction as justices’ courts, 
and shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the circuit courts of all 
misdemeanors committed or triable in their respective counties where 
the punishment prescribed does not exceed . . . a fine of $3,000.”498  
The law thus expresses two grants of jurisdiction. First, district 
courts have the same criminal and quasi-criminal jurisdiction as 
justices’ courts. Second, the district courts have concurrent jurisdiction 
with circuit courts over misdemeanors. The question before the court 
was whether the qualifier “does not exceed . . . a fine of $3,000” 
applied to both of those grants of jurisdiction. To answer that question, 
the Oregon Supreme Court invoked the “long-recognized principle” of 
the rule of the last antecedent. The court concluded that the phrase 
“does not exceed . . . a fine of $3,000” applied only to the latter of the 
two grants of jurisdiction, not to both.499 
There’s an exception to the rule of the last antecedent: if a comma 
precedes the modifier, the modifier following the comma is interpreted 
as “nonrestrictive”—that is, the modifier is not limited to the 
immediately preceding phrase.500 That strikes me as an awful lot to 
read into the presence or absence of a mere comma. Even if it’s fair to 
assume that a rule of the last antecedent exists and that legislators are 
495 I have purloined the example from Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 27–28 (2003). 
496 324 Or. 380, 386–88, 927 P.2d 79, 82–84 (1996). The Oregon Supreme Court 
previously had mentioned the rule in Standard Insurance Co. v. State Tax Commission, 230 
Or. 461, 470–71, 370 P.2d 608, 612 (1962), and Johnson v. C.W. Craddock, 228 Or. 308, 
316–17, 365 P.2d 89, 94 (1961), but it did not apply the rule in either case. Webb was the 
first Oregon Supreme Court case to apply it. 
497 Webb, 324 Or. at 382, 927 P.2d at 80. 
498 Id. at 384–85, 927 P.2d at 81 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 46.040 (1993)). 
499 Id. at 389, 927 P.2d at 83–84. 
500 See, e.g., Liberty Nw. Ins. Corp. v. Watkins, 347 Or. 687, 693–94, 227 P.3d 1134, 
1138 (2010) (applying exception). 
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aware of the rule, it’s an entirely different matter to assume that those 
legislators are also familiar with the effect of including or omitting a 
comma. 
In fact, in more recent cases, there seems to be some pushback—
appropriate, in my view—against too readily applying the rule of the 
last antecedent. Both the Oregon Supreme Court and the Oregon Court 
of Appeals have cautioned that the rule of the last antecedent is not a 
hard-and-fast rule and applies only where no contrary intention 
appears.501  
(iv) Parts of Speech
I’ve already mentioned the importance of attending to parts of
speech in relying on dictionary definitions. In other respects as well, 
courts have relied on the significance of particular parts of speech in 
construing statutes. In a number of cases, courts have relied on the 
significance of the function of prepositional phrases,502 the distinction 
between “dynamic” and “stative” verbs,503 and the functions of 
adverbs.504 
Probably the most common examples are cases relying on the 
distinction between definite and indefinite articles.505 Take Osborn v. 
501 Baker v. City of Lakeside, 343 Or. 70, 75, 164 P.3d 259, 262 (2007); see also Brown 
v. City of Grants Pass, 291 Or. App. 8, 13, 414 P.3d 898, 902 (2018); Home Builders Ass’n
of Metro. Portland v. City of West Linn, 204 Or. App. 655, 661–62, 131 P.3d 805, 808–09
(explaining that the rule of the last antecedent is but one way to solve the problem of the
ambiguous pronoun; the “law of prominence” is another), review denied, 341 Or. 80 (2006).
502 State v. Simonov, 358 Or. 531, 547, 368 P.3d 11, 20 (2016). 
503 State v. Gonzalez-Valenzuela, 358 Or. 451, 457, 365 P.3d 116, 120 (2015). 
504 Vill. at Main St., Phase II, LLC v. Dep’t of Revenue, 356 Or. 164, 174 n.3, 339 P.3d 
428, 433 n.3 (2014); SIF Energy, LLC v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Energy, 275 Or. App. 809, 
816, 365 P.3d 664, 667–68 (2015). 
505 See, e.g., Anderson v. Jensen Racing, Inc., 324 Or. 570, 578–79, 931 P.2d 763, 467 
(1997) (explaining that the definite article “the” denotes a specified thing); Daniel N. 
Gordon, P.C. v. Rosenblum, 276 Or. App. 797, 808, 370 P.3d 850, 856 (2016) (“The 
legislature’s use of ‘a’ as an indefinite article preceding ‘customer’ refers to an unidentified, 
undetermined, or unspecified person.”), aff’d, 361 Or. 352 (2017); State v. Stark, 248 Or. 
573, 578, 273 P.3d 941 (2012) (“The legislature’s use of the definite article ‘the’ indicates 
that there is only one pertinent ‘time of judgment’ at which a court may declare the 
conviction to be a misdemeanor. If the legislature had intended the construction that 
defendant proffers, that any judgment entered at the time may qualify as ‘the time of 
judgment’ . . . it likely would not have used the definite article ‘the.’”) (emphasis omitted); 
Belknap v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n., 235 Or. App. 658, 670, 234 P.3d 1041, 1047 (2010) 
(“The use of the definite article indicates that the 2001 legislature intended the exception 
that it added to [the statute] to apply to the wage claim asserted by a specific plaintiff.”), 
review denied, 349 Or. 654, 249 P.3d 542 (2011); State v. Nguyen, 223 Or. App. 286, 291, 
196 P.3d 40, 43 (2008) (“If the legislature had intended to allow drivers to choose from 
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Psychiatric Security Review Board.506 In that case the court addressed 
whether a person previously committed to the board’s jurisdiction 
because of a mental disease or defect must be released from the board’s 
jurisdiction if he or she no longer suffers from that mental disease or 
defect. The relevant statute provided that, when a person applies for 
discharge from the board’s jurisdiction, the board must make the 
following findings: 
(a) If the board finds that the person is no longer affected by mental
disease or defect, or, if so affected, no longer presents a substantial
danger to others, the board shall order the person discharged from
commitment or from conditional release.
(b) If the board finds that the person is still affected by a mental
disease or defect and is a substantial danger to others, but can be
controlled adequately if conditionally released with treatment as a
condition of release, the board shall order the person conditionally
released . . .
(c) If the board finds that the person has not recovered from the
mental disease or defect and is a substantial danger to others and
cannot adequately be controlled if conditionally released on
supervision, the board shall order the person committed to, or
retained in, a state hospital.507
The petitioner had been convicted of a sex offense, diagnosed with an 
organic personality disorder, and committed to the jurisdiction of the 
board.508 Some time later, the petitioner had been rediagnosed with 
pedophilia and mixed personality disorder, not an organic personality 
disorder.509 The petitioner asked for release because he no longer 
suffered from the condition he had when first committed.510 The board 
refused, arguing that it retained jurisdiction so long as the petitioner 
suffered from any mental disease or defect.511 
different ‘fronts’ of their vehicles in the positioning of registration plates, it would not have 
chosen the definite article ‘the.’”); State v. Branam, 220 Or. App. 255, 260, 185 P.3d 557, 
559 (2008) (“The fact that the legislature used the definite article ‘the’ and the singular form 
of the noun ‘sentence’ suggests that it intended the requirements [of the statute] to apply to 
only one particular sentence.”); State v. Rodriguez, 217 Or. App. 24, 30–31, 175 P.3d 471, 
475 (2007) (“[W]e ordinarily assume that the use of the indefinite article, as opposed to the 
definite article, has legal significance.”). 
506 325 Or. 135, 934 P.2d 391 (1997). 
507 Id. at 140, 934 P.2d at 394 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 161.346(1) (1995)) (emphasis 
omitted). 
508 Id. at 137–38, 934 P.2d at 392.  
509 Id. at 138–39, 934 P.2d at 392–93. 
510 Id. at 141, 934 P.2d at 394. 
511 Id. at 137–40, 934 P.2d at 393–94. 
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The Oregon Supreme Court agreed with the board. The key, the 
court explained, was to read each of the three paragraphs of the statute 
in order.512 This process revealed the significance of the legislature’s 
use of indefinite and definite articles: 
When read in the order written, all parts of that statute are clear. 
That is, the three paragraphs . . . must be read sequentially to 
understand the logic in using first no modifier and then two different 
modifiers. By not using a modifier in the first paragraph, the 
legislature intended that the PSRB discharge any person who no 
longer suffers from any mental disease or defect or who, if affected, 
is not dangerous. Under paragraph (b), if the PSRB has found under 
(a) that a person still suffers from a mental disease or defect and is
dangerous, the board must conditionally release that person if he or
she can be controlled adequately. Finally, in paragraph (c), the
legislature intended for continued confinement of a person who
suffers from the mental disease or defect that was identified under
paragraph (b) and who is dangerous and cannot safely be released
conditionally. A textual analysis thus shows that the legislature
intended for the PSRB to continue jurisdiction over a person who
suffers from any mental disease or defect, even if the diagnosis has
changed.513
The distinction between definite and indefinite articles should not, 
however, be taken as an absolute. Whether it makes a difference will 
depend on the context. In Lake Oswego Preservation Society v. City of 
Lake Oswego, the law provided that, once a historic designation has 
been imposed on a property, the local government may allow “a 
property owner” to remove the historic designation.514 The original 
owner didn’t challenge the city of Lake Oswego’s designation of his 
property as historic.515 But a later owner did object, citing the statute 
that allowed “a property owner” to challenge a city’s designation.516 
The city approved the new owner’s request.517 A local preservation 
society appealed, arguing that the statute referred to the owner at the 
time of the historic designation.518 
The Oregon Supreme Court agreed with the preservation society.519 
The court acknowledged the legislature’s use of the indefinite article 
512 Id. at 142, 934 P.2d at 394. 
513 Id. at 142, 934 P.2d at 395 (emphasis added). 
514 360 Or. 115, 125, 379 P.3d 462, 469 (2016). 
515 Id. at 121–22, 379 P.3d at 467. 
516 Id. at 122, 379 P.3d at 467. 
517 Id.  
518 Id. at 123, 379 P.3d at 468. 
519 Id. at 141, 379 P.3d at 478. 
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“a” in the phrase “a property owner” could be read as referring to any 
property owner.520 Still, the court continued, 
the use of the article “a” as a determiner does not always mean that 
the referenced noun is unspecified in the most generic sense. For 
example, “a” may also be used quantitatively. As a result, “a” may 
simply signal that the specified noun is one of a particular class, 
whether that class is defined by a subsequent restrictive clause or 
other modifier or is implied more generally by the context in which 
the phrase appears. When used in that manner, the determiner “a” 
indicates that the noun that follows is one unspecified member of a 
limited group. Read in that way, the phrase “a property owner” . . . 
could also be interpreted as referring to one of an otherwise limited 
group of property owners.521 
The court then examined the larger context of the statute and concluded 
that the legislature did intend that “a property owner” be used in the 
more restrictive sense to mean any property owner who is part of a 
more limited group—namely, property owners at the time of 
designation.522 
Another common example of the courts focusing on the function of 
a particular part of speech comes into play with the use of the 
disjunctive conjunction “or.” It is often asserted rather categorically 
that “the words ‘and’ and ‘or,’ as used in statutes, are not 
interchangeable, being strictly of a conjunctive or disjunctive nature, 
respectively.”523 That assertion isn’t quite accurate, as Burke v. 
Department of Land Conservation and Development524 makes clear. 
At issue in that case was whether an individual purchasing a parcel of 
land was an “owner” authorized to bring a claim for the diminution in 
value resulting from the imposition of land use restrictions.525 The 
statute defined an “owner” to mean the following: 
(a) The owner of fee title to the property as shown in the deed
records of the county where the property is located; 
520 Id. at 126–27, 379 P.3d at 470. 
521 Id. at 127, 379 P.3d at 470 (citations omitted). 
522 Id. at 128, 379 P.3d at 470; see also SAIF Corp. v. DeLeon, 352 Or. 130, 138, 282 
P.3d 800, 804 (2012) (“[T]he definite article ‘the’ is not dispositive.”); Chu v. SAIF Corp.,
290 Or. App. 194 198–99, 415 P.3d 68, 71 (2018) (explaining that “the” employment refers
not just to one job but to all jobs claimant held at time of injury).
523 Lommasson v. School Dist. No. 1, 201 Or. 71, 79, 261 P.2d 860, 864 (1953), opinion 
withdrawn in part on reh’g, 201 Or. 71, 267 P.2d 1105 (1954). 
524 352 Or. 428, 290 P.3d 790 (2012). 
525 Id. at 430, 290 P.3d at 791. 
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(b) The purchaser under a land sale contract, if there is a recorded
land sale contract in force for the property; or 
(c) If the property is owned by the trustee of a revocable trust, the
settlor of the revocable trust, except when the trust becomes 
irrevocable only the trustee is the owner.526 
The Department of Land Conservation and Development argued that, 
under the statute, there could be only one owner at a time, because the 
statute listed three categories of individuals separated by the disjunctive 
“or.”527  
The Oregon Supreme Court disagreed: 
To say that “or” is “disjunctive” is true enough. But authorities 
agree that a disjunctive connector can have either an “inclusive” or 
an “exclusive” sense. Thus, “A or B” can mean one or the other, but 
not both. But it also can mean one or the other, or both.  
That is certainly true in ordinary conversation. If, for example, a 
person is told, “If you obtain a passport, you may travel to England, 
France, or Germany,” that does not necessarily mean that he or she 
may travel to only one of those destinations. . . . 
It is also true in the law that, particularly in the drafting of 
contracts and statutes, it is common to arrange material in “tabular” 
form, with terms and conditions arranged in lists separated by 
connective terms such as “and” and “or.” In fact, it has been asserted 
that, in legal drafting, it is more often the case that the connective 
“or” is used in the inclusive sense.528 
In that particular case, the court concluded that the statute’s wording in 
context made clear that the legislature intended the “or” to operate in 
the inclusive sense.529 
Courts have similarly struggled with the modal verb “shall” and its 
counterpart “may.” It is common to see cases declaring categorically 
that the word “shall” is mandatory, signifying a command, and distinct 
from the word “may,” which signifies discretion.530 But think about it 
526 Id. at 434, 290 P.3d at 793 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 195.300(18) (2011)). 
527 Id. at 435, 290 P.3d at 793. 
528 Id. at 435–36, 290 P.3d at 794 (citations omitted) (emphasis omitted). 
529 Id. at 439–40, 290 P.3d at 796. 
530 See, e.g., Williams v. Philip Morris, Inc., 344 Or. 45, 59, 176 P.3d 1255, 1262–63 
(2008) (the word “shall” “generally indicates that something is mandatory”); Smothers v. 
Gresham Transfer, Inc., 332 Or. 83, 91, 23 P.3d 333, 338 (2001) (the word “shall” “is a 
statement prescribing how government must conduct its functions”), overruled on other 
grounds by Horton v. Or. Health & Sci. Univ., 359 Or. 168, 376 P.3d 998 (2016); Preble v. 
Dep’t of Revenue, 331 Or. 320, 324, 14 P.3d 613, 615 (2000) (the word “shall,” as used in 
particular statutory provisions, connotes a command); Cain v. Rijken, 300 Or. 706, 718, 717 
P.2d 140, 147 (1986) (“‘[S]hall’ create[s] a mandatory duty while ‘may’ create[s] only
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more carefully, and it gets more complicated. Although the word 
“shall” does ordinarily signify obligation or duty,531 it often gets used 
in other ways, especially in statutes.  
Consider that statutes and rules commonly include the command no 
person “shall,” as in “[n]o party shall file a reply brief”532 or “[n]o 
person shall operate a livestock auction market without a valid 
license.”533 Those statutes obviously do not mean that no person has 
an obligation to file a reply brief or operate a livestock auction market 
without a license. The statutory phrase “no person shall”—and there 
are hundreds of examples of this phrase in the Oregon Revised 
Statutes534—actually means “no person may.” In other cases, the word 
“shall” denotes futurity, not obligation, as in a statute that provides that 
“no further pleadings shall be necessary”535 or that “on and after the 
60th day from the date of the first publication of the notice it shall be 
unlawful for livestock or a class of livestock to be permitted to run at 
large within the boundaries of the livestock district.”536  
As the late professor David Mellinkoff noted, “The standard 
grammatical use of may (permitted) and shall (required) is also a legal 
use, often described as the ‘presumed’ use. But may and shall in legal 
writing, especially in statutes, are so frequently treated as synonyms 
that the grammatical standard cannot be considered the legal 
standard.”537 Bryan Garner has similarly observed that the use of the 
words “may” and “shall” is a “horrific muddle.”538 
The point is that the meaning of “shall” and “may” isn’t as simple as 
the cases sometimes categorically suggest; their meanings will depend 
on their context. Of particular significance are cases in which these two 
words both appear in the same statute. In such cases, courts treat the 
authority to act.”); State v. Justice, 273 Or. App. 457, 465, 361 P.3d 39, 44 (2015) 
(“Generally, the word ‘shall’ implies that the legislature intended to create an 
obligation . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
531 See, e.g., WEBSTER’S THIRD, supra note 296, at 1396 (defining “shall” as, among 
other things, “will have to: must”). 
532 OR. R. APP. P. 12.25(3)(c). 
533 OR. REV. STAT. § 599.215(1) (2017). 
534 A recent Westlaw search for the phrase “no person shall” produced more than 500 
hits in the Oregon Revised Statutes. 
535 OR. REV. STAT. § 545.579(1) (2017). 
536 OR. REV. STAT. § 607.040(1) (2017). 
537 DAVID MELLINKOFF, MELLINKOFF’S DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN LEGAL USAGE 
402 (1992). 
538 BRYAN A. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 939 (2d ed. 1995). 
Garner points out that the word “shall” is especially “slippery,” being subject to at least eight 
different senses, sometimes shifting meaning in midsentence. Id.  
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two words as distinct terms.539 That makes sense. It clearly flows from 
the general principle that, when the legislature uses different words, it 
generally intends them to have different meanings.540 
(v) Punctuation
Punctuation marks originated as signals used by orators to indicate
different types of pauses. In the late seventeenth century, for example, 
a colon indicated a pause that lasted twice as long as a semicolon, which 
lasted twice as long as a comma.541 Suffice it to say that it took a long 
time to develop any agreement about the significance of punctuation. 
Early nineteenth-century cases tended to disparage the significance of 
punctuation in the interpretation of statutes and other documents of 
legal significance. The Oregon Supreme Court explained in State ex 
rel. Baker v. Payne that “the rule is that courts will, in the construction 
of statutes, for the purpose of arriving at the real meaning and intention 
of the lawmakers, disregard the punctuation, or re-punctuate, if need 
be, to render clear the true meaning of the statute.”542 Some cases went 
so far as to say that “punctuation is not part of the statute.” Scalia and 
Garner suggest that this lack of enthusiasm for punctuation may have 
been based on early legislative traditions of voting on legislation as 
read aloud or on the fact that punctuation sometimes was inserted by 
printers.543  
At all events, times have changed. Now, it is not at all uncommon 
for courts to ascribe dispositive significance to one punctuation mark 
539 See, e.g., Friends of the Columbia Gorge, Inc. v. Columbia River Gorge Comm’n, 
346 Or. 415, 426, 212 P.3d 1243, 1249 (2009) (“[W]hatever the possibility for confusion or 
ambiguity that might exist when either word appears alone in a statute, regulation, or other 
directive, when both words appear side by side in the same section of a document, our 
normal interpretive principles dictate that we presume that different meanings are 
intended.”). 
540 See, e.g., Atkinson v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 341 Or. 382, 388, 143 
P.3d 538, 541 (2006) (“[Wh]en the legislature uses different terms within the same statute,
normally it intends those terms to have different meanings.”); Scott v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins., 345 Or. 146, 153, 190 P.3d 372, 376 (2008) (“The legislature’s use of the same term,
‘proof of loss,’ in all three of the statute’s subsections indicates that the legislature intended
the term to have the same meaning throughout the statute.”).
541 For a history of punctuation, see generally KEITH HOUSTON, SHADY CHARACTERS: 
THE SECRET LIFE OF PUNCTUATION, SYMBOLS & OTHER TYPOGRAPHICAL MARKS (2013). 
Especially fun is the history of the “octothorpe,” now known as the “hashtag.” See id. at 41–
57. 
542 22 Or. 335, 341–42, 29 P. 787, 789 (1892). 
543 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 48, at 161; see also NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. 
SHAMBIE SINGER, supra note 115, § 47:15 (noting that early parliamentary enactments were 
not punctuated). 
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or another. Courts seem particularly impressed with the significance of 
commas, the presence of which can indicate that a clause is 
nonrestrictive or parenthetical.544 
I have yet to encounter an Oregon case involving the use of the 
controversial “serial comma,” a comma placed immediately before the 
coordinating conjunction in a list or series of terms: “A, B, C, and D.” 
A number of style manuals require the serial comma. The Oxford 
Companion to the English Language, for instance, requires that 
“[c]ommas are used to separate items in a list or sequence.”545 As a 
result, the serial comma rule is often known as the “Oxford comma” 
rule. The Chicago Manual of Style likewise calls for it,546 as do Strunk 
and White in The Elements of Style547 and the Government Printing 
Office’s Style Manual.548 Garner’s Modern American Usage also 
advocates for using the serial comma.549  
There is good reason for the foregoing authorities to urge the use of 
the serial comma. In short, it avoids unnecessary ambiguity. Consider 
a now famous Maine statute, which required overtime pay for each 
hour worked over forty hours, subject to an exemption for “[t]he 
canning, processing, preserving, freezing, drying, marketing, storing, 
packing for shipment or distribution of: (1) Agricultural produce; (2) 
Meat and fish products; and (3) Perishable foods.”550 
Does the law require overtime for “packing for shipment or 
distribution” of the listed products? Or does it require overtime for 
“packing for shipment” of the listed products, as well as “shipment” of 
those products without packing? In O’Connor v. Oakhurst Dairy,551 a 
group of delivery drivers sued for overtime compensation because they 
delivered—that is, they “shipped”—milk. Their employer argued that 
544 See, e.g., Alfieri v. Solomon, 358 Or. 383, 393, 365 P.3d 99, 106 (2015) (explaining 
that the use of commas in a statute indicates restrictive, as opposed to nonrestrictive, 
clauses); Blacknall v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 348 Or. 131, 140, 229 P.3d 
595, 600 (2010) (applying “the familiar grammatical principle that a phrase set off by 
commas functions as a parenthetical”); State v. Bailey, 346 Or. 551, 560, 213 P.3d 1240, 
1245 (2009) (discussing significance of using commas). 
545 Tom McArthur, Comma, in CONCISE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE ENGLISH 
LANGUAGE (Tom McArthur & Roshan McArthur eds., 1998). 
546 THE CHICAGO MANUAL OF STYLE § 6.18 (16th ed. 2010). 
547 WILLIAM STRUNK, JR. & E.B. WHITE, THE ELEMENTS OF STYLE 3 (Maria Kalman 
illus., 2005). 
548 U.S. GOV’T PRINTING OFF. STYLE MANUAL: AN OFFICIAL GUIDE TO THE FORM AND 
STYLE OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING 202 (31st ed. 2016). 
549 BRYAN A. GARNER, GARNER’S MODERN AMERICAN USAGE 676 (3d ed. 2009). 
550 26 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26 § 664(3) (2015). 
551 851 F.3d 69 (1st Cir. 2017). 
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the exemption applied only to “packing . . . for shipment,” not just 
shipping by itself.552  
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit sided with the drivers. The 
court began by stating, “For want of a comma, we have this case.”553 
The absence of the Oxford comma, the court explained, introduced an 
ambiguity, which, after carefully analyzing the statute in context along 
with its legislative history, the court found itself unable to resolve. The 
court ultimately invoked a Maine statutory construction principle that 
counsels courts to interpret such remedial statutes broadly in cases of 
ambiguity.554 The Dairy ultimately settled the case for $5 million.555 
In the meantime, the Maine legislature amended the statute.556  
In spite of the obvious benefits of employing the serial comma, its 
use is not universally embraced. The New York Times does not use it,557 
nor does the Associated Press.558 In that regard, I find it especially 
noteworthy that the Oregon Legislature is among those who apparently 
abjure the use of the serial comma. The latest edition of the Form and 
Style Manual for Legislative Measures advises practitioners to 
“[g]enerally, omit serial commas before the conjunction in a series of 
words, phrases or clauses, as in ‘men, women and children’ rather than 
‘men, women, and children.’”559 
That suggests that the omission of a serial comma in Oregon 
legislation would have no particular significance. But it depends on 
whether the courts would regard the legislature’s form and style manual 
as evidence of legislative intent. I am not aware of an Oregon case that 
has addressed the issue. I can think of no good reason why it wouldn’t 
be. And there is one case, Burke v. Department of Land Conservation 
and Development, in which the court cited the Oregon Office of 
552 Id. at 71. 
553 Id. at 70. 
554 Id. at 79. 
555 John McCoy, Oakhurst Dairy’s $5M Settlement Driven by Grammar Rules, 
BLOOMBERG LAW (Feb. 9, 2018, 4:28 PM) (https://bnanews.bna.com/daily-labor-
report/oakhurst-dairys-5m-settlement-driven-by-grammar-rules). 
556 The statute now reads, “The canning; processing; preserving; freezing; drying; 
marketing; storing; packing for shipment; or distribution of: (1) Agricultural produce; 
(2) Meat and fish products; and (3) Perishable foods.” 26 ME REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 26
§ 664(3)(F) (2018).
557 ALLAN M. SIEGAL & WILLIAM G. CONNOLLY, THE NEW YORK TIMES MANUAL OF
STYLE AND USAGE 67 (revised by Corbett, et al., 5th ed. 2015). 
558 THE ASSOCIATED PRESS STYLEBOOK AND BRIEFING ON MEDIA LAW 329–30 (Norm 
Goldstein ed. 2002). 
559 OREGON LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY, FORM AND STYLE MANUAL FOR LEGISLATIVE 
MEASURES 5 (2017–2018 ed.). 
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Legislative Counsel’s Bill Drafting Manual for that purpose, albeit on 
a different issue.560  
e. Ejusdem Generis
The rule of ejusdem generis (pronounced eh-yoos-dem generis) is
one of the classics of statutory construction.561 It’s even in Latin. The 
rule states that, when a statute provides a list of specific items followed 
by a general catchall phrase—such as “and other”—the general catchall 
phrase includes only things of the same character or nature as the 
specific items in the list.562 So, if a statute refers to automobiles, trucks, 
sport utility vehicles, tractors, motorcycles, “and other vehicles,” the 
statute would not be read to include bicycles, as all the specific items 
listed share the common characteristic of being motorized. The 
rationale is straightforward: if the legislature has taken the trouble to 
make a list of specifics, it presumably had that list in mind when it 
added the general catchall at the end. This rule also avoids redundancy. 
Think about it. If, in the example, the legislature had intended the 
phrase “other vehicles” to be read literally to apply to all other vehicles, 
it would render superfluous the list of specific vehicles that preceded 
the catchall phrase.  
Still, the rule of ejusdem generis has been subjected to sustained 
criticism in recent years.563 The principal problem is that the common 
characteristics of any given list of specific items can be described at 
many different levels of generality.564 The Oregon Court of Appeals 
decision in State v. Ruff is a terrific illustration of the problem.565 
Oregon law prohibits carrying concealed upon a person a switchblade 
560 352 Or. 428, 436, 290 P.3d 790, 794 (2012). 
561 The rule of ejusdem generis dates back at least to the sixteenth century and The 
Archbishop of Canterbury’s Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 519, 520–21 (1596). 
562 See, e.g., Bellikka v. Green, 306 Or. 630, 636, 762 P.2d 997, 1001 (1988) (“When 
the legislature chooses to state both a general standard and a list of specifics, the specifics 
do more than place their particular subjects beyond the dispute; they also refer the scope of 
the general standard to matters of the same kind, often phrased in Latin as ‘ejusdem 
generis.’”). 
563 See, e.g., REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 
249 (1975) (ejusdem generis and similar canons are “convenient fictions for deciding 
specific controversies . . . [that] should not be confused with what they caricature, measures 
of actual meaning”). 
564 See, e.g., MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: POLITICAL LANGUAGE AND THE POLITICAL 
PROCESS 217 (William D. Popkin ed., 5th ed. 2009) [hereinafter MATERIALS ON 
LEGISLATION] (“Its application can still be troublesome, however, because it is hard to know 
what generic category the list describes.”). 
565 229 Or. App. 98, 211 P.3d 277 (2009). 
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knife, as well as “any dirk, dagger, ice pick, slungshot, metal knuckles, 
or any similar instrument by the use of which injury could be inflicted 
upon the person or property of another.”566 Police stopped Ruff when 
he was carrying a 42-inch “samurai-type” sword concealed under his 
coat. During the stop, the police also found methamphetamine. 
Following his arrest on the charge of possession of a controlled 
substance, Ruff moved to suppress the evidence of the 
methamphetamine, as the police lacked cause to stop him in the first 
place. His theory was that the sword that he carried was not of the sort 
prohibited in the concealed weapons statute.  
A majority of the court of appeals disagreed. “While a three-and-one 
half foot long samurai sword is not a dirk or a dagger,” the court 
explained, “it could qualify as an ‘other similar instrument’” for the 
purposes of the statute.567 The majority reasoned that the weapons 
specifically listed in the statute were designed for stabbing, and so also 
was the samurai sword. 
The dissent argued that the majority erred in concluding that the 
samurai sword was “similar” to the other weapons enumerated in the 
statute:  
It seems to me that a “similar instrument” is one that shares similar 
physical characteristics to the listed weapons. Because the statute 
primarily defines the covered weapons as ones that can be carried on 
the person, the size or concealability of the weapon would seem to be 
an essential characteristic. A “similar instrument” is one that is 
similar in size to the listed instruments. Switchblades, daggers, dirks, 
stilettos, and ice picks are all relatively small stabbing weapons. 
Swords are large stabbing weapons. I do not read the statute to 
include large stabbing weapons as “similar instruments.”568 
Who was right? Both the majority and the dissent appear to have 
applied the principle of ejusdem generis correctly. Both looked for the 
common characteristic of the weapons specifically enumerated in the 
statute.569 The problem was that each came up with a different common 
566 OR. REV. STAT. § 166.240(1) (2017). 
567 Ruff, 229 Or. App. at 104, 211 P.3d at 281. 
568 Id. at 109–10, 211 P.3d at 284 (Sercombe, J., dissenting). 
569 Or at least almost. It occurs to me that the statute includes in the list of prohibited 
weapons brass knuckles and a “slungshot” (no, not a slingshot). A slungshot is a weight 
affixed to a long cord, used by mariners in casting a line from one place to another, or, 
perhaps, to hurt people. Both weapons are not used for stabbing. In describing the common 
characteristics of the listed weapons, then, both the majority and the dissent didn’t quite get 
it right.  
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characteristic of the listed items, and the canon itself did not aid in 
determining which characteristic was the correct one.570  
In spite of that rather fundamental problem with the ejusdem generis 
canon, courts have repeatedly applied it.571 A few cases have suggested 
that ejusdem generis has its limits and cannot be applied if doing so 
would lead to redundancy or to a construction that otherwise would 
lead to a result at odds with the legislature’s intentions.572 Those cases 
are correct. 
In recent years there has emerged something of a kerfuffle about just 
when the ejusdem generis canon applies. Does it apply only to statutes 
that follow a sequence of listed specifics with a general catchall? Or 
does it also apply to statutes that begin with a general statement that a 
general term “includes” or “includes but is not limited to” a list of 
specific items that follow? Scalia and Garner have staked out the 
position that the ejusdem generis rule applies only to the specific-to-
general pattern of legislative drafting.573 Sutherland Statutes and 
Statutory Construction, on the other hand, suggests that the rule applies 
in either case.574 
570 For another fine example of the problem, see State v. Corcilius, 294 Or. App. 20, 430 
P.3d 169 (2018). At issue in that case was whether the defendant violated a statute that
prohibited “[d]iscarding or depositing any rubbish, trash, garbage, debris, or other refuse
upon . . . any public way” when he urinated on a public sidewalk. Id. at 22, 430 P.3d at 171.
The majority said no because urine and urinating are not like any of the items specifically
prohibited, id. at 30, 430 P.3d at 175, while the dissent argued that urine and urinating are
like the other listed items, id. at 36, 430 P.3d at 178 (Hadlock, J., dissenting).
571 See, e.g., Liberty v. State Dep’t of Transp., 342 Or. 11, 20, 148 P.3d 909, 913 (2006); 
Lewis v. CIGNA Ins. Co., 339 Or. 342, 350–51, 121 P.3d 1128, 1132 (2005); Vannatta v. 
Keisling, 324 Or. 514, 533, 931 P.2d 770, 782 (1997); State v. K.P., 324 Or. 1, 11 n.6, 921 
P.2d 380, 385 n.6 (1996); Scharfstein v. BP W. Coast Prods., LLC, 292 Or. App. 69, 79–
80, 423 P.3d 757, 763–64 (2018); State v. Moore, 174 Or. App. 94, 99, 25 P.3d 398, 401
(2001).
572 See, e.g., Clinical Research Inst. of S. Or., P.C. v. Kemper Ins. Cos., 191 Or. App. 
595, 603, 84 P.3d 147, 152 (2004) (“Caution is warranted when applying the rule, both 
because of its uncertain justification and because of its malleability.” (citation omitted)); 
State v. Mayorga, 186 Or. App. 175, 181–82, 62 P.3d 818, 822 (2003) (“[T]he rule applies 
in limited circumstances. . . . It does not apply when its application would lead to 
redundancy or to a construction that otherwise is at odds with the legislature’s apparent 
intentions.”); Sanders v. Or. Pac. States Ins. Co., 110 Or. App. 179, 183, 821 P.2d 1119, 
1121 (1991) (rejecting application of canon when it would lead to surplusage). 
573 SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 48, at 203–05. 
574 NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, supra note 115, § 47:17 (“The doctrine 
applies equally to the opposite sequence, i.e., specific words following general ones, to 
restrict application of the general terms to things that are similar to those enumerated.”); see 
also Gregory R. Englert, The Other Side of Ejusdem Generis, 11 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 
51, 54 (2007). 
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The Oregon Supreme Court at first appeared to side with Sutherland. 
In Liberty v. State Department of Transportation, the court applied the 
ejusdem generis canon to a statute that included the phrase “outdoor 
activities such as hunting, fishing,” and other specified activities.575 
However, the court expressly rejected the specific-to-general only 
argument in Schmidt v. Mount Angel Abbey,576 a case involving a 
statute that extended the statute of limitation for tort actions based on 
“child abuse.”577 The statute defined “child abuse” to include “sexual 
exploitation,” which, in turn, was defined as “including, but not limited 
to” three specific examples. The defendant argued that the statute of 
limitations extension did not apply because he had not been accused of 
engaging in any of the three specified examples or anything of the same 
nature as those examples. The plaintiff argued that the term “sexual 
exploitation” did not have to be limited to the three specified examples 
or others like them. According to the plaintiff, the principle of ejusdem 
generis did not apply to statutes that begin with a general term and are 
followed by specifics. The court rejected that argument, explaining that 
“[i]n interpreting a general term, we have considered the context 
provided by specific examples when those examples fall after the 
general term, as well as when they are placed before that term.”578  
But then, in State v. Kurtz,579 the court appeared to suggest that the 
ejusdem generis canon does not apply when the statute begins with a 
general term and follows that with specific examples. After 
acknowledging the canon and its operation, the court stated the 
following:  
The legislature, however, can alter the calculus by signaling that 
it does not intend to confine the scope of a general term in a statute 
according to the characteristics of listed examples. Typically, 
statutory terms such as “including” and “including but not limited 
to,” when they precede a list of statutory examples, convey an intent 
that an accompanying list of examples be read in a nonexclusive 
sense.580 
The court continued with the observation that, “of course,” the specific 
examples remain a significant source of context, even if they do not 
575 342 Or. 11, 20, 148 P.3d 909, 913 (2006). 
576 347 Or. 389, 403–04, 223 P.3d 399, 407 (2009). 
577 OR. REV. STAT. § 12.117(1) (2017). 
578 Schmidt, 347 Or. at 403–04, 223 P.3d at 407. 
579 350 Or. 65, 75, 249 P.3d 1271, 1277 (2011). 
580 Id. 
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constitute the entire universe of relevant examples.581 The court 
confirmed this approach in Daniel N. Gordon, PC v. Rosenblum,582 
explaining that, although the ejusdem generis canon holds that the 
general term is limited by the common characteristics of the 
specifically listed matters, that rule applies only in the case of specific 
lists followed by general catchall terms.583 
At first blush, this can seem like much ado about very little. In all 
cases—whether the general catchall term appears at the beginning or at 
the end—the meaning of the general term is informed by specific terms 
that are listed. There is, however, an important practical distinction. In 
cases to which the ejusdem generis canon applies, the general term is 
defined by the common characteristics of the specifics listed, and no 
others. In cases to which the canon does not apply, the meaning of the 
general term certainly may be informed by the specifics listed, but the 
specifics listed will be taken as illustrative, not exhaustive. Of course, 
whether the legislature is actually aware of such a fine distinction—as 
Kurtz appears so confidently to assume—is another matter.  
f. Noscitur a Sociis
The noscitur a sociis canon essentially adopts the commonsense
notion that surrounding words can shed light on what those in dispute 
mean.584 Literally meaning “by your friends you know them,” this 
581 Id. 
582 361 Or. 352, 393 P.3d 1122 (2017). 
583 Id. at 364–65, 393 P.3d at 1129; see also 1000 Friends of Or. v. Jackson County, 292 
Or. App. 173, 184, 423 P.3d 793, 800 (2018) (ejusdem generis “does not generally apply 
when the list begins with ‘includes’ or the phrase ‘including but not limited to’”); Dep’t of 
Human Servs. v. K.W., 273 Or. App. 611, 622, 359 P.3d 539, 545 (2015). 
584 See, e.g., Goodwin v. Kingsmen Plastering, Inc., 359 Or. 694, 702, 375 P.3d 463, 
468 (2016) (“It is a familiar rule that the meaning of words in a statute may be clarified or 
confirmed by reference to other words in the same sentence or provision.”); Johnson v. 
Gibson, 358 Or. 624, 629–30, 369 P.3d 1151, 1154 (2016) (“[T]he meaning of an unclear 
word may be clarified by the meaning of other used in the same context . . . .”); State v. 
Walker, 356 Or. 4, 15 n.5, 333 P.3d 316, 323 n.5 (2014) (“Noscitur a sociis is an old maxim 
which summarizes the rule both of language and of law that the meaning of words may be 
indicated or controlled by those with which they are associated.” (quoting Nunner v. 
Erickson, 151 Or. 575, 609, 51 P.2d 839 (1935))); State v. Baker-Krofft, 348 Or. 655, 663, 
239 P.3d 226, 230 (2010) (applying noscitur a sociis rule); Pendergrass v. Fagan, 218 Or. 
App. 533, 539, 180 P.3d 110, 114 (“[W]hen the legislature prohibits a list of different acts, 
the meaning of each term in the list is determined in light of the common characteristics of 
other terms in the same list.”), review denied, 344 Or. 670 (2008); King City Rehab, LLC 
v. Clackamas County, 214 Or. App. 333, 340–41, 164 P.3d 1190, 1194 (2007); In re
Marriage of Austin, 191 Or. App. 307, 326, 82 P.3d 170, 181 (2003) (“Under that maxim
general words, found in a statute, may take the color and meaning of associated words of
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canon is more general than ejusdem generis and is not limited to lists. 
In fact, noscitur a sociis is sometimes invoked in cases involving the 
interpretation of statutes that are not controlled by ejusdem generis.585 
g. Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius
This is another hoary maxim—literally, “the expression of one thing
is the exclusion of others”—that applies to the interpretation of 
statutory lists. Unlike ejusdem generis, though, it applies when a statute 
states a list and does not end with a general catchall phrase that invites 
interpreters to add to it. The essence of the expressio unius canon is the 
idea that the legislature, by having taken the trouble to state a list, 
implicitly intended that anything not on the list was omitted 
purposefully. 
Obviously, the rule makes no sense if taken literally.586 The 
statement “if you obtain a passport, you can travel to England, France, 
and Germany” in no way means that you cannot also go to Italy. 
Whether a list may fairly be read as exhaustive will depend on the 
circumstances. For example, the longer the list, the more likely that it 
is complete. If the statement “if you obtain a passport, you can travel 
to . . . ,” was followed by a list of 197 countries, it would be fair to infer 
that the list is exhaustive.  
The problem is that the conclusion that the list is complete is based 
on its length, not on any canon of construction. The expressio unius 
rule doesn’t add anything to the analysis, except perhaps to supply a 
fancy Latin label with which to state a conclusion. This lack of 
usefulness is why the canon has been the subject of significant criticism 
over the years, at least from academics.587 As is often the case with the 
canons, though, judges still frequently rely on the expressio unius 
rule.588  
specific connotation.” (quoting White v. State Indus. Accident Comm’n, 227 Or. 306, 317, 
362 P.2d 302, 307 (1961))). 
585 See, e.g., Daniel N. Gordon, PC v. Rosenblum, 361 Or. 352, 365, 393 P.3d 1122, 
1130 (2017). 
586 See, e.g., MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION, supra note 564, at 223 (“The ‘expressio 
unius’ canon is clearly doubtful as a description of political language.”). 
587 See, e.g., DICKERSON, supra note 52, at 234 (citing expressio unius as an example of 
“maxims [that] masquerade as rules of interpretation while doing nothing more than 
describing results reached by other means”). 
588 See, e.g., Morgan v. Amex Assurance Co., 352 Or. 363, 372, 287 P.3d 1038, 1042 
(2012) (“Given the close relationship among sections 335, 372, and 375, we assume that the 
omission of the word ‘only’ from section 335 was purposeful.”); State v. Bailey, 346 Or. 
551, 562, 213 P.3d 1240, 1246 (2009) (“Generally, when the legislature includes an express 
provision in one statute and omits the provision from another related statute, we assume that 
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In Crimson Trace Corp. v. Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, however, 
the Oregon Supreme Court acknowledged the limitations of the rule 
and suggested a more cautious approach to its application.589 At issue 
was whether the court had authority to recognize a common-law 
exception to the evidentiary attorney-client privilege for cases in which 
an attorney’s fiduciary obligations may take precedence over the 
privilege.590 The state evidence code expressly provides that “[t]here 
is no privilege” in five enumerated instances.591 There is no mention 
of a “fiduciary exception.”592 The court concluded that the legislature 
apparently intended the list to be exhaustive: 
[B]y taking the trouble to enumerate five different circumstances in
which there is no privilege, the legislature fairly may be understood
to have intended to imply that no others are to be recognized. That
much follows from the application of the familiar interpretive
principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the expression of
one thing implies the exclusion of others).
Of course, care must be taken in applying [the expressio unius] 
principle. The mere expression of one thing does not necessarily 
imply the exclusion of all others. A sign outside a restaurant stating 
“No dogs allowed” cannot be taken to mean that any and all other 
creatures are allowed—including, for example, elephants, tigers, and 
poisonous reptiles. The expressio unius principle is simply one of 
inference. And the strength of the inference will depend on the 
circumstances. For example, the longer the list of enumerated items 
and the greater the specificity with which they are stated, the stronger 
the inference that the legislature intended the list to be exhaustive.593 
The court noted that the evidence code included both a fairly long and 
specific list of exclusions, strongly suggesting the legislature intended 
that list to be exhaustive.594 
the omission was deliberate.”); Springfield Util. Bd. v. Emerald People’s Util. Dist., 339 Or. 
631, 642, 125 P.3d 740, 746 (2005) (“[U]se of a term in one section and not in another 
section of the same statute indicates a purposeful omission.” (quoting PGE v. Bureau of 
Labor & Indus., 317 Or. 606, 611, 859 P.2d 1143, 1146 (1993))); Waddill v. Anchor 
Hocking, Inc., 330 Or. 376, 382, 8 P.3d 200, 203 (2000), adhered to on reconsideration, 
331 Or. 595, 18 P.3d 1096 (2001); Fisher Broad., Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 321 Or. 341, 
353, 898 P.2d 1333, 1340 (1995); Pete Mountain Homeowners Ass’n v. Or. Water Res. 
Dep’t, 236 Or. App. 507, 516 n.2, 238 P.3d 395, 400 n.2 (2010) (“It appears that, when the 
legislature wanted to adopt a definition from the APA, it said so . . . .”). 
589 355 Or. 476, 497–98, 326 P.3d 1181, 1193 (2014). 
590 Id. at 478, 326 P.3d at 1183. 
591 Id. at 493, 326 P.3d at 1191 (quoting OR. EVID. CODE Rule 503 (codified at OR. REV. 
STAT. § 40.225 (2017))). 
592 Id. at 501, 326 P.3d at 1195. 
593 Id. at 497, 326 P.3d at 1193 (citations omitted). 
594 Id. at 498–99, 326 P.3d at 1193–94. 
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Other decisions of the Oregon Supreme Court and the Court of 
Appeals have similarly—and properly—acknowledged that the 
expressio unius rule should be applied carefully and always takes a 
back seat to more direct evidence of legislative intent.595  
h. The “Specific” Controls the “General”
Another classic canon of statutory construction goes by a Latin
phrase—generalia specialibus non derogant—though not many cite it 
in that form any more. The phrase means “things general do not restrict 
(or detract from) things special.”596 The rule tends to be overused and 
underappreciated. It’s a canon that addresses a specific problem in 
statutory construction—namely, what to do when more than one statute 
applies and the statutes appear to contradict one another. The rule is 
supposed to provide a principled way of reconciling the apparently 
conflicting statutes: in cases of irreconcilably conflicting statutes, the 
more specific one is treated as an exception to the more general one.  
Remember the assumption of consistency. It’s presumed that the 
legislature, in enacting multiple statutes, intended all of them to have 
meaning. If two or more statutes appear to apply, every effort must be 
made to reconcile them.597 If, but only if, there is no reasonable way to 
interpret all applicable statutes so that they do not conflict, then, and 
only then, does the specific-versus-general rule apply.598 
595 See, e.g., Rogue Valley Sewer Servs. v. City of Phoenix, 357 Or. 437, 453, 353 P.3d 
581, 590 (2015) (“Expressio unius arguments are most powerful when there is reason to 
conclude that a list of enumerated terms was intended to be exhaustive.”); McDermott v. 
SAIF Corp., 286 Or. App. 406, 415, 398 P.3d 964, 969 (2017) (“[T]he expressio unius guide 
to legislative intent corroborates, rather than supplies, meaning to a statute.”); MEC Or. 
Racing, Inc. v. Or. Racing Comm’n, 233 Or. App. 9, 20, 225 P.3d 61, 67 (2009) (“[A] rule 
of permissible [negative] inference . . . gives way to other, more direct, and contrary 
evidence of legislative intent.”). 
596 Generalia specialibus non derogant, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 705 (8th ed. 1999). 
597 See, e.g., Powers v. Quigley, 345 Or. 432, 438, 198 P.3d 919, 922 (2008) (“[W]hen 
multiple statutory provisions are at issue in a case, this court, if possible must construe those 
statutes in a manner that will give effect to all of them.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
State v. Guzek, 322 Or. 245, 268, 906 P.2d 272, 286 (1995) (“[W]hen one statute deals with 
a subject in general terms and another deals with the same subject in a more minute and 
definite way, the two should be read together and harmonized, if possible, while giving 
effect to a consistent legislative policy.”). 
598 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Grossman, 338 Or. 99, 109, 106 P.3d 618, 623 (2005) 
(“[A]s the more specific statute regarding property settlement in a marital dissolution 
proceeding, it controls to the extent that it is inconsistent with the general ‘just and proper’ 
distribution requirement.”); State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t v. M.T., 321 Or. 419, 426, 899 P.2d 
1192, 1195 (1995) (“When a general statute and a specific statute both purport to control an 
area of law, this court considers the specific statute to take precedence over an inconsistent 
general statute related to the same subject.”); State v. Pearson, 250 Or. 54, 58, 440 P.2d 229, 
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Courts will go to great lengths to avoid concluding that statutes 
irreconcilably conflict. In State v. Guzek, for example, the question was 
whether victim-impact evidence is admissible during the penalty phase 
of a capital case.599 Two statutes applied and, at least on the surface, 
they appeared to suggest two different answers. On the one hand, ORS 
137.013 provided that the victim or the victim’s next of kin had the 
right to appear at the time of sentencing “to reasonably express any 
views concerning the crime, the person responsible, the impact of the 
crime on the victim, and the need for restitution and a compensatory 
fine.”600 On the other hand, ORS 165.150(1) provided that only 
relevant evidence is admissible during the penalty phase of a capital 
case,601 and the Oregon Supreme Court had concluded that victim-
impact statements are not relevant to any of the issues to be decided in 
those cases.602 The court strained to reconcile the two statutes and 
ultimately concluded that the former statute simply didn’t apply to 
capital cases. “Any inconsistency between those two statutes can be 
resolved,” the court explained, “if we construe ORS 137.013 to apply 
only to sentencing in non-capital cases. That construction gives effect 
to both statutes.”603 
Once the court concludes that multiple statutes are irreconcilable, 
the specific-controls-the-general canon comes into play. Kambury v. 
DaimlerChrysler Corp. illustrates how the canon works.604 At issue in 
that case was which of two statutes of limitation applied to an action 
for the death of a person killed by a defective product.605 Either of two 
different statutes seemed to apply. One, Oregon’s product liability 
statute, provided that actions for death, injury, or damage arising out of 
231 (1968) (“[I]f the two statutes cannot be harmonized, the specific statute is considered to 
be an exception to the general rule.”); Smith v. Dep’t of Corr., 276 Or. App. 862, 867, 369 
P.3d 1213, 1216 (2016) (explaining that the rule applies “if two statutes are inconsistent”);
In re Concealed Handgun License for Stanley v. Myers, 276 Or. App. 321, 328, 369 P.3d
75, 79 (2016); see also OR. REV. STAT. 174.020(2) (2017) (“When a general provision and
a particular provision are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former so that a
particular intent controls a general intent that is inconsistent with the particular intent.”);
Olsen v. Deschutes County, 204 Or. App. 7, 13, 127 P.3d 655, 659 (“Applying the maxim
necessarily renders one of the [two] statutes—the older and more general—meaningless,
and should therefore be used only when a conflict actually exists and cannot be avoided.”),
review denied, 341 Or. 80 (2006).
599 322 Or. 245, 906 P.2d 272 (1995). 
600 Id. at 264, 906 P.2d at 284 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 137.013 (1989)). 
601 Id. (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 165.150(1)(b)(D) (1989)). 
602 Id. at 260–63, 906 P.2d at 282–84. 
603 Id. at 269, 906 P.2d at 286.  
604 334 Or. 367, 50 P.3d 1163 (2002). 
605 Id. at 370, 50 P.3d at 1164. 
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defective products must be brought “no later than two years after the 
date on which the death, injury or damage complained of occurs.”606 
The other, Oregon’s wrongful death statute, provided that such actions 
must be brought no later than “[t]hree years after the death of the 
decedent.”607  
With no obvious way to reconcile the two statutes, the court 
examined them to determine which statute was more specific.608 The 
test, the court said, was whether one statute deals with the problem in 
a “more minute and definite way.”609 The court determined that the 
product liability statute was more specific because it spoke to claims 
arising out of a specific source, as opposed to wrongful deaths 
generally.610 In the case of the product liability statute, the legislature 
created a remedy for death caused by a particular source, specifically 
product defects, and provided a two-year period of limitations for those 
claims.611 In so doing, the legislature has dealt with wrongful death 
actions based on product liability in a more minute and definite way, 
and so the product liability statute of limitations must control over the 
more general wrongful death statute of limitations.612 
The trick, of course, is trying to figure out which statute deals with 
a problem in a more minute and definite way. As the court of appeals 
put it,  
[T]he rule that, in cases of conflict, specific statutory provisions
control over general ones can produce different results depending on
which statute is characterized as the specific and which as the
general. The problem is that, in many cases, the same statutes may be
characterized as specific or general depending on which features a
court chooses to emphasize.613
In State v. Haugen, for example, the question arose whether a sentence 
of death for aggravated murder must be imposed only after a defendant 
606 Id. at 371, 50 P.3d at 1164 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 30.905(2) (2001)). 
607 Id. at 372, 50 P.3d at 1165 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 30.020(1) (2001)). 
608 Id. at 373–74, 50 P.3d at 1166. 
609 Id. at 374, 50 P.3d at 1166. 
610 Id. at 375, 50 P.3d at 1166. 
611 Id.  
612 Id.  
613 Oregonians for Sound Econ. Policy v. SAIF Corp., 187 Or. App. 621, 631, 69 P.3d 
742, 746, review denied, 336 Or. 60 (2003); see also City of Lowell v. Wilson, 197 Or. App. 
291, 306, 105 P.3d 856, 864 (in many cases, “the application of the maxim that a ‘particular’ 
statute controls over a more ‘general’ statute becomes a circular exercise”), review denied, 
339 Or. 406 (2005). 
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completes a life sentence that he or she has already been serving.614 
The defendant said yes based on ORS 137.123(3), which provided that, 
when a defendant is sentenced for a crime committed after being 
sentenced for the commission of a previous crime, “the court shall 
provide that the sentence for the new crime be consecutive to the 
sentence for the previous crime.”615 The state said no, the imposition 
of the death sentence need not await the completion of the sentence on 
the earlier offense, because death penalty statutes require the execution 
of the sentence without any delays following the exhaustion of all 
appeals and collateral remedies.616  
In the face of that statutory conflict, both parties argued that one 
statute or the other was the more specific.617 The defendant argued that 
ORS 137.123(3) applied only to a subset of sentences for aggravated 
murder—those committed after the commission of an earlier crime—
whereas the death penalty statutes on which the state relied applied to 
all death sentences for aggravated murder.618 The state argued that the 
death penalty statutes applied only to death sentences, while the statute 
on which the defendant relied applied to sentences for any crime 
committed if the defendant was incarcerated at the time of the crime.619 
The supreme court wrestled with the question at some length, before 
settling on the conclusion that the state had the better of the 
argument.620 The point, though, is that neither the defendant nor the 
state was plainly wrong. Both of their arguments were perfectly 
consistent with the applicable statutes, and it’s not always going to be 
easy to predict which argument about “general” and “specific” statutes 
will prevail.  
5. Legislative History
One of the defining aspects of statutory construction under PGE was
that legislative history analysis could occur only if the first-level textual 
analysis was inconclusive; that is, if the statute remained “ambiguous” 
614 349 Or. 174, 202–03, 243 P.3d 31, 48 (2010). 
615 Id. at 200, 243 P.3d at 46–47 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 137.123(3) (2009)). 
616 Id. at 201, 243 P.3d at 47–48. After the defendant exhausts those remedies, the trial 
court is required to hold a death warrant hearing. OR. REV. STAT. § 137.463(3) (2017). If 
the court determines that the defendant is mentally competent, the court is required to issue 
a death warrant that specifies a date of execution, which is to take place no more than 120 
days from the effective date of the appellate judgment. § 137.463(5). 
617 Haugen, 349 Or. at 202, 243 P.3d at 48. 
618 Id. 
619 Id.  
620 Id. at 204, 243 P.3d at 49. 
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in the technical sense of the term. All that changed with Gaines. Now, 
“a party is free to proffer legislative history to the court, and the court 
will consult it after examining text and context, even if the court does 
not perceive an ambiguity in the statute’s text, where that legislative 
history appears useful to the court’s analysis.”621 
Gaines was occasioned by the legislature’s amendment of ORS 
174.020 in 2001, which declared that a party may offer legislative 
history “at any time” and that courts will give that history the weight it 
warrants. Interestingly, the amendments also provided that “[a] court 
may limit its consideration of legislative history to the information that 
the parties provide to the court.”622 This language suggests that courts 
will not—or at least might not—independently research a statute’s 
legislative history. And, in fact, Gaines itself suggests that “the court 
permissibly may limit its consideration to that history [provided by the 
parties]; the court is not obligated to independently research legislative 
history.”623  
The court was mistaken in suggesting that it is permissible to limit 
consideration of legislative history to what the parties may have 
offered. It has long been the rule in Oregon that courts have an 
obligation to interpret statutes correctly, regardless of the parties’ 
arguments.624 It has never been the case that courts will merely select 
the least wrong interpretation of a statute. And, in fact, in cases since 
Gaines, the Oregon Supreme Court has gone out of its way to 
emphasize its independent responsibility to determine legislative 
intent.625 It’s always best to assume that courts will not limit 
621 State v. Gaines, 346 Or. 160, 172, 206 P.3d 1042, 1050–51 (2009). 
622 Id. (discussing 2001 revision of OR. REV. STAT. § 174.020(3)).  
623 Id. at 166, 206 P.3d at 1047. 
624 See, e.g., Weldon, LPC v. Bd. of Licensed Prof’l Counselors & Therapists, 353 Or. 
85, 91–92, 293 P.3d 1023, 1027 (2012) (obligating the court to correctly construe statutes, 
regardless of parties’ arguments); Stull v. Hoke, 326 Or. 72, 77, 948 P.2d 722, 724 (1997) 
(“In construing a statute, this court is responsible for identifying the correct interpretation, 
whether or not asserted by the parties.”); State v. Joseph, 238 Or. App. 152, 158, 241 P.3d 
752, 756 (2010) (noting obligation to correctly construe statutory terms); State v. Hardesty, 
238 Or. App. 146, 151, 241 P.3d 741, 744 (2010) (quoting Stull, 326 Or. at 77, 948 P.2d at 
724), review denied, 349 Or. 654 (2011); Wilson v. Tri-County Metro. Transp. Dist., 234 
Or. App. 615, 624, 228 P.3d 1225, 1230 (“[O]nce the meaning and application of a statute 
have been put before us, we have an obligation to correctly construe and apply that statute.”), 
review denied, 348 Or. 669 (2010); Lovinger v. Lane County, 206 Or. App. 557, 565, 138 
P.3d 51, 56 (“[W]e have an obligation to determine the proper meaning of statutes,
regardless of the correctness of the parties’ arguments”), review denied, 342 Or. 254 (2006).
625 See, e.g., State v. Cloutier, 351 Or. 68, 76, 261 P.3d 1234, 1239 (2011) (“Both parties 
tend to cherry-pick from the history of the relevant statutes and the cases construing them, 
and only by providing a more complete account may we fairly assess their arguments and 
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themselves to the legislative history offered by litigants, but will 
instead resolve to construe statutes correctly.  
a. What Exactly Constitutes “Legislative History”?
Commentators often speak of the legislative “history” of a statute in
three different senses: 1) the historical background that led to the 
introduction of a particular bill; 2) the enactment history of the bill as 
it winds its way through the legislative process from introduction to 
enactment; and 3) “post-enactment” history, or any developments after 
enactment.626  
Oregon courts take a narrower view. They treat the first category of 
pre-enactment events as part of a statute’s historical context. As we 
have seen, Oregon courts regard a statute’s context broadly to include 
pretty much anything that legislators might have been aware of before 
introducing a bill, including prior versions of a statute, prior 
interpretations of a statute, and the existing common-law context. Once 
upon a time, the distinction mattered, because, under PGE, legislative 
history could be consulted only in the face of ambiguity, while context 
was always available as a “first-level” consideration.627 Since Gaines, 
though, the distinction is immaterial. 
Oregon courts also tend to reject the notion that post-enactment 
events are relevant to a statute’s “legislative history.” That is especially 
true with respect to post-enactment statements of legislators, such as 
affidavits prepared for litigation or statements made in subsequent 
legislative sessions.628 This tendency makes sense. Comments of 
legislators that are generated during the legislative process are 
identify the likely intentions of the legislature in enacting those statutes.”); Blacknall v. Bd. 
of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 348 Or. 131, 139, 229 P.3d 595, 600 (2010) (“We first 
examine the text and context of the disputed provision to determine its meaning. In doing 
so, we are not constrained by the interpretive arguments proffered by the parties.”). 
626 See, e.g., NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, supra note 115, at § 48:1 
(describing three types of “legislative history”). 
627 See, e.g., State v. Chakerian, 325 Or. 370, 378–79, 938 P.2d 756, 760 (1997) 
(classifying Criminal Code Revision Commission Commentary as “context” or “legislative 
history” mattered, because only the former could be consulted in the absence of ambiguity). 
628 See, e.g., Tektronix, Inc. v. Dep’t. of Revenue, 354 Or. 531, 546, 316 P.3d 276, 285 
(2014) (“[L]ater testimony is irrelevant.”); DeFazio v. Wash. Pub. Power Supply Sys., 296 
Or. 550, 561, 679 P.2d 1316, 1324 (1984) (“The views legislators have of existing law may 
shed light on a new enactment, but it is of no weight in interpreting a law enacted by their 
predecessors.”); Salem-Keizer Ass’n of Classified Emps. v. Salem Sch. Dist. 24J, 186 Or. 
App. 19, 26–28, 61 P.3d 970, 974 (2003) (“The rule in this state is that ‘subsequent 
statements by legislators are not probative of the intent of statutes already in effect.’” 
(quoting United Tel. Emps. PAC v. Sec’y of State, 138 Or. App. 135, 139, 906 P.2d 306, 
308 (1995))). 
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generally regarded as having authority, at least in part, because other 
legislators may rely on them in determining how to vote.629 That is not 
the case when legislators offer their opinions outside the context of the 
legislative process,630 where no particular consequences flow from a 
legislator’s comments. At best, legislative comments made outside the 
legislative process represent the views of a single member and cannot 
be attributed to the legislature as a whole.  
Unfortunately, the courts are not altogether consistent about relying 
on subsequent legislative history.631 On occasion, the Oregon Supreme 
Court has examined later legislative history to determine whether the 
legislature’s failure to enact a bill in response to a judicial decision was 
intended to signal agreement with the court’s decision.632 Such cases, 
however, stand at odds with others taking precisely the opposite 
position, that “a later legislature’s failure to change a previously-
enacted statute is not part of the legislative history of that statute.”633 
Moreover, reliance on such subsequent “history” strikes me as 
inconsistent with more recent decisions that cast a more skeptical view 
on the idea of legislative acquiescence.634 
In general, then, Oregon courts view “legislative history” as the 
record of a bill’s progress from introduction to enactment. That covers 
a lot of ground. As a bill courses through the legislative process, there 
are quite a number of junctures at which legislative history can be 
generated. The courts have shown an inclination to take advantage of 
every one of those junctures as sources of evidence of legislative intent. 
Interestingly, the Oregon courts have shown no inclination to 
explain why they regard legislative history—any legislative history—
629 See, e.g., NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, supra note 115 § 48.06 
(“[M]ost members of Congress are likely to consult the committee report in order to gain an 
understanding of the purpose and effect of a bill before they cast their votes.”). 
630 See, e.g., MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION, supra note 564, at 656–57 (“[T]here is not 
even a semblance of an argument that [post-enactment statements] are part of the historical 
context for members of Congress voting on the adopted text.”). For an interesting argument 
that, at least in some cases, post-enactment expressions of opinion about the meaning of a 
statute previously enacted by Congress may have probative value, see generally James J. 
Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations of Statutes: Idle Chatter 
or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1995). 
631 See, e.g., State v. Cloutier, 351 Or. 68, 103, 261 P.3d 1234, 1253 (2011) (“This court 
has stated that subsequent legislative history is irrelevant, although, on other occasions, the 
court has been less categorically dismissive.” (internal citation omitted)). 
632 See, e.g., Harris v. Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 288 Or. 495, 501–02, 
605 P.2d 1181, 1183–84 (1980). 
633 Hilton v. Motor Vehicles Div., 308 Or. 150, 156, 775 P.2d 1378, 1381 (1989). 
634 See supra text at notes 239–49. 
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as a reliable source of evidence of legislative intent. It’s not as if the 
matter is intuitively obvious that, say, the comments of a witness before 
a committee consisting of three legislators is a reliable indicator of what 
any of the other eighty-seven members thought. And, in fact, there is a 
sizeable body of literature challenging the idea that legislative history 
provides anything useful to a determination of legislative intent.635 
Critics of legislative history complain that, for example, there is no 
way to explain how the comments of a single legislator can be taken as 
evidence of what the institution as a whole understood or intended. 
Particularly in small states like Oregon, where so much legislative 
history consists of recordings of oral remarks that were actually heard 
only by those in the audience at the time, it is tough to explain how 
such remarks reliably demonstrate anything approximating “legislative 
intent.” The criticism applies even more forcefully to remarks of 
nonlegislator witnesses who testify in committee hearings. Critics also 
contend that it’s unconstitutional to rely on legislative history, given 
that it was never subjected to a vote of the legislature, and that, in any 
event, legislative history is often every bit as indeterminate as the 
statute it is designed to clarify.  
There is some truth to each of those criticisms. But they don’t so 
much demonstrate the invalidity of legislative history as they 
demonstrate the need for the careful use of it. The fact that it’s difficult 
to attribute the remarks of a single legislator or witness to the 
legislature as a whole, for example, cannot be denied. Still, doing so 
isn’t impossible. In some cases, such as those in which legislators 
expressly state their reliance on certain statements, there may be good 
reason to believe that such statements were influential in the 
understandings or intentions of the body as a whole. That said, courts 
still would do well to articulate such considerations rather than simply 
rely uncritically and without explanation on any form of legislative 
history that happens to be available.  
635 See, e.g., William T. Mayton, Law Among the Pleonasms: The Futility and 
Aconstitutionality of Legislative History in Statutory Construction, 41 EMORY L.J. 113 
(1992); Victoria F. Nourse, The Constitution and Legislative History, 17 U. PA. J. CONST. 
L. 313 (2014) (contesting claims of the unconstitutionality of reliance on legislative history);
Jane S. Schacter, The Confounding Common Law Originalism in Recent Supreme Court
Statutory Interpretation: Implications for the Legislative History Debate and Beyond, 51
STAN. L. REV. 1, 6–10 (1998) (summarizing critiques of legislative history); W. David
Slawson, Legislative History and the Need to Bring Statutory Interpretation Under the Rule
of Law, 44 STAN. L. REV. 383 (1992); Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of
Legislative History, 1987 DUKE L.J. 371; Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of
Legislative History in the Supreme Court, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 205, 212–21.
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(i) Comments of Legislators in Committee Hearings
The courts probably rely on comments of legislators in committee
hearings and work sessions more than on any other type of legislative 
history. This is doubtless due, in large part, to the fact that Oregon’s 
legislative process is very committee-centric. The legislature doesn’t 
permit amendments on the floor of either house without the unanimous 
consent of the members, so most of the work on crafting a bill occurs 
in committees, not on the floor.636 
There remain problems associated with relying on statements of 
legislators in committee hearings. As I have mentioned, it can be tough 
to explain how the remarks of a single legislator demonstrate the 
intentions of an entire house, much less the legislature as a whole. That 
is especially true when the record shows that relatively few legislators 
were even in attendance at the time the statement was made. The courts 
acknowledge this problem, at least on occasion. In one notable 
decision, Errand v. Cascade Steel Rolling Mills, Inc., a majority of the 
Oregon Supreme Court relied on the comments of two legislators and 
two nonlegislator witnesses in a committee hearing.637 That prompted 
a dissent from Justice Susan Graber: 
This case presents an opportunity to make a general observation 
about the use of legislative history. Much of the majority’s discussion 
concerns statements of two witnesses before a committee and two 
legislators. . . . In general, an examination of legislative history is 
most useful when it is able to uncover the manifest general legislative 
intent behind an enactment. By contrast, an examination of 
legislative history is most fraught with the potential for 
misconstruction, misattribution of the beliefs of a single legislator or 
witness to the body as a whole, or abuse in the form of “padding the 
record” when the views of only a small number of persons on a 
narrow question can be found.638 
The majority ignored the criticism.639 But then, in a case decided later 
the same year, a majority of the court cited Justice Graber’s dissent in 
Errand in discounting the comments of a single person.640 More recent 
636 Indispensable to making the most of legislative history is an accurate understanding 
of the process that generated it. The best account of Oregon’s legislative process that I have 
found is Gregory Chaimov, How an Idea Really Becomes Law: What Only Jacques 
Cousteau Can Know, 36 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 185 (2000).  
637 320 Or. 509, 888 P.2d 544 (1995). 
638 Id. at 539 n.4, 888 P.2d at 559 n.4 (Graber, J., dissenting). 
639 Id. at 522–24, 888 P.2d at 550–52. 
640 State v. Guzek, 322 Or. 245, 260, 906 P.2d 272, 282 (1995) (“[T]he dissent relies 
almost exclusively on the inconclusive testimony of one person.”). Ironically, Justice Graber 
authored the dissent in that case. 
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decisions sometimes echo Justice Graber’s critique of relying on the 
comments of a single legislator.641 But just as often, Oregon courts are 
wont to rely on such comments without any qualification.642 
A couple of cautions are in order. First, it appears that the status of 
a particular legislator can matter. The courts are more likely to rely on 
the comments of a single legislator if that legislator is a bill sponsor or 
a committee chair or cochair.643 That’s understandable, as the 
colleagues of such individuals are likely to assume that a bill’s 
sponsors, committee chairs, or cochairs are more knowledgeable about 
a bill and its contents and thus are more likely to rely on these 
individuals’ statements. 
Second, evidence of statements of legislators in committee generally 
comes in two forms: staff-prepared minutes of the committee hearings 
and audio recordings. The committee minutes are often quite detailed 
and accurate, but sometimes they are not. The best evidence of what 
transpired in a committee hearing is the audio recording. In fact, courts 
have been known to reject reliance on committee minutes.644 Only if 
audio recordings are not available should the minutes be quoted as a 
source of legislative history.645 
(ii) Statements of Legislators in Floor Debates
Although legislators are not ordinarily permitted to amend bills
during floor debates, such debates can nevertheless generate useful 
legislative history. If anything, the argument for relying on floor 
debates is stronger than arguments promoting reliance on statements 
641 Patton v. Target Corp., 349 Or. 230, 242, 242 P.3d 611, 618 (2010) (“[T]he comment 
of a single legislator at one committee hearing generally is of dubious utility in determining 
the intent of the legislature in enacting a statute.”). 
642 See, e.g., State v. Baker-Krofft, 348 Or. 655, 664–65, 239 P.3d 226, 230–31 (2010) 
(relying on comments of Senator Ed Fadeley before the Special Committee on Aging). 
643 See, e.g., Bobo v. Kulongoski, 338 Or. 111, 117–18, 107 P.3d 18, 21–22 (2005) 
(relying on comments of Ways and Means Committee cochair); In re Marriage of 
O’Donnell-Lamont, 337 Or. 86, 105 n.9, 91 P.3d 721, 732 n.9 (2004) (relying on statement 
of bill sponsor in committee), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1050 (2005); Belknap v. U.S. Bank 
Nat’l Ass’n, 235 Or. App. 658, 670–71, 234 P.3d 1041, 1047–48 (2010) (relying on bill 
sponsor’s statements in committee), review denied, 349 Or. 654 (2011); Olsen v. Deschutes 
County, 204 Or. App. 7, 40, 127 P.3d 655, 674 (relying on statement of committee chair), 
review denied, 341 Or. 80 (2006). 
644 See, e.g., Vector Marketing Corp. v. Emp’t Dep’t, 275 Or. App. 999, 1008 n.6, 365 
P.3d 686, 691 n.6 (2015) (rejecting arguments based on committee minutes because “audio
recordings of the relevant hearings demonstrates that the minutes do not fully reflect the
content of the committee’s discussion.”).
645 See, e.g., Wright v. Turner, 354 Or. 815, 823 n.5, 322 P.3d 476, 481 n.5 (2014) 
(“Because no audio recording is available, we quote from the minutes.”). 
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made during committee hearings. When a legislator makes a statement 
about a pending bill on the floor, a quorum of an entire house is present, 
and those other legislators have the opportunity to contradict the 
statement. In the absence of such contradiction, there is good reason to 
infer that the legislator’s statement represents an accurate assessment 
of the bill, its purposes, or its effects. In any event, Oregon courts 
routinely rely on statements of legislators in floor debates without 
qualification.646 
(iii) Testimony of Nonlegislator Witnesses
Oregon courts routinely quote testimony of nonlegislator witnesses
as reliable legislative history.647 This can be problematic. It’s one thing 
for a legislator to make a statement about the meaning or purpose of a 
bill. It’s another thing entirely for a nonlegislator to do so. 
646 See, e.g., Baker-Krofft, 348 Or. at 665–66, 239 P.3d at 231 (relying on Sen. Carson’s 
statements during Senate floor debate); Doyle v. City of Medford, 347 Or. 564, 578, 227 
P.3d 683, 691 (2010); State v. Shaw, 338 Or. 586, 605, 113 P.3d 898, 909–10 (2005); Tharp
v. Psychiatric Sec. Review Bd., 338 Or. 413, 427–29, 110 P.3d 103, 110–11 (2005); Indus.
Customers of Nw. Utils. v. Oregon Dep’t of Energy, 238 Or. App. 127, 131–32, 131 n.3,
241 P.3d 352, 354–55, 354 n.3 (2010); Oregon Cable Telecomms. Ass’n v. Dep’t of
Revenue, 237 Or. App. 628, 635, 640–41, 240 P.3d 1122, 1126, 1129 (2010) (relying on
carrier of the bill’s statement during floor debates); State v. Roberts, 231 Or. App. 263, 271–
72, 219 P.3d 41, 45 (2009) (relying on carrier of the bill’s statement during floor debates),
review denied, 347 Or. 608 (2010); Crooked River Ranch Water Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n,
224 Or. App. 485, 492, 198 P.3d 967, 971 (2008) (relying on carrier of the bill’s statement
during floor debates).
647 See, e.g., State v. Zolotoff, 354 Or. 711, 717–18, 320 P.3d 561, 564–65 (2014) 
(quoting statements of prosecutors who proposed legislation); State v. Marshall, 350 Or. 
208, 223–24, 253 P.3d 1017, 1026 (2011) (quoting statements of bill proponents and 
opponents); State v. Partain, 349 Or. 10, 20, 239 P.3d 232, 239 (2010) (quoting letter that 
nonlegislator proponents of the bill submitted); Snider v. Prod. Chem. Mfg., Inc., 348 Or. 
257, 266–67, 230 P.3d 1, 6 (2010) (discussing statement of representative of the Oregon 
State Bar, which sponsored the bill); Ram Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Koresko, 346 Or. 215, 234–
35, 208 P.3d 950, 960–61 (2009) (quoting nonlegislator member of Oregon Law 
Commission); Tharp, 338 Or. at 426–27, 110 P.3d at 109–10; Errand v. Cascade Steel 
Rolling Mills, Inc., 320 Or. 509, 521–24, 888 P.2d 544, 550–51 (1995), superseded by 
statute, OR. REV. STAT. § 656.018 (1999), as recognized in Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, 
Inc., 332 Or. 83, 88, 23 P.3d 333, 337 (2001); State v. Ryder, 267 Or. App. 150, 159–61, 
340 P.3d 663, 668–69 (2014) (quoting the Department of Justice lawyer, in support of 
department bill); State v. Pugh, 255 Or. App. 357, 364, 297 P.3d 27, 32 (2013) (quoting 
Deputy District Attorney answering question from legislator); Elk Creek Management Co. 
v. Gilbert, 244 Or. App. 382, 388–89, 260 P.3d 686, 689–90 (2011) (quoting statement of
representative of Oregon Association of Realtors), rev’d, 353 Or. 565 (2013); Lamb v.
Coursey, 238 Or. App. 647, 655, 243 P.3d 130, 134–35 (2010) (quoting statement by Oregon
state police detective), review denied, 350 Or. 230 (2011); Belknap v. U.S. Bank Nat’l
Ass’n, 235 Or. App. 658, 671, 234 P.3d 1041, 1047–48 (2010) (quoting statements by the
director of the Oregon Law Center), review denied, 349 Or. 654 (2011).
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Nonlegislators are, well, not legislators. They are commonly 
stakeholders who have a direct interest in pending legislation and, as 
such, are inclined to exaggerate a bill’s benefits or its flaws, depending 
on the case. For that reason, it is not uncommon to see a court disparage 
reliance on the comments of witnesses in statutory construction 
cases.648  
There are nevertheless some cases in which it makes sense for courts 
to rely on statements of nonlegislator witnesses. In small states such as 
Oregon in which nonprofessional legislatures meet on a part-time basis, 
it’s a fact of life that state agencies, commissions, or ad hoc groups of 
interested citizen stakeholders draft a substantial number of bills. Those 
bills are then explained to relevant legislative committees or 
subcommittees. At that point, the legislators may approve the bills, 
based at least in part on the representations of the nonlegislator 
witnesses about the nature of the bill, the problem it was drafted to 
target, and its intended effects. In such cases, courts are much more 
comfortable turning to the legislative history, even though individuals 
other than legislators generated it. The key to knowing if it makes sense 
for courts to rely on statements of nonlegislator witnesses is whether 
there is reason to believe that the legislature relied on the 
representations of the nonlegislator witnesses. 
In Kohring v. Ballard, for instance, the Oregon State Bar drafted a 
bill to amend state statutes defining the proper venue for actions 
involving corporations or limited partnerships.649 On behalf of the bar, 
648 See, e.g., Patton v. Target Corp., 349 Or. 230, 242, 242 P.3d 611, 618 (2010) (“[T]he 
comment of a single legislator at one committee hearing generally is of dubious utility in 
determining the intent of the legislature in enacting a statute (and the comment of a 
nonlegislator witness even less helpful) . . . .”); State v. Guzek, 322 Or. 245, 261, 906 P.2d 
272, 282 (1995) (cautioning against relying on statements of nonlegislator witnesses); 
Qwest Corp. v. City of Portland, 275 Or. App. 874, 893–94, 365 P.3d 1157, 1167–68 (2015) 
(finding that a statement of a lobbyist was not persuasive evidence of legislative intent), 
review denied, 360 Or. 465 (2016); Tran v. Bd. of Chiropractic Exam’rs, 254 Or. App. 593, 
606, 300 P.3d 169, 176 (reading views of “a nonlegislator, in seeking a different statutory 
change six years later provides minimal guidance”), review denied, 353 Or. 748 (2013); 
State v. Kuperus, 241 Or. App. 605, 611, 251 P.3d 235, 238 (2011) (providing 
nonlegislator’s statement in a subcommittee “given little weight” (quoting State v. Kelly, 
229 Or. App. 461, 466, 211 P.3d 932, 934, review denied, 347 Or. 446 (2009))); State v. 
Stamper, 197 Or. App. 413, 424–25, 106 P.3d 172, 178 (“[W]e are hesitant to ascribe to the 
Legislative Assembly as a whole the single remark of a single nonlegislator at a committee 
hearing.”), review denied, 339 Or. 230 (2005); Linn-Benton-Lincoln Ed. v. Linn-Benton-
Lincoln ESD, 163 Or. App. 558, 569, 989 P.2d 25, 32 (1999) (“[W]e are reluctant to draw 
decisive inferences concerning legislative intent [because] . . . the statements were made by 
witnesses and are not direct expressions of legislative intent.”). 
649 355 Or. 297, 309–12, 325 P.3d 717, 725–27 (2014). 
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a University of Oregon professor explained the bill to the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary, and the committee approved the bill 
without further debate.650 On the house side, another representative of 
the bar similarly explained the nature of the amendments.651 A 
representative of the business community proposed an amendment to 
the bar’s bill, which was adopted without objection, and the House 
Committee approved the bill without further discussion.652 The 
“legislative history” of the bill thus consisted almost entirely of 
comments of nonlegislator witnesses. The Oregon Supreme Court 
nevertheless relied on those comments to determine legislative intent:  
To be sure, the foregoing legislative history consists principally of 
statements of nonlegislators, which sometimes provides limited 
assistance in determining the legislature’s intent. In some cases, 
however, it is appropriate to give greater weight to such legislative 
history, as when the nonlegislators were the drafters and principal 
proponents of a bill, and it is clear that the legislature relied on their 
explanations.653 
In a related vein, the legislature may authorize the Oregon Law 
Commission or an ad hoc legislative task force to investigate a 
particular subject and report back to the legislature with proposed 
legislation. Courts do not hesitate to consult the comments of members 
650 Id. at 310, 325 P.3d at 725–26. 
651 Id. at 310, 325 P.3d at 726. 
652 Id. at 311, 325 P.3d at 726. 
653 Id. at 311–12, 325 P.3d at 726–27 (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted); see also 
Alfieri v. Solomon, 358 Or. 383, 398–99, 399 n.7, 365 P.3d 99, 108–09, 108 n.7 (2015) 
(relying on statements of the Director of Oregon Dispute Resolution Commission, which 
was “responsible for drafting the text of the legislation”); Jenkins v. Bd. of Parole & Post-
Prison Supervision, 356 Or. 186, 201–02, 335 P.3d 828, 837–38 (2014) (relying on 
statements of representatives of the Department of Justice, which drafted the bill); State v. 
Walker, 356 Or. 4, 17–18, 333 P.3d 316, 324 (2014) (relying on statements of 
representatives of the Department of Justice, which drafted the bill); Ass’n of Unit Owners 
of Timbercrest Condos. v. Warren, 352 Or. 583, 596–97, 288 P.3d 958, 965 (2012) (relying 
on statements of Oregon State Bar representatives as to intended meaning of bar-proposed 
bill); State v. Cloutier, 351 Or. 68, 84–88, 261 P.3d 1234, 1243–45 (2011) (relying on 
statements of court of appeals judges regarding a bill that the court proposed to limit its 
appellate jurisdiction); State ex rel. Engweiler v. Felton, 350 Or. 592, 626–27, 260 P.3d 448, 
468 (2011) (relying on statements of then-Chairman of the Board of Parole, the bill 
proponent); State v. Worth, 274 Or. App. 1, 38–41, 360 P.3d 536, 558–60 (2015) (relying 
on statements of representatives of the Oregon District Attorneys Association, which 
sponsored the bill and whose comments were “consistent with” statements of legislators), 
review denied, 359 Or. 667 (2016); Ogle v. Nooth, 254 Or. App. 665, 672, 298 P.3d 32, 36 
(2013) (relying on statement of Assistant Attorney General in support of proposed 
amendments to Post-Conviction Hearing Act), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 355 Or. 570 
(2014); State v. Wray, 243 Or. App. 503, 509, 259 P.3d 972, 974–75 (2011) (relying on 
statement of bill’s proponent, Ben Swank, representative of Pacific Northwest Bell). 
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of the Commission or of such task forces, recognizing that legislators 
routinely rely on such statements.654 
That leads to an interesting question: whether the deliberations of a 
commission or task force constitute relevant legislative history. In the 
late 1960s, for example, the legislature appointed a Criminal Law 
Revision Commission to propose a revised criminal code. Over several 
years, the commission examined the state’s existing criminal statutes, 
as well as the Model Penal Code and the criminal laws of a number of 
other states. That work resulted in several drafts of a proposed new state 
criminal code, which the commission debated at some length. Those 
debates themselves were recorded in commission minutes. Are the 
various tentative drafts and the discussions of those drafts part of the 
“legislative history” of the final version that the legislature adopted in 
1971? In State v. Branch, the Oregon Supreme Court declared that, in 
the absence of some indication to the contrary, it’s fair to assume “that 
the legislature accepted the commission’s explanations for its drafting 
choices.”655  
654 See, e.g., ACN Opportunity, LLC v. Emp’t Dep’t, 362 Or. 824, 835, 418 P.3d 719, 
725 (2018) (citing report of Independent Contractors Task Force); Dep’t of Human Servs. 
v. G.D.W., 353 Or. 25, 35, 292 P.3d 548, 554 (2012) (citing Commentary to Oregon
Evidence Code); State v. Hamilton, 348 Or. 371, 379, 233 P.3d 432, 436 (2010) (citing
Commentary to the Criminal Law Revision Commission on the Proposed Oregon Criminal
Code); Ram Tech. Servs., Inc. v. Koresko, 346 Or. 215, 234–35, 208 P.3d 950, 961 (2009)
(citing Oregon Law Commission report); State v. Reed, 339 Or. 239, 249 n.10, 118 P.3d
791, 796 n.10 (2005) (Kistler, J., dissenting) (citing Commentary to the Criminal Law
Revision Commission on the Proposed Oregon Criminal Code); State v. Wolleat, 338 Or.
469, 476–77, 111 P.3d 1131, 1134–35 (2005) (citing Commentary to the Criminal Law
Revision Commission on the Proposed Oregon Criminal Code); State v. Wesley, 254 Or.
App. 697, 704, 295 P.3d 1147, 1150 (citing Commentary to the Criminal Law Revision
Commission on the Proposed Oregon Criminal Code), review denied, 354 Or. 62 (2013);
State v. Beck, 254 Or. App. 609, 614, 295 P.3d 169, 172 (2013) (citing minutes of Criminal
Law Revision Commission meetings); State v. Lunacolorado, 238 Or. App. 691, 699–700,
243 P.3d 125, 129–30 (2010) (Wollheim, J., concurring) (citing the Report of the Oregon
Supreme Court Task Force on Racial/Ethnic Issues in the Judicial System), review denied,
350 Or. 530 (2011); State v. Vargas-Torres, 237 Or. App. 619, 624–26, 242 P.3d 619, 622–
23 (2010) (citing Commentary to the Criminal Law Revision Commission on the Proposed
Oregon Criminal Code); State v. Blair, 230 Or. App. 36, 51–56, 214 P.3d 47, 55–58 (2009)
(providing an extensive discussion of Criminal Law Revision Commission Commentary and
testimony), aff’d, 348 Or. 72 (2010); Filipetti v. Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife, 224 Or. App. 122,
130–31, 197 P.3d 535, 539–40 (2008) (providing an extensive discussion of Criminal Law
Revision Commission Commentary and testimony); State v. Spears, 223 Or. App. 675, 694–
95, 196 P.3d 1037, 1046–47 (2008) (providing an extensive discussion of Criminal Law
Revision Commission Commentary and testimony); State v. Walker, 192 Or. App. 535, 543,
86 P.3d 690, 695 (citing report of Governor’s Task Force on Sex Offenses against Children),
review denied, 337 Or. 327 (2004).
655 362 Or. 351, 363, 408 P.3d 1035, 1042 (2018). 
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The assumption may be a slight exaggeration. The commission’s 
explanations for its drafting choices, which appear in the commission’s 
printed commentary, were available to the legislature and no doubt 
readily relied on. As a result, there’s no shortage of cases citing such 
explanations.656 But whether the legislature was aware of details such 
as the internal deliberations of the commission concerning earlier drafts 
as reflected in its minutes is questionable. This appears to be another 
example of the courts treating sources that the legislature could have 
been aware of as ones that the legislature actually was aware of. 
The legislature also frequently borrows statutory wording from 
model codes prepared by the Uniform Law Commission. The Uniform 
Commercial Code is perhaps the most well-known example.657 But 
there are many others, ranging from arbitration to partnership law.658 
Official commentaries are usually prepared for such model codes.659 
And courts readily cite such commentaries as evidence of what the 
Oregon Legislature intended when it adopted a model code.660  
656 See, e.g., State v. Fonte, 363 Or. 327, 333, 422 P.3d 202, 205 (2018); State v. Eastep, 
361 Or. 746, 756, 399 P.3d 979, 985 (2017); State v. King, 361 Or. 646, 662–63, 398 P.3d 
336, 346 (2017); State v. Long, 294 Or. App. 192, 195–96, 430 P.3d 1086, 1088 (2018); 
State v. McKnight, 293 Or. App. 274, 276–77, 426 P.3d 669, 671, review denied, 363 Or. 
817 (2018); State v. Bales, 289 Or. App. 470, 485–86, 410 P.3d 1088, 1096 (2017); State v. 
Lomax, 288 Or. App. 253, 261, 406 P.3d 94, 99 (2017); State v. Robinson, 288 Or. App. 
194, 201, 406 P.3d 200, 205 (2017); State v. Zielinski, 287 Or. App. 770, 778–79, 404 P.3d 
972, 976–77 (2017); Norwood v. Premo, 287 Or. App. 443, 452–53, 403 P.3d 502, 508, 
review denied, 362 Or. 300 (2017); State v. Gonzalez-Aguillar, 287 Or. App. 410, 414, 403 
P.3d 539, 541 (2017). In at least one case, State v. White, 341 Or. 624, 639 n.7, 147 P.3d
313, 321 n.7 (2006), the supreme court characterized the published commentary as “official”
and entitled to some sort of special weight, over and above the weight accorded to other
legislative history.
657 OR. REV. STAT. §§ 71.1010–79.0628 (2017). 
658 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. §§ 36.600–36.740 (2017) (Uniform Arbitration Act); OR. 
REV. STAT. §§ 67.005–67.990 (2017) (Oregon Revised Partnership Act, which is based on 
the former Uniform Partnership Law); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 314.605–314.675 (2017) 
(Uniform Division of Income for Tax Purposes Act). 
659 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES (AM. LAW INST., Official Draft 
and Revised Comments1980). 
660 See, e.g., Peace River Seed Co-Operative, Ltd. v. Proseeds Mktg., Inc., 355 Or. 44, 
52–54, 322 P.3d 531, 536–37 (2014) (citing official commentary to Uniform Commercial 
Code); Elk Creek Mgmt. Co. v. Gilbert, 353 Or. 565, 574–75, 303 P.3d 929, 935 (2013) 
(relying on commentary to Uniform Residential Landlord and Tenant Act); Snider v. Prod. 
Chem. Mfg., Inc., 348 Or. 257, 267, 230 P.3d 1, 6 (2010) (noting fact that commentary for 
the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act did not discuss the issue before the court); Datt v. Hill, 
347 Or. 672, 680, 227 P.3d 714, 719 (2010) (relying on history of Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act on which Oregon post-conviction statute was based); Torres v. Mason, 315 
Or. 386, 389, 848 P.2d 592, 593 (1993) (relying on commentary to Uniform Child Custody 
Jurisdiction Act in construing Oregon’s version of the law); Gemstone Builders, Inc. v. 
Stutz, 245 Or. App. 91, 99, 261 P.3d 64, 69 (2011) (relying on commentary to the Uniform 
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(iv) Statements of Committee Counsel
The House and Senate Committees on the Judiciary are generally
staffed by a lawyer who provides advice and drafting assistance during 
the legislative session. In the course of a committee’s deliberations, 
counsel may be called upon to summarize the contents of a bill, explain 
its background, or express an opinion about the meaning of its terms. 
Members of the committees commonly rely on counsel’s comments, 
and as a result, courts rely on those comments as evidence of the 
legislature’s intentions.661 
(v) Amendment History
As a bill makes its way through the legislative process, its text may
undergo any number of changes. The record of those changes 
themselves—apart from any legislators’ comments about them—can 
provide significant insight as to the intended meaning or effect of a bill. 
Doyle v. City of Medford illustrates this point.662 The case involved a 
statute providing that local governments “shall, insofar as and to the 
extent possible,” make the same health insurance coverage available to 
Arbitration Act); May Trucking Co. v. Nw. Volvo Trucks, Inc., 238 Or. App. 21, 35, 241 
P.3d 729, 738 (2010) (relying on commentary to the UCC), review denied, 350 Or. 130
(2011); Prime Props., Inc. v. Leahy, 234 Or. App. 439, 445, 228 P.3d 617, 620–21 (2010)
(because Oregon statute was based on Uniform Arbitration Act, commentary of National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws “helps to explicate the meaning of
the statutory terms, so it provides a useful tool for promoting uniformity of the law, and we
consider it where appropriate”); Livingston v. Metro. Pediatrics, LLC, 234 Or. App. 137,
143–44, 227 P.3d 796, 801–02 (2010) (“A commentary to a uniform act that is enacted by
the Oregon legislature is a part of the act’s legislative history.”); In re Marriage of Rudder,
230 Or. App. 437, 448–52, 217 P.3d 183, 190–92 (history of Uniform Premarital Agreement
Act), review denied, 347 Or. 365 (2009); State DCS ex rel. Alaska v. Anderson, 189 Or.
App. 162, 169–70, 74 P.3d 1149, 1154 (history of Uniform Interstate Family Support Act),
review denied, 336 Or. 92 (2003).
661 See, e.g., Spearman v. Progressive Classic Ins. Co., 361 Or. 584, 599, 396 P.3d 885, 
893 (2017); State v. Makin, 360 Or. 238, 254, 381 P.3d 799, 807 (2016); In re Marriage of 
Chase, 354 Or. 776, 783, 323 P.3d 266, 270–71 (2014); Doyle v. City of Medford, 347 Or. 
564, 577–78, 227 P.3d 683, 690–91 (2010); State v. Wolleat, 338 Or. 469, 476, 111 P.3d 
1131, 1134–35 (2005); State ex rel. Juvenile Dep’t v. Ashley, 312 Or. 169, 178–79, 818 
P.2d 1270, 1275–76 (1991); State v. Carey-Martin, 293 Or. App. 611, 665–66, 430 P.3d 98,
129–30 (2018); State v. Rankins, 280 Or. App. 673, 688–89, 382 P.3d 530, 538 (2016); State
v. Bevil, 280 Or. App. 92, 104, 376 P.3d 294, 300 (2016); State v. Meek, 266 Or. App. 550,
557, 338 P.3d 767, 770 (2014); State v. Medina, 262 Or. App. 140, 147, 324 P.3d 526, 530
(2014), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 357 Or. 254 (2015); State v. Smith, 259 Or. App. 36,
41–42, 312 P.3d 552, 554 (2013); Simpson v. Dep’t of Fish & Wildlife, 242 Or. App. 287,
302–03, 255 P.3d 565, 573 (2011); Jensen v. Bevard, 215 Or. App. 215, 222–25, 168 P.3d
1209, 1213–14, adhered to on reconsideration, 217 Or. App. 309 (2007); State v. Walker,
192 Or. App. 535, 544–45, 86 P.3d 690, 695–96, review denied, 337 Or. 327 (2004).
662 347 Or. 564, 227 P.3d 683 (2010). 
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retired employees as they make available to current employees.663 The 
issue was whether the word “shall” indicated a mandatory obligation 
on the part of the local governments.664 The word “shall,” of course, 
can be used in any number of senses in statutes, not all of them 
signifying an obligation.665 Not surprisingly, the City of Medford 
argued just that, asserting that it had discretion whether to make health 
care insurance available to retirees.666 The Oregon Supreme Court 
acknowledged the inherent ambiguity of the word “shall” but noted that 
the original version of the law used the term “may” and was later 
amended to substitute the word “shall.”667 That change in wording, the 
court concluded, strongly suggested that the legislature intended the 
word to be understood in its mandatory sense.668 
b. How Courts Weigh Legislative History
In Gaines, the supreme court declared that, although parties may
offer legislative history at any time, it’s up to the courts to determine 
what weight to give that legislative history.669 That leads to the 
question: how do courts weigh legislative history? Unfortunately, there 
is a paucity of case law addressing that question in a general way. 
Several principles may be gleaned from that case law, though, that may 
be useful to keep in mind. 
First and foremost, courts will always give primacy to the text of a 
statute.670 Gaines took some pains to emphasize the point that, 
whatever the legislative history demonstrates about intent, the intent 
663 Id. at 569, 227 P.3d at 686 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 243.303(2) (2009)) (emphasis 
omitted). 
664 Id. at 566–67, 227 P.3d at 684–85. 
665 See supra text at notes 530–40. 
666 Doyle, 347 Or. at 570, 227 P.3d at 687. 
667 Id. at 570–73, 227 P.3d at 687–88. 
668 Id. at 570–72, 227 P.3d at 687–88; see also State v. Partain, 349 Or. 10, 20, 239 P.3d 
232, 239 (2010) (“The history of the amendment confirms that general sense of the 
legislature’s intentions.”); Owens v. Maass, 323 Or. 430, 442–44, 918 P.2d 808, 814–16 
(1996); Eusiquio v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Human Servs., 243 Or. App. 100, 106–110, 259 
P.3d 917, 920–22 (2011) (examining history of Oregon’s vital statistics laws and how
certain amendments tracked changes in the model code); State v. Godines, 236 Or. App.
404, 418–21, 236 P.3d 824, 832–33 (examining amendment history of Measure 11), review
denied, 340 Or. 480 (2010); Koennecke v. Lampert, 198 Or. App. 444, 450–53, 108 P.3d
653, 657–59, review denied, 339 Or. 66 (2005); State v. Walker, 192 Or. App. 535, 543–44,
86 P.3d 690, 694–95, review denied, 337 Or. 327 (2004).
669 State v. Gaines, 346 Or. 160,172, 206 P.3d 1042, 1050–51 (2009). 
670 As the Oregon Supreme Court said in PGE, “the text of the statutory provision itself 
is the starting point for interpretation and is the best evidence of the legislature’s intent.” 
317 Or. 606, 610–11, 859 P.2d 1143, 1146 (1993). 
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must be capable of being effectuated by the wording of the statute.671 
If the text of the statute, when reasonably construed, cannot effectuate 
what the legislative history shows the legislature intended, then that 
history has no weight at all.672  
Second, in general, the testimony of legislators will be given more 
weight than that of nonlegislators.673 This preference makes sense, as 
the intentions of the legislature are the focus of the interpretive effort. 
Still, as I’ve noted above, in some circumstances, the testimony of 
nonlegislators can prove quite useful. The key to ensuring weight will 
be given to testimony of nonlegislators is to show that the legislature 
actually relied on the statements of the nonlegislators.674 In the absence 
of that showing, courts are more likely to give little weight to such 
statements.675 
Third, in the case of legislative history, more is always better. A 
single statement from a legislator will not often carry the day.676 It’s 
important to remember that the focus of statutory construction is 
determining the intentions of the legislature as a whole, not just of 
selected members.677 As the court of appeals explained in State v. 
Kelly, “Cherry-picked quotations from single legislators or of 
nonlegislator witnesses, are likely to be given little weight, as the 
likelihood that such scraps of legislative history represent the views of 
671 Gaines, 346 Or. at 172–73, 206 P.3d at 1050–51. 
672 Id.; see also State v. Rainey, 294 Or. App. 284, 291, 431 P.3d 98, 102–03 (2018) 
(“[W]hatever the legislative history may show the legislature intended by the enactment of 
a statute, the wording ultimately enacted must be capable of carrying out that intention.”); 
Suchi v. SAIF Corp., 238 Or. App. 48, 55, 241 P.3d 1174, 1177 (2010) (“Even assuming 
that the legislative history supported claimant’s interpretation, we are required not to 
construe a statute in a way that is inconsistent with its plain text.”), review denied, 350 Or. 
231 (2011); State v. Elvig, 230 Or. App. 57, 61, 213 P.3d 851, 853 (2009) (rejecting an 
argument based on legislative history because the argument “has no basis in the statute’s 
text”). 
673 See, e.g., State v. Guzek, 322 Or. 245, 260, 906 P.2d 272, 282 (1995) (explaining that 
a statement of a nonlegislator says little “about the intent of the Oregon Legislative 
Assembly as a whole”).  
674 See, e.g., Kohring v. Ballard, 355 Or. 297, 311–12, 325 P.3d 717, 726–27 (2014) (“In 
some cases, however, it is appropriate to give greater weight to such legislative history, as 
when the nonlegislators were the drafters and principal proponents of a bill, and it is clear 
that the legislature relied on their explanations.”). 
675 See id. 
676 See, e.g., Suchi, 238 Or. App. at 55, 241 P.3d at 1177 (“[W]e generally are reluctant 
to place too much weight on a single statement of a single witness in a legislative hearing.”). 
677 See, e.g., State v. Kelly, 229 Or. App. 461, 466, 211 P.3d 932, 934 (“[T]he purpose 
of resorting to legislative history is to aid the court in determining what the legislature as an 
institution intended the statute to mean.”), review denied, 347 Or. 446 (2009). 
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the institution as a whole is slim.”678 The more legislative history that 
can be brought to bear, the more likely the courts will give weight to 
it.679 At the same time, the less consistency there is to the legislative 
history, the less weight courts will be inclined to ascribe to it.680 
Fourth, the more specific the legislative history, the better. Courts 
are more likely to be persuaded by legislative history that bears on a 
particular point in dispute, as opposed to evidence of more general 
legislative purposes.681 The problem with legislative history that 
relates more generally to a statute’s purpose is that it leaves the court 
in the difficult spot of trying to determine the appropriate level of 
generality with which to describe that purpose. 
c. The Absence of Legislative History
Sometimes, there just isn’t any legislative history to be found. This
absence of legislative history can lead to the temptation to propose that 
certain inferences should be drawn from the silence. The argument goes 
something like this: the opposition’s proposed interpretation of the 
statute is preposterous because if the legislature had intended it, surely 
there would have been some indication of that intention in the 
legislative history. Given the absence of any legislative history on the 
point, we can rest assured that the legislature had no such intentions. 
The idea is sometimes referred to as a “dog that didn’t bark” argument, 
after the Sherlock Holmes story in which the great detective observes 
that the family dog must have known the thief, because it had failed to 
bark.682 
678 Id. 
679 See, e.g., State ex rel. Or. State Treasurer v. Marsh & McLennan Cos., 353 Or. 1, 13–
14, 292 P.3d 525, 531–32 (2012) (holding that testimony of multiple legislators from both 
houses was “consistent and compelling”).  
680 See, e.g., Conrady v. Lincoln County, 260 Or. App. 115, 127–28, 316 P.3d 413, 419 
(2013) (“Given the cross-cutting remarks on the House floor, we cannot say with any 
certainty what the House understood to be the effect of [the bill].”), review denied, 355 Or. 
567 (2014). 
681 See, e.g., Tran v. Bd. of Chiropractic Exam’rs, 254 Or. App. 593, 606, 300 P.3d 169, 
176 (rejecting testimony of witness because “even if the testimony were relevant, it would 
not be persuasive because it does not clearly address” the specific issue), review denied, 353 
Or. 748 (2013). 
682 ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE, Silver Blaze, in THE COMPLETE SHERLOCK HOLMES 349 
(1930). The argument frequently surfaces in United States Supreme Court decisions. See, 
e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 501 U.S. 380, 396 (1991) (“We reject that construction because we
are convinced that if Congress had such an intent . . . Members would have identified or
mentioned it at some point in the unusually extensive legislative history . . . .”); Harrison v.
PPG Industries, Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 602 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“In a case where
the construction of legislative language such as this makes so sweeping and so relatively
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Resist the temptation to make the “dog that didn’t bark” argument; 
it’s not likely to work. In Wyers v. American Medical Response 
Northwest, Inc.,683 for example, one of the parties advanced this 
argument, which prompted the following retort from the Oregon 
Supreme Court: 
At the outset, it relies on unrealistic assumptions about the legislative 
process and the omniscience of legislators. That is, it assumes that 
legislators are in a position to predict all the potential consequences 
of legislation and that they will always address them. Such an 
assumption ignores the fact that legislators often cannot be aware of 
every potential consequence of enacting the bills before them, as well 
as the fact that the press of time in legislative sessions of limited 
duration often does not provide legislators the opportunity to 
comment on all of a bill’s potential consequences. Moreover, 
drawing conclusions from silence in legislative history 
misapprehends the nature of legislative history itself, which often is 
designed not to explain to future courts the intended meaning of a 
statute, but rather to persuade legislative colleagues to vote in a 
particular way. Thus, for example, a proposed legislative change to 
the status quo might not prompt comment precisely because everyone 
understands that the law will have that effect or because supporters 
do not wish to draw attention to it.684 
There are just too many other possible explanations for silence in the 
legislative record to support the argument that silence necessarily 
implies legislative rejection of any particular interpretation. 
C. Second-Level Analysis
In the majority of cases, a careful analysis of the text in context and 
in light of applicable rules of textual construction and the legislative 
history will reveal the meaning of a statute most likely intended or 
understood by the legislature.685 In a few cases, though, the statute will 
remain stubbornly ambiguous; in such cases, courts will resort to 
unorthodox a change as that made here, I think judges as well as detectives may take into 
consideration the fact that a watchdog did not bark in the night.”). 
683 360 Or. 211, 377 P.3d 570 (2016). 
684 Id. at 227, 377 P.3d at 579; see also State v. Carlton, 361 Or. 29, 43, 388 P.3d 1093, 
1101 (2017) (“[S]ilence in the legislative history . . . does not inform our inquiry.”); Baker 
v. City of Lakeside, 343 Or. 70, 85, 164 P.3d 259, 267 (2007) (Durham, J., concurring)
(“Legislative silence about the intent underlying a legislative proposal is just that: silence.”).
For more in-depth analysis of the problems with reasoning from silence in legislative
history, see generally Anita S. Krishnakumar, The Sherlock Holmes Canon, 84 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1, 21–39 (2016).
685 For example, Professor Abbe Gluck found in her examination of Oregon statutory
construction decisions that the Oregon Supreme Court resolved the “vast majority” of its 
statutory construction on the basis of textual analysis. Gluck, supra note 2, at 1779.  
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certain canons or maxims of construction that serve to break the 
interpretive logjam.686 PGE denominated these rules “general 
maxims” of construction.687 I’ve never understood where that 
particular term came from. Most authorities draw a distinction between 
“textual” canons or maxims—those we’ve already encountered, which 
deal with assumptions about language, syntax, word order, and the 
like—and “substantive” canons or maxims—those that have to do with 
the substance of the statute at issue.688  
These substantive canons are usually judicially created, based either 
on assumptions about what judges think the legislature would prefer or 
on judicial preferences. An example of a substantive canon based on 
assumptions about what judges think are legislative preferences is the 
rule that when a statute is reasonably capable of more than one 
construction, and one such construction would lead to an absurd result, 
courts will avoid that construction.689 The underlying rationale is that 
the legislature presumably would want courts to make this choice.690 
An example of a substantive canon based on assumed judicial 
preferences is the rule that penal statutes should be construed 
leniently.691 As we’ll see, that rule is rooted both in historical aversion 
to legislative overkill in criminal sentencing and in modern notions of 
due process and fair notice.692  
There is no canon that courts can invoke to determine which 
substantive canon applies.693 Moreover, the fact that several of the 
substantive canons are based on naked judicial preferences has led to a 
great deal of criticism from scholars aimed especially at textualists, 
who are accused of using the more policy-based canons as ways to get 
around the strictures of their approach to statutory construction.694 This 
686 State v. Gaines, 346 Or. 160, 172, 206 P.3d 1042, 1051 (2009). 
687 PGE v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 317 Or. 606, 612, 859 P.2d 1143, 1146–47 (1993). 
688 See, e.g., Anita S. Krishnakumar, Reconsidering Substantive Canons, 84 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 825 (2017). 
689 See infra text at notes 698–728. 
690 Id. 
691 See infra text at notes 799–811. 
692 Id. 
693 See, e.g., State v. Stamper, 197 Or. App. 413, 426, 106 P.3d 172, 179 (“As we have 
endeavored to demonstrate, depending on which rules are given emphasis, different readings 
of the relevant statutes may be justified. And the law neglects to supply a rule for 
determining which rules should prevail.”), review denied, 339 Or. 230 (2005). 
694 Krishnakumar, supra note 688, at 826–27 (“There is a popular belief among statutory 
interpretation scholars that substantive canons of statutory construction—that is, policy-
based background norms or presumptions such as the rule of lenity and the canon of 
constitutional avoidance—act as an ‘escape valve’ that helps textualist judges eschew, or 
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criticism strikes me as having less force in Oregon, where there are 
relatively few substantive canons that the courts ever invoke and 
relatively few cases in which courts invoke them.695 In fact, several of 
the better-known substantive canons have been expressly abandoned in 
Oregon.696  
1. The Unreasonable Results Canon
If a statute is reasonably capable of at least two different
constructions, and one of those two constructions would lead to an 
absurd result, courts will commonly assume that the legislature didn’t 
intend such an absurdity and will opt for the other interpretive 
alternative. This rule is based on the assumption that the legislature 
intends its enactments to accomplish reasonable objectives and to not 
lead to absurd results.697  
In Schutz v. La Costita III, Inc., for example, the plaintiff drank past 
the point of intoxication at a bar and then was severely injured when 
she drove home, traveling in the wrong direction on Interstate 5.698 She 
brought an action for negligence against the bar for having served her 
alcohol when she had already consumed too much and for failing to 
prevent her from driving home.699 The bar moved to dismiss on the 
basis of a statute providing that a plaintiff who “voluntarily consumes 
alcoholic beverages” does not have a claim against the person who 
‘mitigate,’ the rigors of textualism.”); see also Bradford C. Mank, Textualism’s Selective 
Canons of Statutory Construction: Reinvigorating Individual Liberties, Legislative 
Authority, and Deference to Executive Agencies, 86 KY. L.J. 527, 527 (1997–98) 
(“[T]extualist judges selectively prefer clear-statement rules that favor states’ rights and 
private economic interests, and usually narrow a statute’s meaning.”); Manning, supra note 
8, at 125 (Canons such as avoidance “mitigate the textualists’ strict focus on the 
conventional meaning of the enacted text.”). 
695 For example, professor Abbe Gluck found that, during a ten-year period from 1999–
2009, the Oregon Supreme Court applied the PGE framework in 185 cases and reached a 
substantive canon of construction in a single instance. Gluck, supra note 2, at 1779.  
696 See infra text at note 800. 
697 See, e.g., Glen Staszewski, Avoiding Absurdity, 81 IND. L.J. 1001, 1012 (2006) 
(“[C]ourts presume that the legislature wants the judiciary to alleviate the inevitable 
absurdities that would otherwise result from the application of general rules to unforeseen 
circumstances as a normal function of the interpretive process.”); John F. Manning, The 
Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2389 (2003) (“The standard justification for 
the absurdity doctrine is straightforward. In a system marked by legislative supremacy 
(within constitutional boundaries), federal courts act as faithful agents of Congress.”). 
698 256 Or. App. 573, 575, 302 P.3d 460, 461 (2013), abrogated by 288 Or. App. 476 
(2017), review allowed, 362 Or. 794 (2018). 
699 Id. 
2019] Oregon Statutory Construction 713
served them, even if the plaintiff was visibly intoxicated.700 The 
plaintiff argued that she had not “voluntarily” consumed alcoholic 
beverages because she had become too intoxicated and lacked capacity 
to exercise judgment.701 The bar took the position that the word 
“voluntary” refers not to capacity but to an absence of coercion, 
trickery, or constraint.702 
The Oregon Court of Appeals noted that both senses of the word 
“voluntary” find support in the dictionary, but that the legislative 
history revealed the statute had been enacted in response to an Oregon 
Supreme Court decision, Fulmer v. Timber Inn Restaurant and Lounge, 
Inc., which held that a bar could be held responsible for negligently 
serving a visibly intoxicated patron.703 That history showed that the 
legislature intended to ensure that a patron may not sue a bar for injuries 
resulting from the patron’s “own voluntary intoxication.”704 The court 
then added: 
More significantly—indeed, dispositively—we rely on the 
precept that we should avoid interpreting a statute so as to produce 
an absurd result, a precept that “is best suited for helping the court to 
determine which of two or more plausible meanings the legislature 
intended. In such a case, the court will refuse to adopt the meaning 
that would lead to an absurd result that is inconsistent with the 
apparent policy of the legislation as a whole.” We cannot believe that, 
in an attempt to negate the holding in Fulmer—that the server of an 
alcoholic beverage to a visibly intoxicated patron can incur liability 
for the patron’s injuries—the legislature would have enacted a statute 
that provided immunity for serving visibly intoxicated patrons but 
not for serving patrons who had crossed the (invisible) line between 
visible intoxication and volition-negating intoxication. Nor would 
legislators have enacted a statute that required factfinders in cases 
such as this to determine whether, and to what extent, a plaintiff’s 
injuries were the result of alcohol consumed before the loss 
(invisible) of volition and alcohol consumed afterward.705  
The absurd results canon is one that parties often invoke, but one 
that courts rarely apply, for essentially two reasons. First, the canon 
puts judges in the position of second-guessing the reasonableness of a 
700 Id. at 577, 302 P.3d at 462 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 471.565(1) (2011)) (emphasis 
omitted). 
701 Id. at 575, 302 P.3d at 461. 
702 Id. at 579, 302 P.3d at 463. 
703 Id. at 578–79, 302 P.3d at 463–64 (citing Fulmer v. Timber Inn Rest. & Lounge, Inc., 
330 Or. 413, 9 P.3d 710 (2000)). 
704 Id. at 579–82, 302 P.3d at 464–66. 
705 Id. at 583, 302 P.3d at 465–66 (citation omitted). 
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statute as a matter of policy.706 That’s an uncomfortable position for 
courts. One person’s absurdity is another’s sound public policy. In 
State v. Vasquez-Rubio,707 for instance, the statute at issue provided 
that a person commits the crime of unlawful possession of a machine 
gun if he or she “knowingly possesses any machine gun . . . not 
registered as required under federal law.”708 The issue was whether that 
statute required the state to prove, as an element of the offense, that the 
defendant had not registered the machine gun.709 The state argued that 
it would be absurd to interpret the law as requiring the state to prove a 
negative and, moreover, that the state could not get access to the 
information.710 The Oregon Supreme Court rejected the state’s 
argument.711 The statute, the court explained, was unambiguous and 
required the state to prove lack of registration as an element.712 But, in 
any event, the state had failed to demonstrate the absurdity of such an 
interpretation of the statute. Although it may be difficult for the state to 
obtain the information, the state had failed to demonstrate that 
obtaining the information was impossible.713  
The Oregon courts have not articulated a test for determining 
whether a given interpretation is truly “absurd,” but cases like Vasquez-
Rubio—which mentioned an absence of proof of outright impossibility 
of enforcement—suggest that it’s a tough sell.714 It strikes me that, to 
qualify for the absurd results rule, the statutory interpretation at issue 
would, at the least, have to be one that no reasonable person could 
support.  
Second, the absurd results canon applies only in those rare cases in 
which a statute is persistently ambiguous, even after an examination of 
706 This has led some critics of the absurd results canon to question its legitimacy, 
because it involves courts usurping the legislative function. See, e.g., Manning, The 
Absurdity Doctrine, supra note 697, at 2391 (“The Constitution’s sharp separation of 
lawmaking from judging reflects a rule-of-law tradition that seeks to preclude legislatures 
from making ad hoc exceptions to generally worded laws. By asking judges to carve out 
statutory exceptions on the ground that the legislature would have done so, the absurdity 
doctrine calls on judges to approximate the very behavior that the norm of separation seeks 
to forbid.”). 
707 323 Or. 275, 917 P.2d 494 (1996). 
708 Id. at 277, 917 P.2d at 494 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 166.272 (1991)). 
709 Id. 
710 Id. at 282, 917 P.2d at 497. 
711 Id.  
712 Id. at 282–83, 917 P.2d at 497. 
713 Id. at 283 n.4, 917 P.2d at 497 n.4. 
714 See id.  
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the text in context and in light of relevant legislative history.715 If the 
statute is unambiguous, it means what it says, regardless of how absurd 
it might appear. As the supreme court said in Vasquez-Rubio,  
When the legislative intent is clear from an inquiry into text and 
context, or from resort to legislative history . . . it would be 
inappropriate to apply the absurd-result maxim. If we were to do so, 
we would be rewriting a clear statute based solely on our conjecture 
that the legislature could not have intended a particular result.716  
This holding, of course, is consistent with the general textual focus of 
statutory construction after PGE and Gaines.  
Some judges have voiced frustration with this aspect of the absurd 
results rule. In Young v. State, for instance, the statute at issue did not 
include state management employees in its list of public employees 
who are exempt from overtime compensation, which was pretty clearly 
a legislative oversight.717 The Oregon Court of Appeals nevertheless 
concluded that it was required to read the statute as written; there was 
simply no text that, when reasonably interpreted, permitted a different 
conclusion.718 Judge Haselton reluctantly concurred, but only after 
observing,  
715 See, e.g., Coos Waterkeeper v. Port of Coos Bay, 363 Or. 354, 371–72, 423 P.3d 60, 
70 (2018) (“Petitioners also argue that DSL’s ‘lopsided’ interpretation is unlawful because 
it is ‘absurd.’ But without ambiguity as to the legislative intent after consulting the text, 
context, and legislative history, we do not reach canons of construction.”); Comcast Corp. 
& Subsidiaries v. Dep’t of Revenue, 363 Or. 537, 550, 423 P.3d 705, 713 (2018) (citing 
Vasquez-Rubio, 323 Or. at 282–83, 917 P.2d at 494); Greenway v. Parlanti, 245 Or. App. 
144, 150, 261 P.3d 69, 72 (2011) (“We have previously determined that a court cannot 
subvert the plain meaning of a statute, even to avoid a supposedly absurd result.”); State v. 
Chilson, 219 Or. App. 136, 140, 182 P.3d 241, 242–43 (“If this were a jurisdiction where 
we could construe a statute so as to avoid the plainly absurd results of a literal interpretation 
that the legislature could not possibly have intended—that is, every other jurisdiction in the 
United States—the outcome of this case would be a simple and straightforward 
affirmance. . . . Not here. The legislature and the Supreme Court have foreclosed that 
option.”), review denied, 344 Or. 670 (2008); Folkers v. Lincoln Cty. Sch. Dist., 205 Or. 
App. 619, 626–27, 135 P.3d 373, 377 (2006) (the absurd results rule “is, under PGE, 
applicable only if the intent of the legislature cannot be discerned from the statutory text and 
context or from the legislative history”); Freightliner LLC v. Holman, 195 Or. App. 716, 
722, 98 P.3d 1165, 1168 (2004) (“[E]mployer argues that ORS 656.807(1) as interpreted by 
the board creates a potentially limitless statute of limitations and that no rational legislature 
could have intended such an absurd result. That argument, however, must give way to the 
statute’s textual indicators and its legislative history.”); Brundridge v. Bd. of Parole & Post-
Prison Supervision, 192 Or. App. 648, 656, 87 P.3d 703, 707 (“[W]here a term has an 
unambiguous meaning, the fact that it could lead to an absurd result does not justify 
interpreting it to mean something else.”), review denied, 337 Or. 327 (2004). 
716 323 Or. at 283, 917 P.2d at 497. 
717 161 Or. App. 32, 42–43, 983 P.2d 1044, 1050 (1999) (Haselton, J., concurring). 
718 Id. at 36, 983 P.2d at 1047 (majority opinion). 
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If we are to live, sensibly, with PGE, the “absurd results” principle 
must be available at the so-called “first level,” not the “third level,” 
of the analysis. That is, there must be an escape hatch for those rare 
circumstances in which any reasonable person would conclude, 
notwithstanding unambiguous text, that the legislature could not 
possibly have intended the result that the text ostensibly yields.719 
The courts, however, have not been entirely consistent about this 
aspect of the absurd results canon. As I’ve mentioned above, there are 
a number of cases before PGE suggesting that the absurd results rule 
may justify departing from the text of a statute as enacted.720 But even 
after PGE, the court has mentioned the rule at the very outset of its 
analysis, not as a tie-breaking canon to resolve stubborn ambiguity, but 
as a way to frame possible, competing constructions. The statute in 
Marshall v. SAIF Corp.,721 for example, provided that no workers’ 
compensation claim may be allowed unless the record included 
“evidence in addition to the evidence of the claimant.”722 The claimant 
supported her claim with her own testimony and the report of her 
treating physician.723 The insurer argued that the physician’s report did 
not qualify as “corroborating evidence” because it was based on the 
claimant’s testimony.724 The Oregon Supreme Court rejected this 
argument.725 After quoting from the statute and citing PGE, the court 
said,  
It is clear that the legislature could not have intended the phrase 
“evidence of the claimant” to mean all the evidence a claimant 
presents at a workers’ compensation hearing, for that would lead to 
the absurd result that no claimant could ever meet the burden because 
any evidence offered as corroboration would, itself, be “evidence of 
the claimant.” . . . The text, therefore, suggests that something more 
is required . . . .726  
The court went on to conclude that the term “corroborative evidence” 
is any evidence “independent of and apart from claimant’s own 
statements” that corroborates compensability.727 
719 Id. at 42–43, 938 P.2d at 1050 (Haselton, J., concurring). 
720 See supra text at notes 186–201. 
721 328 Or. 49, 55, 968 P.2d 1281, 1285 (1998). 
722 Id. (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 656.128(3) (1997)). 
723 Id. at 58, 968 P.2d at 1286. 
724 Id. at 58, 968 P.2d at 1287. 
725 Id.  
726 Id. at 56, 968 P.2d at 1285. 
727 Id. at 56–57, 968 P.2d at 1286. 
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There’s no question that the court was ultimately correct, but its 
invocation of the absurd results rule is impossible to square with what 
the court said in Vasquez-Rubio. Advocates should be aware of cases 
like Marshall, but they shouldn’t expect too much from them.  
2. The Avoidance Canon
In Vokoun v. City of Lake Oswego, the plaintiffs brought an inverse
condemnation claim against the city based on property damage that 
resulted when inadequate city drainage maintenance led to a landslide 
during a storm.728 The city invoked the $50,000 liability limitation of 
the Oregon Tort Claims Act in effect at the time, which applied to 
claims for “damage to or destruction of property.”729 The plaintiffs 
argued that the statute was not intended to apply to inverse 
condemnation claims.730 The court of appeals acknowledged that both 
parties had a point.731  
On the face of things, the plaintiffs’ action could readily be 
characterized as a claim for damage to property. On the other hand, it 
could also reasonably be asserted that the claim was not a tort claim at 
all, but rather a claim to enforce the federal and state constitutional 
guarantees against unlawful takings of property. The court found no 
relevant legislative history, so it turned to a canon of construction: 
when faced with competing reasonable constructions of a statute, and 
one construction raises constitutional issues, courts will favor the 
construction that avoids such constitutional issues.732 In this case, the 
court explained, imposing a liability limit on an inverse condemnation 
claim raises a constitutional question whether such a limit would run 
afoul of the constitutional guarantee of fair compensation for takings 
of property.733 Vokoun thus illustrates one of the classic substantive 
canons of construction, known as the “avoidance canon.”734  
728 189 Or. App. 499, 501, 76 P.3d 677, 679 (2003), review denied, 336 Or. 406 (2004). 
729 Id. at 509, 76 P.3d at 683 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 30.370(1)(a) (1999)). 
730 Id. at 510, 76 P.3d at 683. 
731 See id. at 510–11, 76 P.3d at 684. 
732 Id. at 511, 76 P.3d at 684. 
733 Id. at 510–11, 76 P.3d at 684. 
734 See also, e.g., State v. Stoneman, 323 Or. 536, 540 n.5, 920 P.2d 535, 538 n.5 (1996); 
State v. Wesley, 254 Or. App. 697, 708, 295 P.3d 1147, 1152, review denied, 354 Or. 62 
(2013); State v. Lafferty, 240 Or. App. 564, 584, 247 P.3d 1266, 1277 (2011); Pete’s 
Mountain Homeowners Ass’n v. Or. Water Res. Dep’t, 236 Or. App. 507, 522, 238 P.3d 
395, 403 (2010); State v. Bordeaux, 220 Or. App. 165, 175–76, 185 P.3d 524, 530 (2008). 
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Although the avoidance canon is recognized as a classic—the United 
States Supreme Court has referred to it as being “beyond debate”735—
the canon resists easy explanation.736 It is frequently justified on the 
ground that it accords with what the legislature most likely would have 
intended.737 The underlying assumption is that the legislature intended 
to color within constitutional lines and would prefer that the courts give 
it the benefit of the doubt. This assumption is dubious.738 The 
legislature may not even have thought about the constitutional 
implications of its enactment, or it may have been aware of those 
implications and intended to force the matter.  
Perhaps a more defensible rationale for the avoidance rule is one of 
judicial restraint. Regardless of whether the legislature may have 
thought about the constitutional implications of a statute’s enactment, 
courts ought to tread lightly to minimize the possibility of conflict 
between the branches.739  
Complicating the discussion is the fact that there is a lack of 
agreement about how the avoidance canon works. In particular, there 
735 Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 
U.S. 568, 575 (1988). 
736 There are abundant scholarly writings about the canon. A sampling of notable articles 
on the subject includes Caleb Nelson, Avoiding Constitutional Questions Versus Avoiding 
Unconstitutionality, 128 HARV. L. REV. F. 331 (2015); Neal Kumar Katyal & Thomas P. 
Schmidt, Active Avoidance: The Modern Supreme Court and Legal Change, 128 HARV. L. 
REV. 2109 (2015); Frank H. Easterbrook, Do Liberals and Conservatives Differ in Judicial 
Activism?, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 1401 (2002); William K. Kelly, Avoiding Constitutional 
Questions as a Three-Branch Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 831 (2001); Neal Kumar 
Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1709 (1998); Brian C. Murchison, 
Interpretation and Independence: How Judges Use the Avoidance Canon in Separation of 
Powers Cases, 30 GA. L. REV. 85 (1995); Frederick Schauer, Ashwander Revisited, 1995 
SUP. CT. REV. 71; Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. REV. 
1003 (1994). 
737 Justice Scalia invoked this justification for the canon in Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 
371, 381–82 (2005), asserting that the canon rests “on the reasonable presumption that 
Congress did not intend the alternative which raises serious constitutional doubts” and thus 
is “a means of giving effect to congressional intent,” an ironic assertion coming from one 
who asserted that congressional intent is irrelevant to statutory interpretation. 
738 And, for that reason, the justification has been roundly criticized. See, e.g., HENRY J. 
FRIENDLY, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, in BENCHMARKS 210 
(1967).  
739 See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 48, at 249 (“A more plausible basis for the 
rule is that it represents judicial policy—a judgment that statutes ought not to tread on 
questionable constitutional grounds unless they do so clearly, or perhaps a judgment that 
courts should minimize the occasions on which they confront and perhaps contradict the 
legislative branch.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 
HARV. L. REV. 405, 468–69 (1989) (stating that the avoidance canon is a “natural outgrowth 
of the system of separation of powers” that “minimizes interbranch conflict”). 
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is disagreement about the level of constitutional difficulty that is 
deemed sufficient to trigger the canon. Some courts hold that the canon 
applies only when a particular interpretation renders the statute under 
consideration unconstitutional.740 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
formulated the rule this way: “[A]s between two possible 
interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be unconstitutional 
and by the other valid, our plain duty is to adopt that which will save 
the Act.”741 In order for the rule to apply, one of the competing 
constructions must be unconstitutional. This version of the avoidance 
rule is sometimes known as “classical” avoidance.742  
Others say that the avoidance canon applies when there is any 
possibility of constitutional infirmity posed by an alternative 
interpretation. How much of a possibility of constitutional infirmity 
required to trigger the rule is not clear,743 but something short of actual 
unconstitutionality is sufficient.744 
Oregon cases tend to reflect the latter, modern approach—that the 
avoidance canon applies when a competing construction of an 
ambiguous statute might be unconstitutional. Some of the Oregon cases 
speak of a “likelihood” of unconstitutionality.745 Others invoke the 
canon if there is “even a tenable argument of unconstitutionality.”746 
But none requires actual unconstitutionality as a prerequisite for 
740 See, e.g., Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895) (“The elementary rule is 
that every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from 
unconstitutionality.”). 
741 Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J., concurring). 
742 See generally Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 85 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1949 
(1997). 
743 Although referred to as a “modern” approach, it actually dates back at least to United 
States ex rel. Attorney General v. Delaware & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909) 
(“[W]here a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful 
constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty 
is to adopt the latter.”). 
744 See, e.g., Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades 
Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (“[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a 
statute would raise serious constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to 
avoid such problems unless such construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.”). 
745 State v. Lanig, 154 Or. App. 665, 674, 963 P.2d 58, 63 (1998) (rejecting proposed 
construction of ballot measure that “likely would set the measure on a collision course with 
state and federal constitution[s]”); see also State v. Duggan, 290 Or. 369, 373, 622 P.2d 316, 
318 (1981) (rejecting interpretation that “may well” be unconstitutional). 
746 State v. Bordeaux, 220 Or. App. 165, 176, 185 P.3d 524, 530 (2008) (quoting State 
v. Rodriguez, 217 Or. App. 24, 34, 175 P.3d 471, 477 (2007)); see also Westwood
Homeowners Ass’n. v. Lane County, 318 Or. 146, 160, 864 P.2d 350, 359 (1993) (rejecting
proposed interpretation that “arguably would infringe on the constitutional rights” of
parties), adhered to as modified on reconsideration, 318 Or. 327, 866 P.2d 463 (1994).
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application of the avoidance canon. This rejection of “classical” 
avoidance seems to be in keeping with the rationale of restraint as the 
underlying justification for the avoidance rule. 
There is also disagreement about how much judicial intervention the 
avoidance canon justifies. Some—probably most—argue that the 
canon provides a mechanism for selecting from competing and 
reasonable interpretations of statutory wording.747 Others, though, 
have invoked the canon as a justification for embarking on a much 
more vigorous, wholesale rewriting of statutes in the name of saving 
them from possible or probable unconstitutionality.748 Oregon cases 
again reflect the former view.749 As Justice Linde explained for the 
court in State v. Robertson, any saving construction must “be attributed 
to the legislature with reasonable fidelity to the legislature’s words and 
apparent intent.”750  
3. The Natural Rights Canon
ORS 174.030 provides that “[w]here a statute is equally susceptible
of two interpretations, one in favor of a natural right and the other 
against it, the former is to prevail.”751 This rule dates back to the 
original Deady Code and has not been changed since.752 It’s a relic of 
nineteenth-century thinking that has not been invoked by the courts in 
more than a half-century.753 Even when the rule was invoked, it was 
747 See, e.g., Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. at 407 (“It is elementary when the 
constitutionality of a statute is assailed, if the statute be reasonably susceptible of two 
interpretations, by one . . . it would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, it is our plain 
duty to adopt that construction which will save the statute from constitutional infirmity.”). 
748 The Roberts Court has engaged in this sort of wholesale rewriting of statutes in the 
name of avoiding unconstitutionality in a number of cases. For a critical assessment of those 
cases, see generally Katyal & Schmidt, supra note 736.  
749 See, e.g., State v. Kitzman, 323 Or. 589, 602, 920 P.2d 134 (1996) (“[W]hen one 
plausible construction of a statute is constitutional and another plausible construction of a 
statute is unconstitutional, courts will assume that the legislature intended the constitutional 
meaning.”). 
750 293 Or. 402, 411, 649 P.2d 569, 575 (1982). 
751 OR. REV. STAT. § 174.030 (2017).  
752 THE ORGANIC AND OTHER GENERAL LAWS OF OREGON 1843–1872, ch. VIII, 
§§ 692 (1874).
753 PGE mentioned ORS 174.030 as an example of interpretive maxims appearing in
statutes, but it did not apply the rule. 317 Or. 606, 612, 859 P.2d 1143, 1147. Justice Ed 
Fadeley cited it in a dissenting opinion in State ex rel. Roberts v. McConville, 310 Or. 283, 
289, 797 P.2d 365, 368 (1990) (Fadeley, J., dissenting). Justice Dean Bryson also cited the 
rule in his dissent in McAlmond v. Myers, 262 Or. 521, 538, 500 P.2d 457, 465 (1972) 
(Bryson, J., dissenting). And Justice Lamar Tooze invoked it in his dissenting opinion in 
State v. Kuhnhausen, 201 Or. 478, 559–60, 272 P.2d 225, 250 (1954) (Tooze, J., dissenting). 
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not clear that the rule actually applied. Buell v. State Industrial Accident 
Commission754 concerned the extent to which the workers’ 
compensation law permitted an appeal from certain orders of the State 
Industrial Accident Commission. The court found the statute 
ambiguous and the legislative history unavailing. So the court 
concluded that it was obliged to construe the statute in favor of the 
worker.755 The court noted that “ORS 174.030 requires a construction 
of ambiguous statutory language that will favor ‘natural right’ and the 
avoidance of harsh results.”756 The court acknowledged that “[w]hile 
there is no ‘natural’ right to receive compensation, there is a strong 
legislative policy in favor of it.”757  
The Buell case reveals the major challenge of applying this particular 
rule: identifying the “natural right” in favor of which the court should 
interpret an ambiguous statute. Defining the scope of natural rights has 
occupied scholars for many years in the context of the Ninth 
Amendment to the Federal Constitution, which provides that the 
“enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”758 Those 
“other” rights are commonly understood to be “natural rights.”759 But 
there’s no consensus about what those natural rights are.760 
Describing—much less attempting to weigh in on—the debate over the 
754 238 Or. 492, 395 P.2d 442 (1964). 
755 Id. at 496–97, 395 P.2d at 444. 
756 Id. at 498, 395 P.2d at 444. 
757 Id. 
758 See generally DANIEL A. FARBER, RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE “SILENT” NINTH 
AMENDMENT AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AMERICANS DON’T KNOW THEY HAVE 
(2007); KURT T. LASH, THE FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT (2009). In 
particular, scholars debate the original meaning of the amendment. See, e.g., Ryan C. 
Williams, The Ninth Amendment as a Rule of Construction, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 498 
(2011); Michael W. McConnell, The Ninth Amendment in Light of Text and History, 2010 
CATO SUP. CT. REV. 13; Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says, 
85 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2006); Thomas B. McAffee, The Original Meaning of the Ninth 
Amendment, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1215 (1990). 
759 See, e.g., Scott Rosenow, Comment, The Ninth Amendment: Textual Support for 
Marriage Freedom, 28 WIS. J.L. GENDER & SOC’Y 39, 59 (2013) (“James Madison 
introduced the Ninth Amendment to calm concerns that the Bill of Rights would be read as 
exhaustive and thus allow unenumerated individual natural rights to be violated . . . .”); Kurt 
T. Lash, The Lost Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 83 TEX. L. REV. 331, 401
(2004) (“[T]here is no textual reason and little historical reason to believe that the ‘other
rights’ of the Ninth Amendment did not include natural rights.”).
760 Some scholars, for example, argue for an “alternative” reading of the Ninth 
Amendment, which holds that the “other” rights are not those derived from sources beyond 
the Constitution itself. See, e.g., Thomas B. McAffee, A Critical Guide to the Ninth 
Amendment, 69 TEMP. L. REV. 61, 68 (1996). 
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natural rights protected by the Ninth Amendment and its state 
counterpart, article I, section 33, of the Oregon Constitution, is beyond 
the scope of this Article. My point is simply to suggest that anyone 
thinking about invoking ORS 174.030 in a statutory construction case 
had best be prepared to explain the source of the “natural right” that is 
the basis for favoring one interpretation over another. 
4. The Rule That Statutes in Derogation of Common Law Are Strictly
Construed
As we’ve seen, the common law is considered part of the context of 
a statute, and the legislature is presumed to have been aware of that 
common law when enacting any given statute. The derogation canon 
goes a big step further: it doesn’t just presume that the legislature was 
aware of the common law but also presumes that the legislature didn’t 
intend to change the common law. The derogation canon holds that a 
statute that arguably alters the common law should be given the 
narrowest interpretation, thus preserving as much of the common law 
as possible.761  
The derogation canon is rooted in longstanding judicial hostility to 
legislation.762 Lord Coke remarked, “The wisdom of the judges and 
sages of the law has always suppressed new and subtle inventions in 
derogation of the common law.”763 But this hostility to legislation was 
especially vigorous in nineteenth-century America, when judges 
viewed state legislatures as corrupt institutions and the common law as 
having been based on reason, not political bargaining. Roscoe Pound, 
writing at the turn of the twentieth century, noted “the indifference, if 
not contempt, with which [legislation] is regarded by courts and 
lawyers.”764 It is “fashionable,” he said, for courts “to preach the 
superiority of judge-made law.”765 
761 See generally R. Perry Sentell, Jr., Statutes in Derogation of the Common Law: In 
the Georgia Supreme Court, 53 MERCER L. REV. 41 (2001). 
762 See, e.g., SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 48, at 318 (“It has often been said that 
statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed. That is a relic of the 
courts’ historical hostility to the emergence of statutory law.”). 
763 Quoted in Pillsbury Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, 425 N.W.2d 244, 
250 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (quoting Francis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 59 N.W. 1078, 1081 
(Minn. 1894)). 
764 Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARV. L. REV. 383, 383 (1908). 
765 Id. at 383–84. 
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That judicial hostility to legislation continued well into the twentieth 
century. And, in fact, the canon has its defenders to this day.766 In 
Oregon, the courts invoked it up through the 1970s.767 Beginning in 
the 1980s, the courts began to recognize that, whatever the arguments 
in favor of judicial hostility to legislation in earlier eras, those 
arguments no longer apply. The leading decision is Beaver v. Pelett, in 
which Justice Hans Linde observed of the derogation canon that “[t]his 
formula, expressing in part resistance to changes in existing law and in 
part the profession’s historical preference for caselaw over legislation, 
is long overdue to be put to rest.”768 Linde pointed out that, in fact, 
practically every statute “derogates” prior law in some way or another, 
and the idea that courts should place artificial constraints on the 
interpretation of statutes was at odds with the basic objective of 
determining legislative intent.769 Since Beaver, the Oregon courts have 
stated that they no longer apply the derogation canon.770 The 
legislature has even agreed, adopting a statute concerning the 
interpretation of adoption laws that declares, “The rule that statutes in 
derogation of common law are to be strictly construed does not apply 
to the adoption laws of this state.”771 For some reason, though, lawyers 
766 Or at least a version of the canon. I’m not aware of anyone who defends the sort of 
outright hostility to legislation that characterized nineteenth-century American judging. But 
some argue that at least a more moderate version of the canon is defensible. Scalia and 
Garner, for instance, argue that a statute should be construed to alter the common law “only 
when that disposition is clear.” SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 48, at 318. In their view, a 
“fair construction” of a statute “ordinarily disfavors change.” Id. Similarly, Professor David 
Shapiro argues that the canon “should be viewed more sympathetically as part of a larger 
picture—a picture that focuses . . . on the importance of continuity as a factor in the 
balance.” David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 N.Y.U. 
L. REV. 921, 937 (1992).
767 See, e.g., Naber v. Thompson, 274 Or. 309, 311, 546 P.2d 467, 468 (1976) (“It is a
cardinal rule of statutory construction that statutes in derogation of a common law right must 
be strictly construed.”); Marsh v. McLaughlin, 210 Or. 84, 89, 309 P.2d 188, 190 (1957) 
(“We must therefore look to some legislative enactment of state or city as the basis for 
liability, bearing in mind that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly 
construed.”); Smith v. Meier & Frank Inv. Co., 87 Or. 683, 686, 171 P. 555, 556 (1918) (“It 
is axiomatic that statutes in derogation of the common law must be construed strictly.”). 
768 299 Or. 664, 668–69, 705 P.2d 1149, 1151 (1985). 
769 Id.  
770 See, e.g., State v. Lanig, 154 Or. App. 665, 676, 963 P.2d 58, 64 (1998) (citing 
derogation canon as example of those “that reflect a fundamental judicial hostility to 
legislation [which] appropriately may be regarded as relics of a view that no longer 
survives”). 
771 OR. REV. STAT. § 109.305(1) (2017). 
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continue to cite the derogation canon in statutory construction cases. 
Don’t be one of those lawyers.772 
5. The Rule That Remedial Statutes Are Broadly Construed
Another age-old, substantive canon of construction is one that
provides that “remedial” statutes are to be liberally, or broadly, 
construed.773 As often as the rule gets cited, it’s surprisingly difficult 
to nail down precisely where the rule came from and what it’s supposed 
to accomplish. Two problems in particular haunt the rule and its 
application. 
First, there is the problem of determining which statutes the canon 
applies to. What is a “remedial” statute? Practically all statutes are 
remedial in the sense that they provide remedies. Early on, Blackstone 
wrestled with this issue and proposed that “remedial” statutes are 
limited to those that are enacted to address inadequacies of the common 
law.774 Oregon cases appear to define “remedial” more broadly. 
Statutes pertaining to garnishment of wages to satisfy a debt,775 
workers’ compensation benefits,776 interest and penalties for 
delinquent taxpayers,777 the rights and property of married women,778 
unemployment compensation,779 relief from judgment,780 
772 See, e.g., Ass’n of Unit Owners of Bridgeview Condos. v. Dunning, 187 Or. App. 
595, 609 n.3, 69 P.3d 788, 796 n.3 (2003) (“We wish that parties would stop invoking that 
canon of construction. It is an anachronism reflecting a nineteenth century preference for 
case law over legislation, which the Supreme Court has stated ‘is long overdue to be put to 
rest.’” (quoting Beaver, 299 Or. at 668–69, 703 P.3d at 1150–51)). 
773 See generally NORMAN J. SINGER & J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, supra note 115, at § 60:2 
(“[I]f a statute is considered remedial, it should be given a liberal interpretation and should 
be construed to give the terms used the most extensive meaning to which they are reasonably 
susceptible.”). 
774 Blackstone said that statutes “are either declaratory of the common law, or remedial 
of some defects therein.” 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *86. 
775 Crites v. Bede, 86 Or. 460, 463, 168 P. 941, 942 (1917). 
776 Russell v. State Accident Ins. Fund, 29 Or. App. 295, 300, 563 P.2d 738, 741 (1977), 
rev’d, 281 Or. 353, 574 P.2d 653 (1978). 
777 State ex rel. Thompson v. Marion County, 117 Or. 426, 428, 243 P. 558, 558 (1926). 
778 Velten v. Carmack, 23 Or. 282, 288, 31 P. 658, 660 (1892). 
779 Puget Sound Bridge & Dredging Co. v. State Unemployment Comp. Comm’n, 168 
Or. 614, 620–21, 126 P.2d 37, 40 (1942). 
780 Wells v. Wells, 7 Or. App. 243, 245–46, 490 P.2d 213, 214 (1971), aff’d, 262 Or. 44 
(1972). 
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professionalization of fire fighters,781 mechanics’ liens,782 civil 
procedure,783 and stray animals784—to pick a handful of examples—
all have been classified as remedial for the purposes of triggering the 
liberal construction rule. It’s hard to imagine what is not a “remedial” 
statute. 
Second, there is the problem of explaining how the canon works. 
What does it mean to give a statute a “liberal” construction? There are 
cases that frame the rule in terms of a command that a remedial statute 
must be liberally construed. This framing has led some to argue that the 
rule applies at the outset of the interpretive process.785 The Oregon 
cases take a much narrower view: the remedial statutes rule permits 
courts to choose between alternative reasonable interpretations when 
textual and legislative history analysis is unavailing.  
The court of appeals addressed just that point in Strader v. Grange 
Mutual Insurance Co.786 In that case, the plaintiffs sought attorney fees 
from an insurer under a statute that generally provides for such an 
award if the insurer doesn’t settle and the plaintiff prevails.787 The 
insurer, though, invoked a statutory exemption from the provisions of 
the state Insurance Code for a “patrons of husbandry association.”788 
The plaintiff argued that, because the attorney-fee statute was remedial 
in nature, it should be liberally construed to apply, notwithstanding the 
exemption.789 The court of appeals disagreed: 
Plaintiffs . . . mischaracterize the “rule” regarding liberal construction 
as a “first level” rule under the so-called “template” established by 
PGE. In fact, the rule regarding liberal interpretation of remedial 
statutes is a policy-based rule, as opposed to a syntax-based rule, and 
781 Myers v. Bd. of Dirs. of Tualatin Rural Fire Dist., 5 Or. App. 142, 152, 483 P.2d 95, 
100 (1971). 
782 State ex rel. Weiser Loan & Tr. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 125 Or. 194, 195, 265 
P. 782, 782 (1928) (citing State ex rel. Hagquist v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 125 Or. 13, 265
P. 775 (1928)).
783 Brown v. Becker, 135 Or. 353, 355–56, 295 P. 1113, 1114 (1931).
784 Tucker v. Constable, 16 Or. 407, 412, 19 P. 13, 15–16 (1888).
785 It is often argued that because a given statute is obviously remedial in nature—take
the Americans with Disabilities Act, for example—it should in some general sense always 
be interpreted broadly to effectuate its purposes. See, e.g., Lawrence D. Rosenthal, 
Reasonable Accommodations for Individuals Regarded as Having Disabilities Under the 
Americans with Disabilities Act? Why “No” Should Not Be the Answer, 36 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 895, 962 (2006) (“The ADA, as a [r]emedial [s]tatue, [s]hould [b]e [i]nterpreted 
[b]roadly to [e]liminate [d]iscrimination in the [w]orkplace . . .”).
786 179 Or. App. 329, 39 P.3d 903, review denied, 334 Or. 190 (2002).
787 Id. at 332, 39 P.3d at 905.
788 Id. (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 731.032(4) (1999) (repealed 2003)).
789 Id. at 337, 39 P.3d at 907–08.
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therefore operates at the “third level” under PGE—a level we do not 
reach when, as here, the text and context of a provision are clear.790 
At all events, the rule is never a justification for going beyond the 
wording of the statute. As the Oregon Supreme Court stated in 
Halperin v. Pitts, the remedial-statute rule “guides the interpretation of 
statutory wording that the legislature actually enacted. It is not a 
justification for supplying statutory wording that the legislature did not 
pass into law.”791 
6. The Rule of Lenity
The rule of lenity—that, as Blackstone put it, “penal statutes must
be construed strictly”792—is one of the most familiar substantive 
canons.793 It is also one that, for the most part, doesn’t apply in Oregon. 
The rule originated in England, during a time when Parliament had 
imposed the death penalty on an astonishing number of criminal 
offenses. (According to one authority, in the seventeenth century, there 
were more than 200 capital offenses, including “maliciously” cutting 
down hops.)794 Judges of a more humanitarian bent sought to 
ameliorate the harshness of the criminal law by imposing a rule that 
any doubts about the meaning of such laws must be resolved in favor 
of the accused.795  
The rule was adopted in America rather early on. Chief Justice John 
Marshall cited it in United States v. Wiltberger, remarking that the rule 
“is founded on the tenderness of the law for the rights of 
individuals.”796 The Oregon Supreme Court invoked the rule in one of 
its very first published opinions in 1859.797 
790 Id. at 337, 39 P.3d at 908. 
791 352 Or. 482, 495, 287 P.3d 1069, 1076 (2012). 
792 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *88. 
793 See, e.g., Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 410–11 (2010) (relying on the 
“familiar principle that ‘ambiguity concerning the ambit of criminal statutes should be 
resolved in favor of lenity.’” (quoting United States v. Cleveland, 531 U.S. 12, 25 (2000))). 
794 1 L. RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS 
ADMINISTRATION FROM 1750, 10–11 (1948), quoted in John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, 
Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 198 n.23 (1985).  
795 See generally Livingston Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes, 48 
HARV. L. REV. 748, 750 (1935) (“It was against this background of unmitigated severity in 
serious crimes that the doctrine of strict construction emerged.”). 
796 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 95 (1820). 
797 Horner v. State, 1 Or. 267, 268 (1859) (citing the “well-known rule that criminal 
statutes are strictly construed”). 
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But the Oregon Legislative Assembly had other ideas. Only a few 
years after statehood, the legislature enacted a statute expressly 
disowning the common-law rule and instead requiring that provisions 
of the state criminal code be construed in accordance with “the fair 
import of their terms.”798 The Oregon Supreme Court duly noted the 
legislative change and abandoned the rule of lenity.799  
In 1971, the legislature completely revised the state criminal code 
but retained the century-old abrogation of the rule of lenity.800 As part 
of the revision, ORS 161.025(2) provides that “[t]he rule that a penal 
statute is to be strictly construed shall not apply” to the state criminal 
code.801 Since then, Oregon courts have followed that statute and 
declined to apply the common-law rule.802  
There is a possible exception, though. ORS 161.025(2) provides that 
the rule of lenity doesn’t apply to the state’s criminal code, which it 
defines as “Chapter 743, Oregon Laws 1971.” There are laws of a penal 
nature that are not included in the 1971 revisions or their 
amendments.803 It could be argued that ORS 161.025(2) does not apply 
to those laws. 
798 Act of Oct. 19, 1864, ch. 53, § 730, 1854–1866 Or. Gen Laws at 578 (Deady ed. 
1866) (current version at OR. REV. STAT. § 161.025(2) (2017)). 
799 See, e.g., State v. Brantley, 201 Or. 637, 644–45, 271 P.2d 668, 672 (1954) (“[T]he 
rule of the common law, that penal statutes are to be strictly construed, has no application 
in this state, and all its provisions are to be construed according to the fair import of their 
terms . . . .”) (citing § 23-106 O.C.L.A.); State v. Dunn, 53 Or. 304, 308, 99 P. 278, 280 
(1909) (“It is urged on behalf of defendant that the juvenile act, under which defendant is 
convicted, is a criminal statute, and must be strictly construed, in support of which our 
attention is directed to Horner v. State, 1 Or. [at] 268. While the holding in that case appears 
to be in harmony with defendant’s theory on this point, it merely states the rule at common 
law upon the subject, which at that time (1859) had not been modified by statute. This rule, 
however, was subsequently modified by the adoption of section 2192 of the Code (B. & C. 
Comp.), as follows: ‘The rule of the common law that penal statutes are to be strictly 
construed has no application to this Code, but all its provisions are to be construed according 
to the fair import of their terms . . . .’”), reh’g denied, 53 Or. 304 (1909); State v. Brown, 7 
Or. 186, 209 (1879) (“The statute is to be construed according to the fair import of its terms; 
and not according to the rule of the common law, that penal statutes must be construed 
strictly.”). 
800 1971 Or. Laws, ch. 743, § 2. 
801 OR. REV. STAT. § 161.025(2) (2017).  
802 See, e.g., State v. Partain, 349 Or. 10, 21, 239 P.3d 232, 239 (2010) (“The ‘rule’ [of 
lenity] was abrogated by the legislature when it adopted ORS 161.025(2), which directs 
courts to construe penal statutes ‘according to the fair import of their terms.’” (citation 
omitted)); State v. Maney, 297 Or. 620, 624 n.5, 688 P.2d 63, 66 n.5 (1984) (“We note that 
the common law rule that a criminal statute must be strictly construed in favor of an accused 
has been abolished in this state.”). 
803 ORS 161.035(2) expressly contemplates that there may be statutory offenses “outside 
chapter 743, Oregon Laws 1971.” OR. REV. STAT. § 161.035(2) (2017). The Oregon Vehicle 
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The Oregon Court of Appeals noted that possibility in State v. 
Thomas.804 In that case, the state charged defendant with misdemeanor 
driving under the influence of intoxicants.805 At the time, driving under 
the influence was a traffic infraction, but under ORS 484.365, it could 
be elevated to a misdemeanor if the defendant was previously 
convicted of a traffic infraction or traffic crime within the previous five 
years.806 In Thomas, the defendant was convicted of the same offense 
in California the previous year.807 The defendant, however, argued that 
the state couldn’t charge him with a misdemeanor, because the 
California conviction didn’t count.808 The court of appeals agreed with 
the defendant based on its analysis of the text of the statute in 
context.809 The court then added an interesting observation: 
ORS 484.365 is a penal statute. The common law rule with respect 
to penal statutes is strict construction. Under this rule, the fact that 
the statute does not expressly provide for the use of prior foreign 
convictions precludes the construction urged by the state. However, 
the common law rule has been abrogated with respect to the Oregon 
Criminal Code . . . . ORS 484.365 is not a part of [the Oregon 
Criminal Code]. However, assuming arguendo that the rule embodied 
in the statute applies to all penal statutes, whether or not found in the 
Criminal Code, the construction of ORS 484.365 we adopt here is 
according to the fair import of its terms.810 
In other words, care must be taken before ignoring the rule of lenity too 
quickly. 
7. The “Hail Mary” Canon: What Would the Legislature Have Done
if It Thought of the Issue?
A final canon must be mentioned, if only because the courts tend to 
invoke it so often. When faced with intractable ambiguity and no other 
tie-breaking substantive canon of construction comes to mind, courts 
will adopt the construction the legislature most likely would have 
preferred had it thought about the matter.811 
Code, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 811.005–811.812 (2017), for example, includes a number of 
criminal offenses that are not part of the Oregon Criminal Code. 
804 34 Or. App. 187, 578 P.2d 454 (1978). 
805 Id. at 190, 578 P.2d at 454. 
806 OR. REV. STAT. § 484.365 (1977) (repealed 1981). 
807 Thomas, 34 Or. App. at 190, 578 P.2d at 454. 
808 Id. at 191, 578 P.2d at 455. 
809 Id. at 193–95, 578 P.2d at 456–57. 
810 Id. at 195–96, 578 P.2d at 457. 
811 See, e.g., Carlson v. Meyers, 327 Or. 213, 225, 959 P.2d 31, 37 (1998) (“Where no 
legislative history exists, this court will resort to general maxims of statutory construction, 
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I’ve always found this rule perplexing. It seems to me that the Hail 
Mary canon doesn’t really add much to the analysis. Statutory 
construction is always about determining what the legislature intended, 
looking at the usual sources of legislative intent. The canon seems to 
say that if that analysis doesn’t reveal what the legislature actually 
intended, courts should look at those same usual sources—presumably 
for some more generalized evidence of intent—to determine what the 
legislature most likely would have intended if it had thought of the 
specific matter at issue.812 But statutory construction frequently 
doesn’t establish conclusively what the legislature actually intended. 
Rather, statutory construction offers various bases for inferring what 
the legislature most likely intended.813 The Hail Mary canon doesn’t 
really say anything more than that. 
III 
SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN OREGON STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 
In this final Part, I address how all the foregoing rules apply in 
particular circumstances or to particular problems common to statutory 
construction cases. I’ve singled out three such problems because they 
arise especially frequently. 
including the maxim that where no legislative history exists the court will attempt to 
determine how the legislature would have intended the statute be applied, had it considered 
the issue.” (citation omitted)); Marks v. McKenzie High Sch. Fact-Finding Team, 319 Or. 
451, 463, 878 P.2d 417, 424 (1994) (“[W]hat the legislature would have intended, had it 
considered the specific issue.”); Angle v. Bd. of Dentistry, 294 Or. App. 470, 479, 431 P.3d 
447, 453 (2018) (“[W]hen a specific issue is not addressed clearly in a statute or its 
legislative history, we use ‘the broader purpose of the statute’ as a guide in our ‘attempt to 
discern what the legislature would have intended had it considered’ it.” (quoting State v. 
Mayes, 220 Or. App. 385, 395, 186 P.3d 293, 300 (2008))); Mayes, 220 Or. App. at 395, 
186 P.3d at 300 (in case of ambiguity, “we attempt to discern what the legislature ‘would 
have intended had it considered th[e] problem’” (quoting State v. Abdelrasul, 111 Or. App. 
276, 279, 826 P.2d 58, 59 (1992) (emphasis omitted) (alteration in Mayes))). 
812 See, e.g., State v. Tannehill, 341 Or. 205, 211, 141 P.3d 584, 587 (2006) (to determine 
“how the legislature would have resolved the issue if it had considered it,” the court “draw[s] 
guidance from the statutes that we previously have discussed”); Windsor Ins. Co. v. Judd, 
321 Or. 379, 387–88, 898 P.2d 761, 765 (1995) (identifying what the legislature “would 
have intended” based on general purpose of the statute); Linn-Benton-Lincoln Ed. Ass’n v. 
Linn-Benton-Lincoln ESD, 163 Or. App. 558, 570–71, 989 P.2d 25, 32–33 (1999). 
813 See, e.g., Dowell v. Or. Mut. Ins. Co., 361 Or. 62, 67, 388 P.3d 1050, 1053 (2017) 
(consulting text, context, and legislative history “[t]o discern the meaning of the statute most 
likely intended by the legislature that enacted it”); Dep’t of Consumer & Bus. Servs. v. 
Muliro, 359 Or. 736, 742, 380 P.3d 270, 273 (2016) (“We attempt to discern the meaning 
of the statute most likely intended by the legislature that enacted it, examining the text in 
context, any relevant legislative history, and pertinent rules of interpretation.”). 
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A. Interpreting Statutes Enacted by Initiative
Most Oregon statutes are enacted by the legislature, but a number of 
them are products of direct democracy, specifically, the power of 
initiative or referendum.814 Statutes enacted by the legislature are 
treated no differently—in terms of enforceability—than statutes 
enacted by the people directly. Yet, there remains a question whether 
statutes enacted by the legislature should be interpreted by the same 
methods as statutes enacted by initiative or referendum. 
A fair amount of scholarly commentary exists on the subject, much 
of it taking the position that the rules should be different.815 Such 
arguments tend to be predicated on either of two concerns about 
statutes enacted by direct democracy. First, there are concerns about 
the nature of direct democracy and the extent that it circumvents the 
deliberation that is presumed to attend ordinary legislative enactments. 
Because of that lack of deliberation, the argument goes, statutes 
enacted by initiative or referendum should be subject to rules that 
narrow or limit their effect in the absence of clear statutory wording to 
the contrary.816 
Second, there are concerns that the rules of interpretation that apply 
to traditional legislation don’t apply well to the interpretation of 
statutes enacted by initiative or referendum. In particular, these critics 
note, the focus of traditional statutory construction on legislative intent 
doesn’t make sense when applied to statutes enacted by direct 
democracy.817 “Voter intent,” critics argue, is too difficult to ascertain 
814 The Oregon Constitution vests the legislative power of the state in the legislature and 
in the people, through the powers of initiative and referendum. OR. CONST. art. I, § 1 (1859). 
During the 2015 regular session, the Legislative Assembly introduced 2641 bills, of which 
847 became law. Since 1902, the people have passed a total of 127 initiative measures and 
approved 257 referrals from the legislature. SECRETARY OF STATE, OREGON BLUE BOOK 
2017–18 at 129, 289.  
815 See, e.g., Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503 
(1990); John Copeland Nagle, Direct Democracy and Hastily Enacted Statutes, 1996 ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 535; Glenn C. Smith, Solving the “Initiatory Construction” Puzzle (and 
Improving Direct Democracy) by Appropriate Refocusing of Sponsor Intent, 78 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 257 (2007); Glen Staszewski, Contestatory Democracy and the Interpretation of
Popular Initiatives, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 1165 (2013); D. Zachary Hudson, Comment,
Interpreting the Products of Direct Democracy, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 223 (2009); Evan
C. Johnson, Comment, People v. Floyd: An Argument Against Intentionalist Interpretation
of Voter Initiatives, 45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 981 (2005); Note, Judicial Approaches to
Direct Democracy, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2748 (2005).
816 See, e.g., Philip P. Frickey, Interpretation on the Borderline: Constitution, Canons, 
Direct Democracy, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 477 (1996). 
817 Probably the leading article on the subject is Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of 
“Popular Intent”: Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107 (1995). 
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to form a useful focus of the meaning of statutes.818 As a result, these 
critics also argue for the application of rules that narrow the effect of 
statutes enacted by initiative or referendum.819  
My own view is that neither of these criticisms justifies treating the 
interpretation of initiatives or referenda any differently from the 
interpretation of traditionally enacted statutes.820 Criticisms of the lack 
of deliberation in enacting laws by direct democracy tend to 
romanticize the amount of deliberation that occurs in the ordinary 
legislative process. And criticisms of the applicability of traditional 
rules of statutory construction tend to gloss over the difficulties of 
determining legislative intent.  
In any event, Oregon courts have never taken the position that 
specialized rules apply to the interpretation of initiatives or referenda. 
PGE itself declared, after setting out its method of interpretive analysis, 
that “[t]he same structure . . . applies, not only to statutes enacted by 
the legislature, but also to the interpretation of laws . . . adopted by 
initiative or referendum.”821 
Nevertheless, there are some slight, but important, differences in 
application of construction rules depending on how a statute was 
enacted. In the case of statutes adopted by initiative or referendum, 
although the goal is still to determine legislative intent, the “legislative” 
intent refers to the intention of the voters who adopted the law.822 
Because the focus of interpreting statutes adopted by direct democracy 
818 See, e.g., Hudson, supra note 815, at 225 (2009) (“[D]iscovering the intent of the 
general public in passing a ballot measure is extremely difficult when compared to 
ascertaining the intent of legislative actors.”). 
819 Id. at 227. 
820 See generally Jack L. Landau, Interpreting Statutes Enacted by Initiative: An 
Assessment of Proposals to Apply Specialized Interpretive Rules, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 
487 (1998). 
821 PGE v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 317 Or. 606, 612 n.4, 859 P.2d 1143, 1147 n.4 
(1993); see also State v. Guzek, 322 Or. 245, 265, 906 P.2d 272, 284 (1995) (“This court 
applies the same method of statutory analysis to a statute enacted by the voters as it would 
to a statute enacted by the Legislative Assembly.”). 
822 See, e.g., Burke v. State ex rel. Dep’t of Land Conservation & Dev., 352 Or. 428, 
433, 290 P.3d 790, 792 (2012) (“When we interpret a referendum . . . our goal is to discern 
the intent of the voters who adopted it.”); Guzek, 322 Or. at 265, 906 P.2d at 284 (“In 
interpreting a statute enacted by initiative, the court’s task is to discern the intent of the 
voters who passed the initiative.”); Papworth v. Or. Dep’t of Land Conservation & Dev., 
255 Or. App. 258, 265, 296 P.3d 632, 636 (2013) (“When interpreting a statute enacted by 
legislative referral, our task is to discern the intent of the voters.”); Dep’t of Land 
Conservation & Dev. v. Klamath County, 215 Or. App. 297, 303, 168 P.3d 1241, 1244 
(2007) (“We attempt to determine the meaning of the statute intended by those who enacted 
it—in this case, the voters who adopted it by initiative—by examining the text in context 
and, if necessary, relevant enactment history and other aids to construction.”). 
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is the intent of the voters, the relevant sources of that intent necessarily 
are different. To be sure, the focus of the courts remains on the text of 
the measure.823 But when the analysis reaches the “legislative history” 
of a measure, the evidence of legislative intent isn’t the same. In the 
case of statutes enacted by the legislature, the enactment process leaves 
a trail of evidence of legislative intent in the form of recordings of 
committee hearings and bill files containing amendment histories, 
committee minutes, and recordings of floor debates.824 Statutes 
enacted by direct democracy leave behind a different trail of evidence 
of legislative intent, particularly the official voters’ pamphlet, which 
sets out a ballot title and arguments for and against a measure.825 The 
basic idea of interpreting voter intent of such statutes is to examine any 
information that was available to voters at the time of enactment.826 
That means that media reports are also a potential source of the 
legislative intent behind an initiative or referendum. In State v. Allison, 
for example, the court addressed the meaning of a mandatory minimum 
sentencing law that had been adopted by the people.827 The court 
examined the text of the measure in context, along with information in 
the voters’ pamphlet, newspaper stories, magazine articles, and “other 
reports from which it is likely that the voters would have derived 
information about the initiative.”828 Some caution is warranted here, of 
course, given the potential for contradictory information.829 
823 See, e.g., Stranahan v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 331 Or. 38, 56, 11 P.3d 228, 238 (2000) 
(“The best evidence of the voters’ intent is the text of the provision itself.” (quoting 
Roseburg Sch. Dist. v. City of Roseburg, 316 Or. 374, 378, 851 P.2d 595, 597 (1993))); 
Guzek, 322 Or. at 265, 906 P.2d at 284 (“The text of the statute is the starting point because 
the text is the best evidence of the voters’ intent.”). 
824 See supra text at notes 637–69. 
825 See, e.g., Burke, 352 Or. at 445, 290 P.3d at 798 (examining voters’ pamphlet); 
Friends of Yamhill Cty., Inc. v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 351 Or. 219, 224, 264 P.3d 1265, 1268 
(2011) (voters’ pamphlet); State v. Moyer, 348 Or. 220, 226, 230 P.3d 7, 11, cert. denied, 
562 U.S. 895 (2010) (voters’ pamphlet); State v. Urie, 268 Or. App. 362, 366, 341 P.3d 855, 
858 (2014) (“[W]e determine the voters’ intention by examining the Oregon Voters’ 
Pamphlet and other information that was available to the public at the time of the vote.”). 
826 See, e.g., Con-Way Inc. & Affiliates v. Dep’t of Revenue, 353 Or. 616, 627–28, 302 
P.3d 804, 810 (2013) (“When interpreting a statute adopted through the initiative process,
this court will look to ‘other sources of information that were available to the voters at the
time the measure was adopted and that disclose the public’s understanding of the measure.’”
(quoting Ecumenical Ministries of Or. v. Or. State Lottery Comm’n, 318 Or. 551, 559 n.8,
871 P.2d 106, 111 n.8 (1994))).
827 143 Or. App. 241, 923 P.2d 1224, review denied, 324 Or. 487 (1996). 
828 Id. at 251, 923 P.2d at 1230. 
829 See, e.g., Johnson v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety Standards & Training, 253 Or. App. 307, 
314, 293 P.3d 228, 232 (2012) (“We also note that the enactment history of [the disputed 
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B. Judicial Review of Administrative Agencies’ Interpretations of
Statutes 
As I said at the very beginning of this Article, statutes govern nearly 
every corner of the modern legal landscape. One of the most significant 
ways they do so is by creating administrative agencies to enforce 
statutes. The website Oregon.gov lists some 387 administrative 
agencies, boards, and commissions, and every single one is governed 
by and authorized to enforce one or more statutes.830 Thus, the 
agencies, boards, and commissions must interpret those statutes they 
are authorized to enforce, and their interpretations are ultimately 
subject to judicial review.831 
That leads to an important question: when courts review an agency’s 
interpretation of a statute, what weight (if any) do the courts give the 
interpretation? Said another way, do the courts accord any deference to 
an agency’s construction of a statute? 
In the abstract, it’s a fascinating question, one that has occupied 
scholars for decades.832 In general, there are three different 
approaches.833 First, there are those who see statutory construction as 
measure] is not helpful in discerning the voter’s intent because it contains inconsistent 
explanations of the purpose of the provision at issue.”). 
830 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 240.086 (2017) (authorizing Employment Relations 
Board to enforce collective bargaining law, rules, and agreements); OR. REV. STAT. 
§ 561.020(1) (2017) (providing Department of Agriculture with “full responsibility and
authority for all the inspectional, regulatory and market development work provided for
under the provisions of all statutes which the department is empowered and directed to
enforce”); OR. REV. STAT. § 673.730(1) (2017) (authorizing Board of Tax Practitioners to
enforce statutes governing the qualifications of tax preparers); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 684.155(1)(b) (2017) (authorizing Board of Chiropractic Examiners to enforce statutes
governing the qualifications of chiropractors).
831 See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 183.400 (2017) (judicial review of validity of rules); OR. 
REV. STAT. § 183.480 (2017) (judicial review of agency orders). 
832 Early commentary on the subject includes JOHN LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
PROCESS 14053 (1938); 4 KENNETH DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 30.00–
30.14 (1958); and L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 546–94 
(1965). More recent commentary includes Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and 
the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 452 (1989); Philip 
Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1187 (2016); Kristin E. Hickman & 
Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 
1235 (2007); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?: Implied Delegations, Agency 
Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 735 (2002); John F. 
Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of 
Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612 (1996); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Deference to 
Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969 (1992); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Democratizing the 
Administrative State, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 559 (2006). 
833 See, e.g., MICHAEL ASIMOW, ARTHUR EARL BONFIELD & RONALD M. LEVIN, 
STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 557–64 (2d ed. 1998) (identifying three 
734 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97, 583 
essentially a question of law, which the courts are best equipped to 
answer without any deference to an agency’s prior interpretations.834 
Second, there are those who view the legislature’s delegation of 
responsibility to an administrative agency to interpret statutes as 
imparting a measure of interpretive authority, to which the courts 
should defer so long as the interpretation is reasonable.835 Third, there 
are those who take a sort of middle position that in cases in which an 
agency brings a substantial measure of expertise to bear, courts should 
defer to administrative agency interpretations.836 
Oregon law started out in the middle position, but then it more or 
less gravitated in the direction of the first position. Courts now treat 
statutory construction largely—but not exclusively—as a question of 
law requiring no deference to agency interpretations.837 Here’s how 
that happened. 
The seminal case is Springfield Education Association v. Springfield 
School District No. 19.838 In that case, the Oregon Supreme Court 
explained that the extent to which a court must defer to an 
administrative agency’s statutory interpretation depends on the nature 
of the wording that the agency interpreted.839 The court classified 
statutory words and phrases into three categories, each of which 
triggered a different degree of deference: 
categories of deference to administrative agency interpretations: strong, weak, and none). 
But see Michael Pappas, No Two-Stepping in the Laboratories: State Deference Standards 
and Their Implications for Improving the Chevron Doctrine, 39 MCGEORGE L. REV. 977, 
985 n.26 (2008) (arguing for four classifications). 
834 As the Delaware Supreme Court explained in Public Water Supply Co. v. 
DiPasquale, 735 A.2d 378, 382–83 (Del. 1999), “Statutory interpretation is ultimately the 
responsibility of the courts. . . . A reviewing court will not defer to such an interpretation as 
correct merely because it is rational or not clearly erroneous.” 
835 This is often referred to as “strong” deference and is associated with Chevron U.S.A. 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). See, e.g., Thomas W. 
Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 835 (2001); Jim Rossi, 
Respecting Deference: Conceptualizing Skidmore Within the Architecture of Chevron, 42 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1105, 1117 (2001). 
836 This brand of deference to agency interpretations is often associated with Skidmore 
v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944) and is known as “weak” deference. See, e.g., Michael
Asimow, The Scope of Judicial Review of Decisions of California Administrative Agencies,
42 UCLA L. REV. 1157, 1194–98 (1995); Colin Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the
Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 565 (1985).
837 See infra text at notes 839–41. 
838 290 Or. 217, 621 P.2d 547 (1980). 
839 Id. at 222–23, 621 P.2d at 552. 
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1. Exact Terms
The first class is of statutory terms which impart relatively precise
meaning, e.g., 21 years of age, male, 30 days, Class II farmland, 
rodent, Marion County. Their applicability in any particular case 
depends upon agency factfinding. . . . 
2. Inexact Terms
The second class is of terms which are less precise. Whether
certain things are included will depend upon what the user intended 
to communicate or accomplish by the use of the word. To determine 
the intended meaning of inexact statutory terms, in cases where their 
applicability may be questionable, courts tend to look to extrinsic 
indicators such as the context of the statutory term, legislative 
history, a cornucopia of rules of construction, and their own intuitive 
sense of the meaning which legislators probably intended to 
communicate by use of the particular word or phrase. . . . An agency 
interpretation may be given an appropriate degree of assumptive 
validity if the agency was involved in the legislative process or if we 
infer that it has expertise based upon qualifications of its personnel 
or because of its experience in the application of the statute to varying 
facts. Judicial deference, however, is not automatic or unreasoning. 
If a statute must be interpreted to determine its applicability to the 
facts of a contested case, then, it is necessary for the agency to 
express in its order, to the degree appropriate to the magnitude or 
complexity of the contested case, its reasoning demonstrating the 
tendency of the order to advance the policy embodied in the words of 
the statute. Explicit reasoning will enable the court on judicial review 
to give an appropriate degree of credence to the agency 
interpretation. . . .  
3. Delegative Terms
The third class of statutory terms . . . express non-completed
legislation which the agency is given delegated authority to complete. 
The legislature may use general delegative terms because it cannot 
foresee all the situations to which the legislation is to be applied and 
deems it operationally preferable to give to an agency the authority, 
responsibility and discretion for refining and executing generally 
expressed legislative policy. . . . The delegation of responsibility for 
policy refinement under such a statute is to the agency, not to the 
court. The discretionary function of the agency is to make the choice 
and the review function of the court is to see that the agency’s 
decision is within the range of discretion allowed by the more general 
policy of the statute.840 
Thus, Springfield adopted a nuanced approach to the issue of deference. 
An exact term involved no deference, an inexact term could involve 
840 Id. at 223–29, 621 P.2d at 553–56. 
736 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97, 583 
deference depending on the agency’s expertise, and a delegative term 
accorded an agency considerable deference. 
The fly in the ointment was PGE. Recall that the issue in PGE was 
whether an administrative agency, the Bureau of Labor and Industries, 
correctly construed the parental leave statute to permit employees to 
use accrued sick leave as parental leave.841 What the supreme court in 
PGE should have done is first classify the statutory phrase under 
Springfield and then determine the amount of deference, if any, to be 
given to the agency’s interpretation. The problem was the court didn’t 
do that—it didn’t even mention Springfield. Instead, the court 
announced its new template for statutory construction analysis, applied 
it, and determined the meaning of the statute on its own without any 
reference to deference. 
Decisions immediately following PGE didn’t clarify matters. The 
court continued to cite Springfield in agency cases.842 In Gage v. City 
of Portland,843 for example, the court referred to its earlier opinion for 
the proposition that “judicial deference to an administrative agency’s 
interpretation of a statutory term may be appropriate.”844 Yet in other 
cases, such as SAIF Corp. v. Allen, the court reviewed the agency’s 
interpretation of an inexact provision of a statute as a matter of law, 
without any explanation as to why the agency was not entitled to 
deference.845 
In the years that followed, mention of deference to agency 
interpretations of inexact terms simply disappeared from the supreme 
court’s decisions.846 Eventually, the court declared that an agency’s 
construction of an inexact term is entitled to no deference.847 The court 
841 See supra text at notes 34–36. 
842 See, e.g., Drew v. Psychiatric Sec. Rev. Bd., 322 Or. 491, 500, 909 P.2d 1211, 1215 
(1996); Holland v. City of Cannon Beach, 323 Or. 148, 151, 915 P.2d 407, 408 (1996); SAIF 
Corp. v. Allen, 320 Or. 192, 209–10, 881 P.2d 773, 782 (1994); Don’t Waste Or. Comm. v. 
Energy Facility Siting Council, 320 Or. 132, 164 n.6, 881 P.2d 119, 137 n.6 (1994) (Unis, 
J., dissenting). 
843 319 Or. 308, 877 P.2d 1187 (1994). 
844 Id. at 316, 877 P.2d at 1191. 
845 320 Or. 192, 881 P.2d 773 (1994). 
846 See, e.g., Norden v. State ex rel. Water Res. Dep’t, 329 Or. 641, 645–49, 996 P.2d 
958, 961–63 (2000) (interpreting Administrative Procedure Act without reference to 
Springfield or agency deference); King Estate Winery, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 329 Or. 
414, 418, 988 P.2d 369, 371 (1999) (interpreting state tax law without reference to 
Springfield or agency deference). 
847 See, e.g., Blachana, LLC v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 354 Or. 676, 687, 318 P.3d 
735, 742 (2014) (holding that an agency’s interpretation of an inexact term “is not entitled 
to deference on review”); Schleiss v. SAIF Corp., 354 Or. 637, 642, 317 P.3d 244, 247 
(2014) (“[T]he Director’s construction of the [inexact] statutory term in his rule is not 
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has never explained the disappearance of the “assumptive validity” of 
an agency’s interpretation of an inexact term that Springfield 
mentioned. But there’s no question that it’s gone. 
In other respects, though, Springfield remains relevant. An agency’s 
application of exact terms is still reviewed without interpretive 
deference,848 and an agency’s interpretation of a delegative term is still 
given considerable deference.849 Courts continue to review an agency’s 
interpretation of a delegative term to determine whether the 
interpretation is within the range of discretion allowed by the statute’s 
general policy. 
Of course, that raises the issue of identifying the “range of 
discretion” that the statute allows, which is itself a question of statutory 
construction. The range of discretion is determined by the analytical 
process required by PGE and Gaines, without any deference.850 In fact, 
determining whether a given term is “delegative” in the first place is a 
question of statutory construction. In J.R. Simplot Co. v. Department of 
Agriculture, for example, the company challenged the amount of fees 
that the Department of Agriculture charged to inspect the company’s 
potato-processing operations.851 The statute allowed the department to 
charge fees that were “reasonably necessary to cover the cost of . . . 
inspection and administration.”852 The department argued that what 
entitled to deference on review.”); Bobo v. Kulongoski, 338 Or. 111, 116, 107 P.3d 18, 21 
(2005) (determining whether Department of Administrative Services correctly interpreted 
the state “kicker” law was governed by interpretive principles set forth in PGE); V.L.Y. v. 
Bd. of Parole & Post-Prison Supervision, 338 Or. 44, 53, 106 P.3d 145, 149 (2005) (holding 
that because the statutory terms in dispute were not delegative, the objective is to determine 
their intended meaning by reference to the principles of construction described in PGE); 
Moon v. Gov’t Standards & Practices Comm’n, 198 Or. App. 244, 250, 108 P.3d 112, 115 
(2005) (reviewing agency construction under PGE interpretive principles). 
848 See, e.g., Coast Sec. Mortg. Corp. v. Real Estate Agency, 331 Or. 348, 353, 15 P.3d 
29, 33 (2000) (citing Springfield Educ. Ass’n v. Springfield Sch. Dist. No. 19, 290 Or. 217, 
223, 621 P.2d 547, 552 (1980)). 
849 See, e.g., Bergerson v. Salem-Keizer Sch. Dist., 341 Or. 401, 411–13, 144 P.3d 918, 
924–25 (2006); Qwest Corp. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 205 Or. App. 370, 380, 135 P.3d 321, 
326, review denied, 342 Or. 46 (2006); SAIF Corp. v. Avery, 167 Or. App. 327, 331, 999 
P.2d 1216, 1218 (2000), review denied, 331 Or. 583 (2001); Olney Sch. Dist. 11 v. Olney
Educ. Ass’n, 145 Or. App. 578, 582–83, 931 P.2d 804, 806 (1997).
850 See, e.g., Bergerson, 341 Or. at 413, 144 P.3d 918, 925 (2006) (“Determining the 
general policy of a statute is a matter of statutory construction controlled by the PGE 
framework.”); Hale v. Water Res. Dep’t, 184 Or. App. 36, 41, 55 P.3d 497, 500 (2002) 
(“Determining the general policy expressed in the statute is itself a matter of statutory 
construction.”). 
851 340 Or. 188, 190, 131 P.3d 162, 163 (2006). 
852 Id. at 196, 131 P.3d at 166 (quoting OR. REV. STAT. § 632.940 (2001)) (emphasis 
omitted). 
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was “reasonably necessary” was a matter delegated to its discretion. 
The court disagreed: 
In our view . . . the phrase “reasonably necessary to cover the cost of 
inspection and administration” is not so general as to constitute a 
delegative term, because it does more than simply set a generally 
expressed legislative policy for the department to pursue. Instead, 
that phrase tells the department how to pursue the policy objective of 
funding an inspection program: It is to do so by setting fees that bear 
a defined relationship with the likely range of costs for the program. 
The department may determine what the cost of inspection and 
administration likely will be, and then it must set the fees at a level 
that will “cover” those costs. Therefore, that phrase is an “inexact 
term” that expresses a complete legislative policy, and we review the 
department’s action to determine whether it effectuated that 
policy.853 
In Oregon Occupational Safety & Health Division v. CBI Services, 
Inc., the court attempted to articulate a set of factors that explain when 
a given term is “delegative” in nature.854 The court named four factors: 
1) Is the term in dispute like one of those the court already has
concluded is delegative? 2) Is the term defined by statute or instead
readily susceptible to multiple interpretations? 3) Does the term in
dispute require the agency to engage in policy determination or make
value judgments, as opposed to simply interpreting the statute? 4) Is
there anything in the larger statutory context that suggests the
legislature did not intend the term to be delegative?855
C. Interpreting Federal Statutes
State courts are often required to interpret federal statutes.856 In such 
cases, PGE and Gaines don’t apply, as those decisions govern only the 
interpretation of Oregon statutes. When state courts interpret federal 
statutes, they must apply federal rules of statutory construction. For 
example, in Friends of the Columbia Gorge, Inc. v. Columbia River 
Gorge Commission,857 the supreme court was tasked with reviewing 
the Columbia River Gorge Commission’s interpretation of the federal 
853 Id. at 197–98, 131 P.3d at 167 (emphasis omitted).  
854 356 Or. 577, 341 P.3d 701 (2014). 
855 Id. at 590, 341 P.3d 708–09. 
856 See, e.g., Etter v. Dep’t of Revenue, 360 Or. 46, 52–53, 377 P.3d 561, 565 (2016) 
(Internal Revenue Code); Emerald Steel Fabricators, Inc. v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 348 
Or. 159, 173–74, 230 P.3d 518, 526–27 (2010) (Controlled Substances Act); Greenhaw v. 
Pacific-Atlantic S.S. Co., 190 Or. 182, 190, 224 P.2d 918, 921–22 (1950) (Jones Act). 
857 346 Or. 366, 213 P.3d 1164 (2009). 
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Columbia River Gorge National Scenic Area Act.858 The question 
arose whether the commission’s interpretations of the act were entitled 
to deference under the federal case law governing deference to 
administrative agency interpretations of federal statutes.859 The court 
concluded that the matter was governed by federal law, and under that 
law, the commission’s interpretations were entitled to deference.860 
The challenge is identifying precisely what the federal statutory 
interpretation rules are. In Friends of the Columbia Gorge, the matter 
was relatively straightforward, as the federal courts have a well-
developed doctrine concerning deference to agency interpretations of 
statutes.861 The same cannot be said of more mundane issues of 
statutory construction.862 The United States Supreme Court has never 
reached agreement about what rules govern the interpretation of federal 
statutes. Justice Breyer, for example, doesn’t recognize a rule 
forbidding consideration of legislative history,863 and he often cites 
such history.864 Justice Ginsburg, likewise, routinely relies on 
legislative history.865 Justice Scalia, on the other hand, famously 
regarded legislative history as illegitimate.866 Justice Thomas 
858 Id. at 369, 213 P.3d at 1167 (citing 16 U.S.C. §§ 544–544p (2012)). 
859 Id. at 377–78, 213 P.3d at 1171–72. 
860 Id. at 384, 213 P.3d at 1175.  
861 Literally hundreds of articles have been written about the United States Supreme 
Court’s doctrine of deference to administrative agency construction. For an introduction to 
the topic, see generally David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 
2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201; Evan J. Criddle, Chevron’s Consensus, 88 B.U. L. REV. 1271 
(2008); David M. Hasen, The Ambiguous Basis of Judicial Deference to Administrative 
Rules, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 327 (2000); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, 
Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 (2001). 
862 As professors Henry Hart and Albert Sacks famously complained of federal courts a 
half-century ago, “The hard truth of the matter is that American courts have no intelligible, 
generally accepted, and consistently applied theory of statutory construction.” HENRY M. 
HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING 
AND APPLICATION OF THE LAW 1169 (William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey eds. 1994). 
Scholars agree that complaint continues to apply. See generally Sydney Foster, Should 
Courts Give Stare Decisis Effect to Statutory Interpretation Methodology?, 96 GEO. L.J. 
1863, 1866 (2008). 
863 See generally Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting 
Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992). 
864 See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432, 442–43 (2012). 
865 See, e.g., Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1081 (2015). 
866 Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The greatest 
defect of legislative history is its illegitimacy.”). 
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apparently agrees with Scalia,867 and it appears that Justice Kavanaugh 
may as well.868  
Courts in Oregon tend to fudge when describing the rules of federal 
statutory construction. Usually, the courts will adopt a vague 
formulation that refers to the text, context, and legislative history. In 
Etter v. Department of Revenue, for instance, the court explained that 
“[i]n interpreting a statute, the federal courts may examine the statute’s 
text, its structure, and its legislative history.”869 Obviously, this 
explanation is a bit of oversimplification. But then, given that the 
United States Supreme Court has proven itself incapable of settling on 
the applicable rules, it’s not clear to me what else the state courts are 
supposed to do. 
CONCLUSION 
The Oregon courts have devoted a great deal of attention to the 
principles that govern the interpretation of statutes. They’ve had to, as 
so much of the law today is governed by statutes. PGE marked the 
beginning of that effort. The decision attempted to impose some order 
on the chaos of case law that had existed before then. It was a flawed 
beginning, to be sure. PGE properly emphasized the importance of a 
statute’s text, but it significantly limited reliance on legislative history 
for less than persuasive reasons, harkening back to the early twentieth-
century “plain meaning rule.”870 With Gaines, though, statutory 
construction became somewhat less artificial without sacrificing the 
appropriate emphasis on the limitations of a statute’s text.871 At the 
same time, the courts have begun to examine more carefully the 
individual rules, describing the rules’ underlying rationales and 
limitations. The result is a reasonably coherent approach to statutory 
867 Lawson v. FMR LLC, 134 S. Ct. 1158, 1176 (2014) (Scalia, J., joined by Thomas, 
J., concurring) (“I do not endorse, however, the Court’s occasional excursions beyond the 
interpretive terra firma of text and context, into the swamps of legislative history.”). 
868 Edith Roberts, Potential Nominee Profile: Brett Kavanaugh, SCOTUSBLOG (June 
28, 2018, 5:48 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2018/06/potential-nominee-profile-brett-
kavanaugh/. 
869 360 Or. 46, 52, 377 P.3d 561, 565 (2016); see also Friends of the Columbia Gorge, 
Inc. v. Columbia River Gorge Comm’n, 346 Or. 366, 378, 213 P.3d 1164, 1172 (2009) 
(“examining the text, context, and legislative history of the statute”); Corp. of the Presiding 
Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. City of West Linn, 338 Or. 
453, 463, 111 P.3d 1123, 1128 (2005) (“Federal courts generally determine the meaning of 
a statute by examining its text and structure and, if necessary, its legislative history.”). 
870 See supra text at notes 45–46. 
871 See supra text at notes 106–07. 
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construction. It isn’t perfect. It’s predicated on a number of fictions—
though commonly accepted and arguably unavoidable fictions in light 
of the emphasis on the subjective intentions of the legislature. There is 
more work to be done. For example, the court would do well to spell 
out more clearly the role of legislative “rules” of construction such as 
those codified in chapter 174 of the Oregon Revised Statutes. The case 
law also still contains annoying inconsistencies, though I’m pleased to 
say they are only occasional. 
My hope is that this Article helps to make Oregon’s approach to 
statutory construction understandable and the rules involved more 
accessible. Because statutory construction is such an integral part of 
modern law, business, and public administration, everyone should 
comprehend the rules involved and be able to predict, with some 
measure of confidence, what appellate courts will do in statutory 
construction cases. 
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